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FOREWORD
Since the end of World War II, the United States
has made maintaining a favorable balance of power
in Eurasia a core element of its national security strategy. It did so in good measure by maintaining a large
conventional military force that was based not only
at home, but also in bases spread across Europe and
Asia. That strategy was buttressed by developing security ties and alliances with key powers and frontline states. The implicit bargain was that the United
States would help keep the peace on their door front
if they would provide access from which American
forces could operate and, in turn, maintain credible
forces themselves to reinforce and support U.S. efforts
at keeping the great power peace.
The question raised by this collection of essays is:
Is that bargain unraveling? As the following chapters
note, since the end of the great power threat posed by
the Soviet Union, both the United States and its principal allies have seen fit to cut the size of their forces
substantially and, in most cases, slowed efforts at replacing military systems and platforms. The quandary many of America’s allies have faced is, on the one
hand, reforming their militaries to make them more
expeditionary and useful for addressing various security problems—such as piracy, terrorism, and the instability brought about by collapsing regimes. On the
other hand, not having the political resources at home
to prioritize defense spending in the face of domestic
demands and, more recently, faltering economies are
also problems that need to be considered. The result is
smaller, half-modernized militaries with often significant gaps in key capabilities.
The strategic problem is that, while its allies and
partners have shrunk their militaries, so too has the
vii

United States. It no longer retains a military sized to
handle multiple major contingencies at once as it once
did and is now facing the prospect of not only continuing to deal with large-scale disorder within the
Middle East but also the problematic behavior of two
major military powers, China and Russia. In short, at
a time when the United States needs the most help, the
prospects for receiving it, with the exception of a few
allies, look more worrisome than at any point since
perhaps the immediate aftermath of World War II.
A Hard Look at Hard Power provides in-depth analysis of the state of key allied militaries. It could not be
more timely.
		

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Gary J. Schmitt
Since World War II, a key element of America’s
grand strategy has been its worldwide network of
strategic allies and partners. This network has provided the United States with the framework for sustaining its global presence, enhanced deterrence against
adversaries in key regions of the world, and, when
called upon, provided men and materiel necessary
to fight wars. Indeed, since the fall of the Berlin Wall,
with one exception—the U.S. invasion of Panama in
December 1989—American forces have not engaged
in a major conflict without allies fighting alongside
them. Although, in the words of Bill Clinton administration Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the
United States might be “the indispensable nation,” as
a matter of practice, America is so in conjunction with
its security partners.1
This practice is grounded in four simple considerations. The first and most straightforward is that
allies might have capabilities that increase the overall “punching power” of a given military campaign.
Second, allied militaries, even when requiring the assistance of U.S. enablers, will often reduce the overall
burden on U.S. forces. Third, and related to the second
consideration, is that, when confronted with two major military campaigns as in Iraq and Afghanistan in
the last decade, the United States required additional
forces to sustain both campaigns simultaneously. As a
matter of “economy of force,” allied militaries helped
“hold” Afghanistan against the Taliban as the body
of American military forces turned their attention to
1

the main action in Iraq from 2003 to 2009. And, finally, although U.S. administrations routinely claim the
prerogative of acting unilaterally to address threats to
U.S. security, the American body politic prefers to act
in conjunction with allies—especially democratic allies—when engaging in military operations. It does so
for the simple reason that the American public and its
leaders believe that coalitions of like-minded liberal
governments confers a degree of legitimacy on such
operations that unilateral action is short of. Whether
this is necessarily the case—and, arguably, unilateral
actions can be just as legitimate as those undertaken
under “collective security” arrangements in certain
circumstances—the political and diplomatic reality is
that the United States favors going to war with other
democracies.
Despite this preference for coalitions, following
the end of the Cold War and the existential threat
posed by the Soviet Union and its Iron Curtain allies,
increasingly less attention was paid to America’s allies—especially their “hard power” capabilities—in
the 1990s. Everyone, including the United States, was
busy collecting on the “peace dividend” that seemed
to flow from the fact that the West was no longer facing a military superpower. To be sure, there were new
missions for our European allies, such as in the Balkans and Africa, but those missions did not require
militaries of the scale that had previously been under
arms. Moreover, savings from cutting the size of the
militaries could then be put to modernizing and reshaping them; it would be a “win-win” for America’s
security partners. Except it was not.
New platforms cost more than expected. Personnel costs for all-volunteer forces continued to rise,
and governments continued to expand domestic so-
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cial programs, squeezing out what little budget space
remained for defense spending. Compounding these
problems for allies who joined the fight in either Iraq
or Afghanistan, or both, was the reality that those campaigns were prolonged, “boots-on-the-ground” intensive, and required equipment and platforms unique to
those fights. Toss in economies hard hit by the “great
recession” of 2008 and the lackluster recoveries that
followed, and one has a recipe for an even further
decline in the hard power capabilities of key allies.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies’
continued effort to try to “do more with less” has resulted in a decade-long series of complaints from senior U.S. officials that too many of our allies have not
kept to the 2002 agreed-upon benchmark of spending
a minimum of 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. Nor is this a problem confined
to NATO and Europe. Key Asian security partners—
South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Australia—fall
below the 2 percent line, as well.
As justified as those complaints are and as useful
as it is for generally measuring a country’s defense
burden, focusing on military spending as a percentage of GDP is insufficient for fully understanding
each country’s military-strategic plans, capacities, and
outlook. The chapters which follow, commissioned
over the past few years by the Marilyn Ware Center
for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, are intended to fill in that gap.
The chapters, written by country and security experts,
examine current and planned defense budgets, troop
strengths, deployable capabilities, procurement programs, research and development efforts, doctrinal
updates, and strategic guidance documents in an ef-
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fort to provide an accurate, well-rounded account of
various key allies’ hard power capabilities.
In addition to the country-specific chapters, there
are also chapters that provide an overview of NATO
land, air, and maritime forces, and a chapter discussing the possibilities and limitations of the attempt to
squeeze more capabilities of allied militaries through
“smart defense” and “pooling” initiatives.
This focus on “hard power” is not intended to
shortchange the utility of “soft power”—what Harvard professor Joseph Nye has described as being the
ability to attract rather than coerce other states into
doing what you want. But, as we have seen in Eastern
Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia in recent years,
the absence of military capabilities or the strategy to
deploy them effectively can create regional dynamics that invite instability or, worse, a vacuum that soft
power cannot fill by itself.
Having a fuller understanding of allied military
capabilities, plans, and strategies is becoming even
more important as the U.S. Government cuts its own
defense budget and force structure. For American
policymakers and strategists, knowing what relative assistance allies and partners can provide now
and in the future, will only grow in importance. The
chapters that follow are intended to deepen that
understanding.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1
1. Madeleine Albright, Interview on NBC-TV, The Today Show
with Matt Lauer, February 19, 1998, available from www.state.
gov/1997-2001-NOPDFS/statements/1998/980219a.html.
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CHAPTER 2
ITALIAN HARD POWER:
AMBITIONS AND FISCAL REALITIES1
Gary J. Schmitt

KEY POINTS
•	Although Italy has the eighth largest economy
in the world, its military capabilities fall short
of key allied countries of similar size and economic strength because of its government’s
long-term failure to increase its defense budget.
•	Facing severe fiscal constraints, the Italian government has issued a new round of defense
spending cuts that has substantially lowered
overall force structure, but which the government hopes will still allow for continued
modernization of its forces.
•	The question going forward is whether the regional and global ambitions Rome once had for
its military will diminish as its forces contract.
Although recent headlines have highlighted Italy’s
dire fiscal situation, its defense capabilities have been
in decline since well before the latest economic crisis.
For Americans who grew up reading about the sometimes poor performance of Italian forces in World War
II or watching movies set in Rome in which the theme
is la dolce vita, perhaps this comes as no surprise.
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However, Italy remains one of the world’s leading
economies; it had the eighth largest gross domestic
product (GDP) in 2011.2 Indeed, in terms of the size
of its economy and population, the two nations Italy
most resembles are France and the United Kingdom
(UK). But, in terms of willingness to turn these attributes into hard military power, Rome falls short of
benchmarks set by Paris and London.
As Figure 2-1 elucidates, Italy’s defense burden
(measured as a percentage of GDP), while never high
in the past, has declined even more in recent years.3
As a percentage of GDP, Italy’s defense burden has
dropped substantially from what it was just a decade
ago—and well below the 2 percent minimum that
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies agreed to try to obtain at the alliance summit in
Prague in 2002.

Source: Data derived from “Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione per la Difesa per l’Anno” (“Additional Note to the Defense
Budget for the Year”), 2003-2011/2012. Data expressed in current
prices.

Figure 2-1. Italy’s Defense Expenditure as a
Percentage of GDP.
6

Although both France and the UK have also seen
defense spending decline, Italy’s per-capita expenditure on defense, according to the Italian defense ministry, lags significantly behind that of its NATO allies
(see Figure 2-2). On the face of it, Italy is punching
well below its weight (see Figure 2-3).

Source: Data Derived from “Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione per la Defesa” (2003-2011/2012). Data expressed in current
prices.

Figure 2-2. Defense Spending per Capita (€).
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Source: Data derived from International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance, 1991-2012, London, UK: Arundel
House.

Figure 2-3. Base Defense Budget (Millions €).
Nor is Italy’s defense budget picture improving.
According to the Italian defense ministry, its base
defense budget [Funzione Difesa (FD)]—never large
to begin with—will fall to €13.6 billion this year (see
Figure 2-4).4
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Source: “Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione per la Difesa
per l’Anno 2012” (“Additional Note to the Defense Budget for the
Year 2012”), p. 140.

Figure 2-4. Italian Base Defense Budget
(Millions €).
Compared to the FD average of the previous 4
years (2008–11), this amounts to a cut of some 7 percent. Significantly, the “investment” (procurement)
portion of the budget for 2012 has been shorn by 25
percent from the previous 4 years and has seen a drop
of nearly 30 percent from 2011 to 2012 alone.
Also important is the reduction in funds allotted
to Italy’s Ministry of Economic Development, which
subsidizes Italian defense research and development
and procurement programs, as well as a 30 percent
reduction in funds for military operations abroad.
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Under new austerity measures, Italy will reduce its
defense budget by €3 billion over the next 3 years.5
ITALY’S STRATEGIC VISION
Any analysis of Italian grand strategy faces one
overriding difficulty: there is no systematic production by the government of national-level strategy
papers. To the extent that strategic documents have
been issued, more often than not, they have been at
the initiative of individual ministers rather than an established policy planning process.
That said, there have been various government
papers issued over the past decade that allow one to
tease out Italy’s strategic ambitions, and the military—
the government believes—is required to obtain them.
The most relevant documents of this sort have been
the 2001 defense ministry’s New Forces for a New Century; the post–September 11, 2001 (9/11) Defense White
Paper, issued by the ministry in 2002; the 2005 Defense
Chief of Staff’s Strategic Concept paper; the defense
staff’s 2005 Investing in Security: The Armed Forces, An
Evolving Tool; and the defense ministry’s annual Addendum to the Defense Budget, which attempts to give
strategic and political context to the approved budget,
as well as provide details on specific accounts within
the budget.
The 2001 document was the first formal paper of
its kind produced by the Italian defense ministry since
the end of the Cold War—indeed, it was the first since
the mid–1980s.6 The paper notes the obvious but important point that Italy will not be facing a conventional military threat to its homeland anytime soon.
But it couples that fact with the assertion that Italy’s
interests are “quite broad,” ranging from Southeast-
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ern Europe to the Caucasus, from the Horn of Africa
to the Maghreb, and that Italy’s military contribution
to collective security and stabilization efforts in recent
years has ranged far, wide, and outside the areas directly affecting Italy’s own strategic national interest.7
New Forces offers up a relatively ambitious strategic
outlook, including Italy potentially having the capability to take the lead in military operations. To meet
those ambitions, the paper notes that Italy will need
to progress in creating an all-professional military,
work with allied countries to develop and produce a
plethora of new weapons systems, and increase its defense expenditures from 1.5 to 2.0 percent of GDP. The
post–Cold War “peace dividend” had to end if Italy’s
military was going to be able to handle the expected
increased involvement in multilateral (NATO- and
European Union [EU]-led) military operations, and do
so as a capable allied force.
The 2002 white paper was published in the wake
of the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the subsequent removal of the Taliban-led government from
power in Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, the paper
pays particular attention to the then-emerging threat
of Islamist terrorism and, similar to the previous
year’s document, emphasizes the military’s need to
operate abroad in concert with allies or under the auspices of the United Nations. With the recent conflict
in the Balkans and Afghanistan being on the defense
ministry’s mind, stabilization missions were at the
forefront, leading, among other things, to a potentially enhanced role for the Carabinieri—Italy’s national
military police force—in peacekeeping operations.
As in 2001, the 2002 white paper reemphasized the
need to reform and modernize the Italian military. It
noted that the air force was short on modern fighters
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and even missiles for its planes. It also pointed out that
much of the navy fleet was aging, and advocated accelerating the transition to an all-professional Italian
military, with a total active duty level for the armed
forces set at 190,000, and 12 to 13 smaller but more
capable army brigades. To help pay for this transformation, the white paper hoped to find savings in
lower overall force structure and a new level of allied
defense industrial cooperation to reduce costs while
simultaneously increasing interoperability.8
The 2005 Strategic Concept paper was not a substantial break from previous papers, but it did attempt to
provide a somewhat fuller account of the military tasks
confronting a European power in the post–Cold War,
post–9/11 era. The paper claimed that, in addition to
traditional requirements such as protecting the homeland, Italy faces threats that are increasingly “multilayered and unpredictable,” requiring a preemptive
military capability and a capacity to intervene rapidly
even when the threat is some distance from Italy.9
Italian forces will thus need to act more jointly and,
more often than not, in concert with allied militaries.
To do so, the military will require enhanced command
and control capabilities, surveillance assets, mobility, logistic support, and precision-guided weaponry.
The Italian military should aim for a qualitative improvement of its capabilities that are more in line with
NATO’s leading powers and that allow the military to
address the wide range of security problems it might
be asked to address.
After the Strategic Concept paper, the defense staff’s
Investing in Security paper was published.10 With its
focus on the likely requirements for the Italian military over the next 15 years, the document drills down
even further than the Strategic Concept paper in its
matching of specific scenarios with force require12

ments. It lays out what capabilities it would need to
secure “national spaces” and an immediate-reaction
expeditionary (land, air, and naval) force that could
act as an independent entry force, operate alone for 30
days if necessary, and for 6 months as part of a larger
multinational operation.11
Also useful for understanding Italy’s strategic
posture or, more specifically, the connection between
the country’s ambitions and the military resources it
is willing to apply are the yearly Nota Aggiuntiva allo
Stato di Previsione per la Difesa (Additional Note to the
Defense Budget). The “Additional Note” to the defense budget is sent to the Italian parliament under
the signature of the defense minister and provides an
overview of how the ministry views the overall security situation and, in turn, its plans and programs for
the military to meet its security objectives.
Starting with the Nota Aggiuntiva for the 2001
budget—a document released in October 2000—and
ending with the Nota Aggiuntiva for 2012, Italy’s post–
Cold War view of the security environment has been
relatively stable. The notes first and foremost recognize that Italy faces no conventional military threat
of any consequence to its homeland. However, since
the late-1990s, Italian governments of both the left
and right perceive Italy’s security as being affected by
instability in the Balkans, North Africa, the Horn of
Africa, the Middle East, the Mediterranean Basin, and,
since the 9/11 attacks, even farther afield.
Hence, the country’s security problems are “multidimensional” and of “undefined contours.”12 This, in
turn, requires, as note after note suggests, a military
that is deployable, flexible, sustainable for extended
periods, and modernized so as to be capable of operating in conjunction with top-line forces of both NATO
and the EU.
13

Indeed, at the turn of the century, in the 2001 note,
Italy was not shy about its ambitions. With plans to
begin reversing the “peace dividend” cuts to the military that took place throughout the 1990s, Minister of
Defense Sergio Mattarella declared that Italy’s global
“credibility” had grown, making Italy “one of the
leading” countries in NATO and the EU, as well as,
he pointed out, being the fourth largest contributor to
UN peacekeeping missions.13
With more than 8,000 of its military deployed
abroad—ranging from operations in the Balkans to a
stabilization mission in East Timor—Italy was asserting itself in a manner that allowed it to increasingly
play a role in that group of nations driving international affairs. The 2001 bump in defense spending was
only the first step, the note argued, in Italy’s military
acquiring the kind of capabilities needed to match its
ambitions and ensuring that it would not be a “mere
spectator” in addressing future security problems.14
Indeed, by 2006, more than 10,500 of Italy’s military were deployed abroad, including to Iraq and Afghanistan. While the numbers were “unprecedented”
for post–World War II Italy, the note also stipulated
that, in light of the generally unpredictable security environment, those numbers could no longer be
thought of as “unusual.”15
Of course, increasing deployments abroad, while
at the same time modernizing Italian forces, required
greater resources for Italy to fulfill its new strategic
ambitions. As with most European states following
the end of the Cold War, Italy had made deep cuts
in its defense budget. The increase in defense spending in 2001 was meant to be the first step in reversing course and, eventually, putting Italy on par with
France and the UK when it came to defense spending
and military credibility.
14

According to the note attached to the 2002 budget, the goal was to have the base defense budget
(FD) equal 1.5 percent of GDP and then be sustained
there.16 At that level, the FD would be more or less
aligned with other “major” European allies. However,
this would require a change in Italian spending priorities since, in 2002, the FD was less than 1.1 percent of
the country’s GDP.
Even with the slight bump in resources in 2002,
however, the increase in personnel costs was squeezing the training, maintenance, and investment accounts. Indeed, by 2006, more than 70 percent of the
base defense budget was going to personnel costs—far
from the “model” allocation in which 50 percent goes
to personnel costs, 25 percent is spent on maintaining
the force, and 25 percent is spent on procurement and
recapitalization.
Further complicating matters was the fact that, between 2002 and 2006, the defense budget was cut every year. By 2006, the base defense budget was down
to 0.82 percent of GDP, and the ministry began announcing delays in modernization plans and increasing problems in sustaining the overall readiness of the
force. After an increase in the defense budget in 2007—
but, according to the note, just enough of one to support the most pressing operational requirements for
overseas operations and to “only partially allow” the
ministry to deal with “the already difficult” problem
of too few resources—the tsunami of the global economic crisis hit.17 By 2009, the note was warning that,
if the downward direction of the budget continued,
the ministry would have to slash the size of its force
by tens of thousands, plans for modernization would
dramatically slow, and “important programs” would
need to be “reduced or postponed.”18 The trend has
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not been reversed, and, as predicted in the 2012 note,
the ministry has formalized plans to shrink the Italian
military by 40,000 and cut back or delay procurement
programs designed to modernize Italy’s military.
In short, since 2007, resources for training and
modernization have dropped by over 40 percent and
30 percent, respectively. Like other European states
that are reducing numbers of people and platforms,
the pledge is that Italy’s military will be “of smaller
dimensions but with higher quality.”19 Whether that
will happen remains to be seen.
But the ambitions Italy set for itself a little more
than a decade ago cannot, as the ministry itself made
clear from the start, be fulfilled in the absence of a sustained increase in defense funds. In this context, was
the fact that Italy was forced to withdraw its aircraft
carrier—the Garibaldi—from ongoing NATO operations against Libya in July 2011 in order to cut costs
the low point from which the Italian forces will now
move forward, or a harbinger of things to come?20
ITALY’S MILITARY ABROAD
Italy’s military during the Cold War was principally focused on defending the country itself. This
strategic posture was reinforced by the fact that, as
one of World War II’s defeated Axis powers, Italy was
reluctant (like post-war Japan and Germany) to be
viewed as believing that its military was for anything
but defending the homeland proper.
To a very limited degree, this attitude toward the
use of the military has changed in Japan in the wake of
9/11. Judging by Berlin’s use of the military in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa over the past
decade and a half, it appears that Germany has modi-
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fied its views about what constitutes a legitimate use
of military force. So too Italy, if judging by the number
of times its military has been involved in operations
outside its borders.21 Italian forces were sent to Iraq
during the first Gulf War, followed shortly thereafter
by a deployment to Somalia, and then to Bosnia. Other
deployments have included operations in Central Africa, East Timor, Mozambique, the Balkans, Iraq again,
Afghanistan, Lebanon, and, most recently, against
Libya, where the Italian Air Force flew air defense
suppression and strike missions and helped enforce
the United Nations (UN)-sanctioned no-fly zone over
the country.
While the activity level of the Italian military has
certainly picked up in recent years, perhaps the origins
of this new attitude toward using the military dates to
1982 when Italy—along with France and the United
States—sent troops into Lebanon in the wake of the
First Lebanon War between Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization and Syria. The deployment
arose because Rome believed that, given its geographic location, Italy should have a more prominent role
in Middle Eastern and Mediterranean security affairs.
But it was not until Italy’s participation in Operation DESERT STORM in 1991—the first time the Italian Air Force had been involved in actual military
operations since World War II—that the rate of the
military’s deployments surged and appeared to open
the door to more kinetic use of force. For example, in
the 1991 Kosovo War air campaign against Yugoslav
forces, Italy was the third largest contributor of aircraft and flew the fourth largest number of sorties by
a NATO member.22
However, more recent deployments present a
mixed picture when it comes to the use of military
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force, especially in the cases of Italian ground contingents sent to Iraq in 2003 after Saddam Hussein was
removed from power, to Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission,
and to Lebanon following the “33-Day War” between
Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. Wary of casualties and
unwilling to provide the extended security rationale
that would be needed to justify Italy’s involvement in
all three missions, successive governments in Rome
have sold these deployments—involving thousands
of Italian soldiers in total—to the Italian public as
“peacekeeping” and “humanitarian” missions. But,
of course, neither the Iraq nor the Afghanistan mission turned out to be the “soft” power, light security
missions the Italians expected.
Iraq.
The Italian military’s deployment to Iraq—which
lasted from June 2003 until November 2006—was certainly as difficult an experience for Italy’s forces as
what they faced in Afghanistan, and undoubtedly reinforced Rome’s inclination to take a cautious operational approach in Afghanistan. Coming on the heels
of the American-led military campaign removing
Saddam Hussein from power—a campaign decidedly
unpopular with the Italian electorate—the decision to
send Italian troops was justified by the government as
an “urgent intervention in favor of the Iraqi people.”
Keeping with this theme, Italy’s defense minister at
the time said the intervention was just the “opposite
of war.”23
But war it was. Just a few short months after deploying almost 3,000 troops to Nasiriyah, a city in Dhi
Qar Province southeast of Baghdad, a lightly protect-
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ed Italian outpost was attacked by a suicide bomber,
which killed 13 Italian military policemen and four
soldiers. In response, the order was given to move
most of Italy’s forces out of the city. This was not going
to be the kind of “peacekeeping” and “stabilization”
operation Italian forces had previously conducted in
the Balkans.
Indeed, throughout the spring of 2004, Italian
forces were engaged in a form of urban warfare with
the Mahdi Army, as this Shia militia attempted to take
advantage of Rome’s decision to reduce its footprint
in the city.24 Lacking firepower, numbers, sufficiently
armored vehicles, and surveillance capabilities, the
best the Italian forces could do was establish a strategic standoff for control of the city. Eventually, the
decision was made to concentrate the vast bulk of Italian troops at Tallil Air Base outside the city. With the
change of government in Rome in April 2006, the decision was made to end the Iraq mission altogether.
Afghanistan.
There is little question that the Italian military’s involvement in Afghanistan has been the largest, most
complex, and most difficult campaign for the country
since World War II. A little over 2 months after the
9/11 attacks, elements of Italy’s navy (an aircraft carrier, two frigates, and a tanker) were steaming toward
the Indian Ocean in support of Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM (OEF). Engaged principally in sea-control
duties and at-sea inspections of suspicious vessels, the
carrier Garibaldi deployed with eight AV-8 (Harrier)
ground-attack jets that flew nearly 300 missions over
Afghanistan. However, Rome had restricted the Harriers’ use to target identification, leaving actual strike
missions to other allied planes.25
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On the ground, Italy’s contribution to ISAF has
recently topped 4,000 troops (see Figure 2-5). In addition, the Italian military assumed overall command of
ISAF from September 2005 to May 2006, took the ISAF
lead in 2005 of the geographically large and forbidding area of western Afghanistan, headed up the Provisional Reconstruction Team in Herat, and contributed forces to several mentoring teams tasked with
training Afghan security forces by partnering with
them in the field.

Source: Data derived from The Military Balance, 2002-12, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK: Arundel House.

Figure 2-5. Deployment of Italian Troops
in Afghanistan.
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While all this information is well known, very little
has been written about combat operations involving
Italian forces. At least initially, this was due to the fact
that the troops sent to Afghanistan were lightly armed
and equipped as though their mission would be
Kosovo-like peacekeeping. Indeed, the original UNsanctioned ISAF mission, as opposed to the OEF effort
to overthrow the Taliban and hunt down al-Qaeda
remnants, was understood as having the more limited
mandate of providing security to support efforts at rebuilding the Afghan state. The last thing Rome wanted to talk about was the idea that “providing security”
might require more robust military operations.
This is not to say that Italian troops have not been
involved in kinetic operations. For example, from
mid–March 2003 to mid–September 2003, a contingent
of 1,000 Italian troops was involved in Operation NIBBIO. Operating out of a base in Paktia, a province on
the border with Afghanistan, the Italian forces were
tasked with helping coalition forces disrupt efforts by
al-Qaeda and the Taliban to reinsert themselves into
this heavily Pashtun area.26
However, the Italian government having sent
them—without helicopters, heavy weaponry, or armored land transport—to eastern Afghanistan, there
was a limit to what Italian forces could do. As a result,
the bulk of their efforts consisted of setting up checkpoints, establishing blocking positions at potential
insurgent escape routes, and conducting intelligencegathering patrols.
Although RC-West (the ISAF designation for the
four provinces of Herat, Farah, Badghis, and Ghor
over which Italy’s military had overall command for
the region) was not a hotbed of Taliban activity by
2006, insurgent activity was increasing in the region.
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But in an area nearly half the size of Italy and containing more than 2.5 million Afghans, the resources the
Italian forces had been provided in manpower, firepower, and transport meant that, even in conjunction
with allied forces in the region, fulfilling the ISAF mission of “securing” the region became an increasingly
improbable task.
As a result of pressure from both its own military
and ISAF allies, Rome did increase the size of the Italian force in RC-West and provided more assistance in
terms of armor, jet aircraft, air transport, unmanned
aerial vehicles, and attack helicopters. This gave the
Italians a greater capacity to engage in blocking operations as the Taliban fled from ISAF operations in
nearby Helmand into RC-West and, in a limited number of cases, to participate in operations designed to
clear pockets of Taliban in their area of responsibility.
Nevertheless, it is also the case that Italian governments—both of the left and the right—have not wanted Italian soldiers to participate in operations in the
more dangerous areas in the south or the east regions
of the country. It was only in 2008 that the Italian government modified its caveat that Rome would have to
approve any and all requests for Italian forces to assist
coalition forces outside of RC-West by lowering the
time allotted for it to respond from 72 hours to 6.
As with other ISAF contributors, Italy has begun
to draw down the numbers deployed to Afghanistan.
Because it is pressed financially, Rome would like to
reduce the Italian deployment by 1,200 over the next
year and gradually wind down force levels to no more
than 800 to 1000 troops in country by the end of 2014,
with 2014 being the year the Afghan government
takes the lead in providing security throughout the
country.27
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Although the Italian military’s experience in Iraq
and Afghanistan can, at best, be described as problematic, there is no question that the deployments
have helped the Italian military in its goal of creating
a more professional force. Working with allies in a
hostile environment far from Italy has forced Italian
forces to “up their game” when it comes to training,
logistics, and field-level modernization.
Whether the same can be said for the Italian policymakers who decide how to employ Italy’s military
abroad and provide the rationale for doing so is a different question. As former chief of Italy’s defense staff
General Mario Arpino pointedly remarked regarding
the mission in Afghanistan: “If Italy participates in
international missions just to be there, to get a little
prestige, but without understanding what the dangers
are . . . we risk doing damage to the interests of our
country.”28
MOVING FORWARD
As noted previously, in 2012, the Italian government proposed plans to restructure its defense effort
to keep it more in line with the resources at hand.
According to the defense ministry’s note for this
year, “Today’s reality [is marked by a] significant
imbalance” between personnel costs and the monies available to keep the military trained, ready, and
modernized.29
The heart of the plan is to reduce personnel costs,
now more than 70 percent of the base defense budget
(see Figure 2-6), by dropping the active duty numbers
authorized from 190,000 to 150,000, and by slicing the
civilian work force to 20,000 from its current 30,000.
With the cut in force structure, expected savings from
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eliminated military overhead and the sale of no-longer-needed infrastructure, the hope is to free up resources for the “investment” and “training” accounts.
If successful, the budget’s general parameters would
be more in line with what the defense ministry calls its
“most significant allies,” meaning 50 percent would
go to personnel, 25 percent to modernization, and 25
percent to training and maintenance.

Source: “Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione per la Defesa
per l’Anno, 2012” (“Additional Note to the Defense Budget for the
Year 2012”), p. 142.

Figure 2-6. Breakdown of the Defense Function
by Spending Area.
In the short term, however, the defense investment
account is taking a beating, with a reduction in spending of 28 percent from 2011 to 2012. (For the individual services and their respective investment budgets,
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this means a cut of 52 percent for the army, 40 percent
for the navy, and 29 percent for the air force.) Given
the 30 percent reduction in defense investments since
2007, the modernization hole is deep and will require
a substantial effort to be dug out of.
Moreover, while the 2012 budget increased spending on operations and maintenance and training by
5.4 percent, since 2007, spending in this area had
fallen by 40 percent—again, a deep hole to climb out
of. According to commander of the Italian joint operations headquarters General Marco Bertolini, if funds
for training were not boosted, Italy would not be able
to undertake another mission like Afghanistan; or, as
the defense ministry itself notes more prosaically, this
year’s increase will still be “insufficient” to meet the
services’ needs.30
As for the Italian Air Force, the budget reductions
have substantially reduced the number of fourth and
fifth generation fighter aircraft it will be flying. A decade ago, the initial goal was to replace Italy’s aging
fleet of F-104s, AMX fighter bombers, and leased F-16s
with a buy of 121 Eurofighter Typhoons, 40 F-35Bs,
and 69 F-35As. The Typhoon order has, however, been
cut back to 96, with some 62 now in service; the F-35B
buy reduced to 15; and the F-35A purchase pared back
by 9.31 Although these new acquisitions will clearly be
an upgrade in individual aircraft capabilities, the fleet
itself has declined from 313 fighter aircraft in 2001
to 220 today and, once the 70 or so multirole, 1970sdesigned Tornadoes are retired from service over the
next decade, the Italian tactical fighter fleet could consist of only 150 aircraft.
The Italian Navy is following a similar path. In
June 2012, navy chief Admiral Luigi Binelli Mantelli
announced that 26 or 28 vessels would be retired over
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the next half-decade. Although new and more capable
platforms will be added to the fleet, overall numbers
will drop as the replacement vessels will not be 1:1
for those withdrawn from service. Indeed, to save the
cost of decommissioning the ships, the government is
looking to sell them at a discount to other countries or,
even, to simply give them away.32 Examples of the cuts
include reducing the submarine force from the current
six to four (about half the number in 2001), dropping
the number of new frigates to be bought from 10 to 6
(leaving the total number of frigates at 10 after seven
or eight older frigates are pulled from service), cutting
minesweepers from 12 to 8, and patrol boats from 18
to 10. Moreover, plans for replacing the retiring carrier Garibaldi and amphibious transport docks with the
much larger carrier Cavour and amphibious assault
ships (LHDs) has been complicated by a reduced buy
of F-35Bs and the freezing of the LHDs’ acquisition.33
The number of army combat brigades has also
shrunk. In 1991, there were 19 combat brigades. By
1997, the number had dropped to 13. Under the new
plan, the combat brigades will go from the current 11
to 9. Concurrently, the Italian army has seen the number of tanks cut by more than half since 2001, with
an equally substantial loss in numbers of field artillery and mortars. Smaller and less “heavy,” the army
hopes to use the savings from fielding a leaner force
to upgrade its fleet of attack helicopters, increase the
capabilities of its special operations forces, and modernize its inventory of land vehicles.
To maximize the effectiveness of its smaller armed
forces, the ministry’s plan is to invest in greater service
jointness; enhanced command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities; a
digitalized (net-centric) land force; and upgraded sur-
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veillance and target acquisition systems for the navy
and air force. And, indeed, other than line items for
expenditures on the F-35 program (€548.7 billion) and
the final two U-212 submarines (€170.7 billion), the two
most expensive programs listed in the defense budget
are for programs involving C4I and ground surveillance (€160 billion) and jointness (€154 billion).33
Even so, the efforts to enhance the effectiveness
of the smaller force despite budget cuts have meant
some important programs have “slipped.” For example, delivery of the last pair of U-212 submarines has
been pushed back a year, while the time frame for the
planned procurement of medium armored vehicles,
multirole helicopters, and various advanced munitions has been shuffled to the right by 2 to 4 years.
This collectively suggests that, even with the substantial cuts in the overall size of the military, the number
of civilian employees, and no-longer-needed military
infrastructure, the margin of error for Minister of Defense Di Paola’s vision of creating a smaller but better
equipped and advanced military is a thin one. Unexpected cost increases for major programs, fewer savings from personnel and infrastructure reductions, or
further cuts in defense spending to address current
deficits in government spending could undercut his
plans for Italy’s military.
CONCLUSIONS
Under current plans, Italy’s military will retain
a wide spectrum of capabilities befitting a mediumsized global power. As such, according to Di Paola,
the government will not only have sufficient “hard
power” to ensure Italy’s own defense, but a range of
military tools from which Rome can pick and choose
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how it will involve the country in operations abroad.
But without strategic airlift and sealift, Italy will, in
most instances, either require a relatively permissive
environment to deploy a substantial number of forces
or the assistance of NATO allies. Moreover, with cuts
in numbers to personnel, platforms, and resources,
Italian policymakers will find they have less discretion in where and when they use the military. While
the forces themselves might be more capable, a smaller military in a tight fiscal environment will inevitably
lead Rome to conserve the capabilities it has.
A decade ago, Rome acted on the unstated but implied quid pro quo that, in exchange for U.S. and allied
assistance in stabilizing the Balkans, ensuring energy
supplies from the Persian Gulf, and keeping Islamist
terrorism at bay, Italy would offer military assistance
in places like Iraq and Afghanistan—locations which
the Italian public, however, did not readily consider
vital to Italy’s national security. This dynamic also fit
Rome’s sense that it could and should play a larger
role on the world stage. But that implicit deal and the
ambition that accompanied it have gradually come
undone in the face of fiscal pressures and the public
sense that Italy did not face the kind of immediate
threats that required maintaining, let alone increasing,
Italy’s defense burden.
However, if the United States follows through on
its decision to focus more of its attention on ensuring
a favorable military balance in the Asia-Pacific region,
and does so by reducing its military footprint in Europe, then countries such as Italy will be expected to
do more in meeting their own security needs. Those
security tasks appear to be growing, not receding. Not
only is Iran’s threat to stability in the Gulf increasing, but the Horn of Africa and large segments of the
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Mediterranean Basin appear less and less stable—all
of which could, and probably will, impact Italy’s security. But with military spending cut to the bone, Italy’s
ability to help address those challenges will likely fall
short not only of what one might expect of a country
its size and economic weight, but also of Rome’s own
ambitions at the century’s turn.
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CHAPTER 3
AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE IN THE ERA
OF AUSTERITY: MIND THE
EXPECTATION GAP1
Andrew Shearer
The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s
and in no way reflect the position of the State Government of Victoria.

KEY POINTS
•	After sustaining a 10 percent cut in 2012, Australia’s defense budget is unlikely to exceed 1.7
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) over
the next 5 years.
•	As China and other regional powers procure
advanced weapons systems, Australia risks
losing its long-standing capability edge in key
categories such as naval warfare and air combat, a risk that will only be exacerbated by future shortfalls in planned spending.
•	Australia must make a commitment to boosting its military capabilities to ensure that it
can make a credible contribution in the unilateral and multilateral defense roles it has signed
up for.
Like many Western countries, Australia looked for
a peace dividend when the Cold War ended. Defense
spending fell, ground forces in particular were cut,
and key capabilities such as strategic lift were allowed
to wither. By the mid-1990s, Australia had only four
undergunned and understrength infantry battalions.
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It made a token contribution (two frigates, a supply
ship, and a handful of medical and other support
personnel) to the first Gulf War in 1991 and provided
peacekeeping forces, most notably in Cambodia. But
the military participated in no major combat operations for more than 2 decades after the Vietnam War.
High-end defense capabilities such as antisubmarine
warfare were starved of funds and training opportunities and were allowed to atrophy.
Before coming to office in 1996, former prime minister John Howard had been a strong critic of the preceding government’s underfunding of defense. At the
start of the Howard government’s tenure, it made extensive spending cuts to restore the national budget to
a surplus, but deliberately quarantined defense. The
real watershed for defense, however, came with Australia’s leadership of the International Force for East
Timor, the regional coalition that in 1999 intervened
to restore order in East Timor.
The East Timor operation was a major military,
diplomatic, and political risk for an Australian government that was relatively inexperienced in international affairs. Notwithstanding a United Nations
mandate for the operation, opposition by rogue Indonesian military units or even inadvertent conflict with
Indonesia could not be ruled out. These outcomes
were avoided, and the operation was judged a success. But the Australian government was alarmed
by the capability gaps revealed by the operation—in
particular, the shortcomings in what was needed to
deploy and sustain a modest expeditionary force even
a short distance from Australia.
The result was the 2000 Australian defense white
paper that committed to grow the defense budget by
an average of 3 percent per year, in real terms, over
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the following decade.2 It outlined a 10-year plan to
boost air, maritime, and strike capabilities and to ensure that Australia could sustain a brigade-sized force
on operations for an extended period, while still having a smaller reserve available for other contingencies. During the Howard government’s years in office,
Australian defense spending increased by 47 percent
in real terms and approached 2 percent as a proportion of GDP.
The 2000 white paper highlighted the importance
of the United States to Asia-Pacific security while also
flagging that China was likely to pose challenges for
the U.S. strategic role in the future. It likewise emphasized that, through the alliance, Australia gained
invaluable access to U.S. military technology, intelligence, and training opportunities. As a result, the
Howard government placed a premium on interoperability with the United States when the government
made major defense acquisition decisions. However,
the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks and the Australian government’s response—which included invoking the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) for the first time and committing
air, naval, and special forces to coalition military
operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban—took
Australia-U.S. military and intelligence cooperation
to a new level.
Australian Defence Force (ADF) participation in
U.S.-led coalition operations in the global war on terror saw Australian air, naval, and special forces operate more closely with their U.S. counterparts than at
any time since Vietnam and across a much larger and
vastly more complex area of operations. The sharing
of intelligence and access to battlefield information
systems between the two countries reached unprec-
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edented levels.3 There were, however, limits to the
ADF’s contribution. Australia lacked the full range of
capabilities, particularly those enablers necessary to
deploy and sustain conventional ground forces at (or
above) battalion strength in major combat or stabilization operations in Afghanistan or Iraq.
In 2007, Kevin Rudd’s government sought to differentiate itself from Howard’s by opposing Australia’s military involvement in Iraq; however, it offset
this by sustaining Australia’s troop contribution in
Afghanistan and by reaffirming its strong support for
the U.S. alliance. The Rudd government’s 2009 defense white paper extended Howard’s 3 percent real
growth spending target to 2017–18.4 It also called for
a “more potent and heavier” maritime force by 2030,
including a fleet of 12 larger and more capable submarines. It also emphasized the need for the ADF to
strengthen its offensive strike capabilities; modernize
its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
systems; and expand its cyber warfare capacity.
In the white paper and the accompanying media briefing, the government clarified that the major
driver of these decisions was the regional uncertainty
caused by China’s rapid military modernization. It
went further than previous Australian governments
in publicly querying the strategic intentions underlying Beijing’s rapid acquisition of blue-water naval
capabilities and in calling for greater transparency regarding China’s defense plans.5
However, the 2009 white paper was undermined
from the outset by a mismatch between strategic aspirations and capacity to pay for them. The document
provided a credible analysis of the regional security
environment and a force structure to match, but the
funding commitments were weakly rooted.6 The doc-
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ument’s strong association with Rudd became a further vulnerability when the Labor Party peremptorily
replaced him as prime minister with Julia Gillard in
June 2010.
The extent of the 2009 white paper’s overreach became obvious in the 2012 budget, when the politically
and fiscally embattled minority Gillard government
slashed defense spending by 10 percent—the largest reduction since the end of the Korean War. This
followed a 5 percent cut the year before.7 A total of
Australian dollars (AUD)5.5 billion was stripped from
the budget over 4 years, including AUD3 billion in reductions for new military equipment and AUD1.2 billion in facilities construction. Equipment procurement
was further reduced by AUD2.9 billion as a result of
government reallocations. Consequently, Australia’s
defense spending fell to 1.56 percent of GDP—the
lowest level since 1938. Faced with this obvious gap
in strategic vision and available resources, the Gillard
government moved up the scheduled 5-year defense
review from 2014 to 2013.
2013: PAPERING OVER THE CHASM
The defense planners who drafted the 2013 white
paper faced the unenviable task of repairing the view
that the government was not serious about the country’s defenses. However, the paper’s proximity to the
forthcoming Australian election on September 7, 2013,
means it has inevitably been interpreted as a political
as much as a strategic document.
The 2013 white paper’s greatest distinguishing
factor is its tone regarding China’s growing regional
influence. In contrast to its 2009 predecessor, the newest paper proclaims that “Australia welcomes China’s
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rise” and, rather defensively, that “the Government
does not approach China as an adversary.”8 While acknowledging that “China’s defence budget continues
to record significant year-on-year increases,” it describes China’s ensuing rapid military m
 odernization
as “a natural and legitimate outcome of its economic
growth.”9 It highlights the China–U.S. relationship as
the single most important determinant of Australia’s
strategic environment in coming decades and forecasts that a degree of Sino-American competition is
inevitable.
But the 2013 paper concludes (without much compelling evidence) that “Australia sees the most likely
future as one in which the United States and China
are able to maintain a constructive relationship encompassing both competition and cooperation.”10 It
also emphasizes Australia’s commitment to pursue
“strong and positive” defense relations with China,
including annual defense talks, ministerial-level
strategic discussions, working-level exchanges, and
humanitarian and disaster-relief exercises.11
The message was not lost on Beijing: a Chinese
foreign ministry spokeswoman said the white paper
shows “respect” for Australia’s relationship with
China and expressed hope that it marked a “turning
point” in Australian attitudes.12 China’s continued
maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea and
in waters disputed with Japan, as well as the Australian public’s deep-seated ambivalence about aspects
of China’s rise, mean that this is unlikely.13 But the
fact that Australia has toned down its official public
position on China’s military modernization represents a significant tactical victory for Beijing in the
Western Pacific.
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The second prominent theme of the 2013 white paper is its fin de siècle emphasis on the drawdown of
long-standing ADF contributions in East Timor (withdrawn in March 2013), the Solomon Islands (withdrawn in mid-2013), and Afghanistan (withdrawn by
the end of 2013). Former prime minister Gillard emphasized this drawdown when she declared the end
of the 9/11 era.14
The white paper anticipates that the drawdowns
will allow the ADF to refocus its efforts on stabilization and humanitarian assistance operations in Australia’s immediate region and on enhancing the ADF’s
presence in northern and northwestern Australia,
where much of Australia’s natural resources wealth is
located.15 This echoes U.S. President Barack Obama’s
Middle East drawdown and “pivot” to Asia, with perhaps similar wishful thinking that Australia’s national
interests can be circumscribed to its immediate neighborhood and that tomorrow’s threats to Australia’s
security can be divined today.
The third change in emphasis in the 2013 white
paper was the adoption of the Indo-Pacific as an organizing principle for Australian strategic policy. It confirms that “The Indian Ocean will increasingly feature
in Australian defense and national security planning
and maritime strategy,” and that the ADF needs to be
prepared to play a part in securing these sea lanes.16
This is consistent with Australia’s Indian Ocean littoral status and the increased prominence of the Indian
Ocean in developing U.S. strategic policy. While the
emphasis given to the Indo-Pacific region is in some
respects a continuation of previous defense thinking,
the increased focus is significant nonetheless.
The final noteworthy thematic departure of the
2013 white paper is the emphasis on fiscal uncertain-
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ty. The chapter on finances commits the government
to a defense budget that delivers the capabilities to
meet preparedness requirements and to protect Australia’s national security interests. But it flags that the
Australian fiscal environment “remains challenging”
and stipulates that this commitment is subordinate to
the priority the government places on improving the
overall budget situation.17 Many Australian defense
commentators expressed skepticism about the likelihood of the force structure outlined in the white paper being adequately funded and about the likelihood
that defense spending would return to the aspirational
target of 2 percent of GDP.18
AUSTRALIA’S DEFENSE BUDGET:
NOT KEEPING UP WITH THE JONESES
After the 10 percent 2012–13 defense budget cut,
the 2013–14 budget represented something of a return
to normalcy. The government allocated AUD25.3 billion for defense, an increase of AUD1.2 billion (2.25
percent) over the previous year. This modest increase
will nudge defense spending from 1.56 percent of
GDP to 1.6 percent (see Figure 3-1). The planned allocation will grow to AUD30.7 billion in 2016–17, with
AUD 8.3 billion budgeted for new projects across the
next 4 years—representing real growth of 10 percent
annually in capital investment.19
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Source: “The Cost of Defense: ASPI Defense Budget Brief, 201314,” Barton, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May
30, 2013, available from www.aspi.org.au/publication/publications_
all.aspx.

Figure 3-1. Defense Expenditure as a
Percentage of GDP, 2000-14.
Overall, however, the budget does not redress
the cuts of the previous 2 years.20 The budget documents reaffirm the government’s intention to attain
the 2 percent of GDP target, but this will not happen
soon: “This is a long-term objective that will be implemented in an economically responsible manner as and
when fiscal circumstances allow.”21 According to the
government’s own estimates, defense spending will
be capped as a share of GDP at 1.66 percent through
at least 2017–18.22
This leisurely return to a credible level of defense
spending is difficult to reconcile with a regional security environment that, if anything, has deteriorated
since the 2009 white paper was published. As the 2013
paper makes clear: “We are witnessing the evolution
of a more complex and competitive order” and “Australia’s relative strategic weight will be challenged as
the major Asian states continue to grow their economies and modernize their military forces.”23
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The paper notes that neighboring countries are
introducing advanced weapons systems including
beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles, air-to-air
refueling, modern surveillance radars, digital data
links, highly capable airborne early warning and control platforms, and electronic warfare (EW) systems.
Together, they can provide a significant increase in
combat capability.24
For Australia—a country with a small population
that occupies a vast island continent with an extensive
coastline and massive territorial waters—maintaining
sophisticated forces with a technological edge over
neighboring countries has long been a keystone of its
defense policy. Recent regional defense acquisition
trends are reducing the strategic depth that has long
benefited Australian security and are making it more
expensive to maintain that capability edge.
As noted previously, the 2013–14 budget does
commit additional funds for procuring equipment,
including AUD2.94 billion to acquire 12 EA-18G
Growler aircraft, which will complement the existing
24 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets purchased in 2006, as
a hedge against late delivery of the F-35 Lightning II
aircraft.25 Australia has allocated up to AUD16 billion
for the F-35 program, with plans to buy up to 72 F35s initially and potentially another 28 later on. The
budget also allows for:
•	
Fast-tracking replacement vessels for the
existing fleet of Armidale-class patrol boats;
• Replacing two fleet replenishment ships;
•	
Installing Australian-designed phased-array
radar on the navy’s future frigates;
•	
Establishing a joint U.S.–Australia-operated
C-band radar space surveillance installation in
Western Australia; and,
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•	Acquiring P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance
aircraft.26
Funding for operations is down, ostensibly reflecting the drawdown of ADF operations in Australia’s
immediate region and the departure of 1,000 of Australia’s 1,650 troops in Afghanistan by the end of 2013.
Spending on operations will drop from AUD1.5 billion in 2012–13 to less than AUD1.0 billion in 2013–14.
Australia’s two largest political parties—Labor
and 
Liberal—agree that current levels of defense
funding are inadequate. As noted earlier, the current
Labor government has set 2 percent of GDP as a longterm goal for defense spending, conditioned on the
fiscal situation. The Liberal Party, which leads the Coalition of opposition parties, has said it will “restore
sensible defense spending to 3 percent real growth per
year subject to improvements in the Budget.”27 In both
cases, the devil will be in the details. The outlook is far
from promising, owing to rapid expansion in government spending by successive Labor governments, ballooning health care costs, and deteriorating national
revenues tied to a variety of factors, including a slowdown in commodity exports to China. As a result,
economic forecasters are warning that Australia could
face annual budget deficits for the next decade.28 Add
in the costs of new entitlement programs, and it is difficult to be optimistic about Australia returning to a
credible level of defense spending anytime soon.
This funding crunch comes at a time when the
United States faces its own fiscal pressures and deep
defense budget cuts. Consequently, Washington’s expectations for its allies are rising. The Obama administration is demanding U.S. partners make credible
contributions to defense and security by maintaining
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modernized and ready forces and by taking the lead
in regional security and stabilization operations. Senator John McCain’s pointed criticism of the Gillard government’s defense cuts likewise suggests that a future
Republican administration is unlikely to have lower
expectations.29 Australia has made a clear commitment
to support the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, yet
it remains to be seen whether the Australian defense
budget will be able to meet its side of the capability,
readiness, and operational bargain.
PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS:
SEEKING AN EDGE
Australia has introduced a number of significant
new m
 ilitary capabilities in the past decade, many
of them as a result of decisions made by the Howard
government. These include E-7A Wedgetail airborne
early warning aircraft, C-17 Globemaster III transport
aircraft, KC-30 air-to-air refuelers, M1 Abrams tanks,
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet combat aircraft, and Tiger
ARH attack helicopters. The regular army and special
forces have expanded since 2000. Nevertheless, Australia faces a number of major capability challenges
over the next decade and beyond.
Foremost among these is replacing Australia’s increasingly unreliable fleet of six conventional Collinsclass submarines. These boats have been plagued with
problems since they were delivered between 1996 and
2003, including propulsion system issues, poor availability, a shortage in skilled operators, and significant
limitations in combat capability.30 Efforts to address
some of these problems with a new combat system
and the acquisition of new heavyweight torpedoes
began in 2002. But based on current plans, it will not
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be until 2016 that all of the submarines will have the
new combat system installed.31 Moreover, retirement
of the Collins-class fleet is expected between 2022 and
2031, resulting in a potential submarine capability gap
in the late-2020s.32
The 2009 white paper committed the government
to acquiring 12 larger, more capable conventional submarines to replace the Collins class—all of which were
to be built in South Australia. Despite many commentators’ views that this commitment was financially
unsustainable and technologically beyond Australia’s
reach, the 2013 white paper reaffirmed both the need
for 12 conventionally powered submarines and the
plan to have them built in Australia.33
Australia’s long coastline and distances from key
operating areas necessitate a submarine force with
extensive range and endurance, capabilities that go
well beyond those provided by most conventional designs. These characteristics can only be incorporated
in a very large hull. Indeed, a number of Australian
and U.S. analysts have argued that Australia’s needs
could be best met by acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, most likely from the United States.34
Despite arguments in favor of this option, it remains politically controversial and the Labor Party
has expressly ruled it out. Officials have, however,
confirmed that the submarines will be equipped with
U.S. heavyweight torpedoes and a U.S.-supplied
combat system.35 Defense technological cooperation
with Japan on this front is also a possibility.36 But
in the meantime, the looming submarine capability
gap is becoming a matter of increasing urgency for
Australia’s defense planners.
The other major potential gap is in air-combat capability. Australian governments are typically sen-
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sitive to any suggestion of a gap in air capabilities.
Faced with an aging F/A-18A/B fleet, the earlierthan-anticipated withdrawal from service of its fleet
of F-111 Aardvark strike aircraft, and delays in the
development of the fifth-generation F-35, the Howard
government decided to purchase 24 Super Hornets as
a hedge against this eventuality.
The 2013 white paper continues this prudential
approach. It takes note of the emerging advanced
air-combat and air-defense systems in the region, the
proliferation of modern EW systems, and the growing
risk EW systems pose to Australia’s ability to control
the air, conduct strikes, and support land and naval
forces.37 Against this challenging backdrop, the white
paper is unequivocal that “The Government will not
allow a gap in our air-combat capability to occur.”38 It
reaffirms Australia’s commitment to the F-35 program,
with an expectation that three operational squadrons
of up to 72 aircraft will enter service around 2020.
In response to the proliferation of sophisticated EW
systems, it also commits to acquiring 12 new Growler
electronic attack aircraft, which will make Australia
the only country outside of the United States with this
capability.
Together with the six E-7 Wedgetail early warning
and control aircraft, these new systems will provide
Australia with significantly enhanced networking capability among its forces, interoperability with U.S.
forces, and the ability to operate in a more “contested”
regional environment. After delays in development,
the Wedgetail is now m
 eeting or exceeding performance parameters and will have the capability to detect and identify potential enemy electronic emissions
at great ranges.39 The Royal Australian Air Force’s
future dependence on the F-35, however, means that
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Canberra will remain acutely sensitive to any further
delays and capability issues affecting the program and
to future reductions in the overall size of the program
that would drive up the F-35’s unit cost.
The middle of this decade will also see the transformation of Australia’s amphibious capabilities with
the introduction into service of two Spanish-designed
Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs) which, at 27,000
tons, will be the largest-ever ships to serve with the
Royal Australian Navy. They will improve interoperability with the United States and regional partners and increase Australia’s ability to respond to a
range of contingencies. The rotation of U.S. Marines
in Northern Australia will provide extensive training opportunities to build on Australia’s increased
amphibious capabilities.
Under Plan Beersheba, the Australian Army is being restructured into three multirole combat brigades,
including a battalion designated as the core of a future
amphibious force.40 It remains unclear, however, how
much ground combat power Australia will be able
to deploy and sustain. A combination of capability
and political considerations has constrained the situations in which the Australian government has been
prepared to use land forces.
In 2006, for example, Canberra deployed an amphibious task force to waters off of Fiji in response to
an anticipated military coup. However, a major factor
in the government’s ultimate decision to not intervene
was the concern that the ADF lacked the firepower to
overcome the well-trained Fijian military at an acceptable cost to Australian forces. In Iraq and Afghanistan,
the government preferred to commit special forces to
initial combat operations rather than commit larger
ground forces, again in part because of perceived
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capability limitations in firepower, force protection,
and combat enablers and the resulting political risks
such a deployment would entail.
In both cases, Australia did subsequently take
on larger stabilization responsibilities—in Iraq’s Al
Muthanna Province and in Afghanistan’s Uruzgan
Province. It is unclear, however, whether the ADF
could have on its own held down a “hotter” province
in either country for a prolonged period if the Australian government had made a decision to do so—as the
Australian Army did in Vietnam, for example.
As Australian force planners examine the lessons
learned from recent operations, they should advise
Australia’s current and future political leaders on
whether the ADF has the capabilities they assume
it has and, if not, whether the ADF should develop
them. Coalition planners in the Pentagon likewise
need to know what the ADF’s actual capabilities are.
The 2013 white paper left two other key capability decisions unresolved. The first of these is whether
to equip Australia’s three new air-warfare destroyers
with Standard Missile 3s so Australia can be involved
in missile defense operations. The ships will be actively
outfitted with the U.S. Aegis Combat System, capable
of detecting and tracking a variety of missiles including ballistic missiles, and will operate with American,
Japanese, and South Korean naval forces. While the
white paper recognizes the increasing threat posed by
ballistic missiles, it rather vaguely commits the government to “continue to examine potential Australian
capability responses.”41
The second unresolved matter is cruise missiles.
Currently, Australia’s main weapon for strike missions is the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile,
launched from the air force’s F/A-18 aircraft and with
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a range of over 200 nautical miles. This capability will
be augmented when the F-35 is introduced, with its
stealth characteristics and suite of precision weapons
and ISR systems. The 2009 white paper, however,
went further, committing the government—in a major
departure for Australia and for the Southeast Asian region—to acquiring maritime-based land-attack cruise
missiles to be fitted to the new air-warfare destroyers,
future frigates, and to the successors to the Collinsclass submarine fleet.42
With no explanation, however, the 2013 white
paper seems to have stepped back from this commitment, stating only that it would look into “options for
the Government to expand strategic strike capabilities
if required.”43 This development presumably owes as
much to the government’s current fiscal problems as it
does to any alteration in the regional security environment outlined in the 2009 white paper.
SUSTAINABILITY, READINESS, AND POSTURE
IN NORTHERN AUSTRALIA
Sustainment has been a major challenge for the
ADF since the late-1990s. Multiple operations abroad
have placed significant strain on personnel, equipment, and support systems. ADF recruitment and retention have generally held up well, with Australia’s
military forces enjoying public support and with enhanced pay and housing conditions boosting the attractiveness of military service. With the acquisition
of C-17 and C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft
and the LHDs, the ADF will enjoy enhanced strategic
lift capabilities and an increased capacity to support
deployed forces.
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Although the defense budget has come under pressure in the last few years, the 2013 white paper avoided declaring a post-drawdown “peace dividend,”
stating that despite the more fiscally constrained environment, there would be no reduction in overall ADF
personnel numbers.44 Significant pressures and deficiencies remain, however. Shortages of specialist skills
in some areas have been exacerbated by the Australian
minerals boom, with the demand for engineering and
related trades in particular draining individuals from
the military.
This has resulted in reduced operational availability in some arms of the ADF such as the submarine
fleet. The navy’s amphibious fleet has suffered a series of major mechanical failures owing to systemic
sustainment and maintenance failures, forcing the
government to make the rushed purchase of a former British vessel to make up the shortfall.45 As noted
earlier, the army’s fleet of light armored vehicles has
experienced unanticipated wear and tear as a result
of sustained deployments and will require significant
rehabilitation as troops deploy back to home bases.
Maintaining readiness during a period of reduced
operational tempo will be another major challenge for
the ADF. One possible consequence of the reduction
in the operational budget noted previously will be
fewer funds for training.46 This is likely to affect the
active duty army in particular, but will also impact the
training for reserve forces.
A more uncertain regional security environment,
the growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean,
and community concerns about the potential vulnerability of Australia’s vital natural resources led the
government to commission a review of the ADF’s
force posture in 2011.47 The review found that the
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ADF needs to be postured to support high-tempo military operations in Australia’s northern and western
approaches and recommended a number of steps to
strengthen the ADF’s presence and ability to sustain
such operations, including:
• 
Upgrading airbases in Northern and North
Western Australia to handle larger aircraft types
(necessary to implement the agreement reached
during President Obama’s November 2011 visit
to Australia for increased rotations of U.S. aircraft);
• Increasing ADF aircraft and ship deployments
to the area;
• Upgrading airfield facilities at Cocos Island (an
offshore Australian territory proximate to the
Bay of Bengal and the western approaches to the
strategically vital Strait of Malacca) to support
future operations by P-8A maritime surveillance
aircraft and unmanned aerial v
 ehicles (UAVs);
• Expanding facilities at HMAS Stirling, the Royal
Australian Navy’s major west-coast base near
Perth, to support deployments by major surface
combatants of the U.S. Navy;
• Giving consideration to hardening forward-operating bases; and,
• Enhancing facilities and opportunities for training with U.S. and other partner militaries.
The government has accepted the thrust of the
force posture review and is already implementing
some of its more straightforward recommendations.48
The government also announced that it would seek
opportunities with the United States to fund jointly
improvements to bases, facilities, and training infra-
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structure as part of the enhanced practical defense cooperation measures announced in 2011.
THE U.S.-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE:
SOUTHERN HINGE OF THE U.S. PIVOT?
U.S.-Australia security cooperation deepened and
broadened significantly during the post-9/11 decade.
This included closer operational, intelligence, and
counterterrorism collaboration; greater Australian
access to U.S. defense information and systems; and
the 2007 signing of the Australia–U.S. Defence Trade
Cooperation Treaty to streamline defense industrial
cooperation. The treaty, which came into force in May
2013, is intended to facilitate exports of defense goods,
services, and technology and to improve delivery
times and sustainment. It complements the ADF’s acquisition of a range of weapons systems that are able
to operate seamlessly with U.S. forces.
Initial talks on enhanced U.S. military access to
Australia preceded the Obama administration’s pivot,
or rebalance, to Asia, and should be seen in the context of intensifying strategic links. The talks were quietly initiated by the Howard government in 2007 with
the George W. Bush administration, building not only
on the post-9/11 alliance relationship but also with
an eye toward shifting power dynamics in the AsiaPacific region.49
By 2011, governments around the region were becoming concerned with China’s increasingly assertive
behavior and looking for reassurance about America’s
staying power in the Western Pacific following the
2008 global financial crisis. Washington, for its part,
was seeking options to facilitate a more distributed
military footprint in Asia, closer engagement with
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Southeast Asia, and enhanced access to vital Indian
Ocean sea lanes of communication.
The result was President Obama’s speech to the
Australian parliament in November 2011 in which he
laid out Washington’s rebalancing strategy. During
his visit, the two governments announced that Australia was the first country in the region to agree to an
enhanced U.S. military presence. This would include
both a rotational Marine Corps presence in Darwin—
which, by 2016–17, would build to a 2,500-strong
Marine Air-Ground Task Force—and increased use
by U.S. Air Force aircraft of airbases in Northern
Australia.
The current marine rotation numbers around 200,
and an assessment has just been released to prepare
for rotations of up to 1,100 personnel.50 While there
has been some concern that the Labor Party’s support
for these initiatives may be ebbing, Defense Minister
Stephen Smith is on record as stating that the government’s current fiscal difficulties will not have an
adverse impact on enhanced cooperation with the
United States.51
What could have an impact over time, however,
is an increasingly vocal strand of elite opinion in
Australia that sees the country’s growing economic
interdependence with China as incompatible with
its security ties to the United States.52 Beijing exploits
this anxiety in an increasingly sophisticated public diplomacy effort in Australia.53 U.S. officials, however,
have grounds for cautious optimism on this score.
First, neither major political party shows any sign of a
weakened commitment to the U.S. alliance. The Labor
Party went out of its way to state in the 2013 white paper that “The Government does not believe that Australia must choose between its long-standing Alliance
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with the United States and its expanding relationship
with China.”54 The Liberal-led coalition took this view
under Howard and maintains that position.
Second, public opinion is unequivocal. Support for
the U.S. alliance is strong, with more than 80 percent
of Australians regarding the alliance as either “very
important” or “fairly important” for Australia’s security.55 Nearly three-quarters believe the United States
will be Australia’s most important security partner
over the next decade and a similar proportion are in
favor of “up to 2,500 U.S. soldiers being based in Darwin.”56 Third, China’s behavior in disputed waters in
the Western Pacific shows few signs of moderating
and is likely to sustain support for the alliance as a
hedge against future uncertainty and as a counterweight to China’s economic influence in Australia.
(See Figure 3-2.)

Figure 3-2. Australia’s Strategic Neighborhood.
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Assuming that the base of support for the alliance
in Australia remains strong, enhanced defense cooperation is likely to deepen and to continue extending
into newer areas. During World War II, Australia was
vital to the U.S. Pacific War effort because Australia
offered strategic depth and access to crucial sea lanes
of communication. The joint Australia
–U.S. intelligence facilities have made a vital contribution to the
security of both nations for the past several decades.
While circumstances are obviously different today,
those strategic considerations remain important.
In addition to the aforementioned increased deployments of American sea and air assets to Australia,
the ramped-up program of amphibious training exercises with the ADF, and the potential creation of a
genuinely joint expeditionary capability, discussions
have started about the use of the enhanced airfield on
Cocos Island to support operations by maritime surveillance aircraft and UAVs. Australia and the United
States have also stepped up defense cooperation in the
realms of cyberspace and space, including the establishment of the new joint space surveillance installation in Western Australia.
Close defense industrial, intelligence, and operational cooperation will also remain vitally important,
particularly for Australia. U.S. technical support was
essential to rehabilitating the Collins-class submarines, and the 2013 white paper makes explicit that
Canberra will look to Washington for assistance to deliver its ambitious submarine replacement program.57
Integrating the sophisticated F-35 into the ADF and
networking it with a suite of other interoperable capabilities will likewise require unprecedented levels of
Australia–U.S. collaboration.
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The ADF can make an important operational contribution to the evolving Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept,
not only by facilitating a more distributed American
force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, but also by
participating in “distant blockade” operations around
Southeast Asian maritime chokepoints and by augmenting U.S. enabling capabilities such as tanker aircraft, EW assets, and strategic lift in contingencies.58
But deepening cooperation will require greater
effort on Washington’s part to articulate more fully
its vision for ASB and the roles allies are expected to
play. At the same time, deepened defense and strategic ties will require more maturity in Australia about
the need for closer involvement in a range of detailed
U.S. military contingency planning and the attendant diplomatic challenges that will inevitably arise
as a result.
CONCLUSION
Australia, the United States, and their alliance
face major strategic challenges as global power shifts
increasingly toward Asia. China’s rise and its rapid
military modernization are transforming the regional
security environment. The People’s Liberation Army’s
development of anti-access and area denial capabilities is challenging the U.S. military’s ability to operate
in the Western Pacific and is reshaping the regional
military balance. Moves by other Asian powers to
acquire sophisticated weapons are contributing to a
more complex and contested region and eroding Australia’s long-standing military c apability edge.
Against this backdrop, it seems imperative that
Australia’s own military modernization agenda proceed apace. As a result of the Gillard government’s

58

defense cuts and predicted revenue pressures for
the next decade, however, Australia’s modernization
plans are now at risk. The funding shortfalls outlined
in the 2009 and 2013 white papers may be as much
as AUD33 billion for the period 2009–22.59 The consequence, according to a leading expert on the Australian defense budget, is an inevitably slow modernization of the defense force.60
A related alliance-based challenge will be managing U.S. expectations. Reasonably enough, the United
States is looking to its Asia-Pacific allies, including
Australia, to shoulder a greater share of the burden
of maintaining a favorable balance of power in the region. Continuing support for enhanced defense cooperation in Australia is part of this expectation, as is an
increased Australian contribution to maintaining deterrence through stepped-up operational cooperation.
Australia is doing this unobtrusively in the realms of
space and cyber warfare, intelligence collection, and
ballistic missile early warning, but it must accept a
more public and upfront role in other areas such as
missile defense and participation in ASB.
Australia will also need to continue efforts to step
up its own defense engagement with other U.S. regional partners such as Japan, Indonesia, India, and
South Korea, utilizing mechanisms such as the Australia–Japan–U.S. Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and
establishing new, informal “minilateral” security
groupings that incorporate India and Indonesia. It is
unclear how the forthcoming Australian election will
affect the nation’s defense policy. The center-right
coalition traditionally places importance on defense,
and the opposition has committed itself to producing
a new, properly priced defense white paper within 18
months of taking office and to making the necessary
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decisions within that time frame to avoid any submarine capability gap.61
The opposition has also signaled a less constrained
approach to supporting U.S. military forces in Australia should it win office. Ultimately, however, the Liberal Party-led coalition’s ability to deliver on defense
would depend on its success in restoring the budget
to a sustainable trajectory and the priority it places on
defense and maintaining a strong U.S. alliance.
The defense implications of a Rudd election victory are even less clear. Judging by the 2009 white
paper, Rudd’s instincts on defense are hawkish, and
he may seek to restore its ambitious force structure
goals. His ability to deliver on them, however, would
be significantly constrained by Australia’s difficult fiscal outlook and his own party’s appetite for increased
domestic spending.
The jury will remain out until Australia’s new
government confronts its own inevitable first national
security test and delivers its first defense budget.
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CHAPTER 4
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION AT SEA:
TRENDS IN ALLIED NAVAL POWER1
Bryan McGrath
KEY POINTS
•
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s
(NATO) intervention in Libya during the
spring and summer of 2011 raised serious questions about the naval capabilities of America’s
European allies.
•
Despite declining defense budgets, the major
European naval powers have sought to retain
a broad array of naval capabilities, resulting in
modern but substantially smaller fleets.
• With U.S. armed forces increasingly focused on
the Asia-Pacific region, there are growing concerns as to whether the navies of America’s continental allies are up to meeting the challenges
arising from the general unrest on Europe’s eastern and southern maritime flanks.
Taking its name from one of the world’s great
oceans, NATO has throughout its history been a military alliance focused primarily on land. Although several of its members have built and maintained first-rate
navies, sea power served largely as a flanking force
for what was envisioned as the main Cold War battle
on the central front. After the fall of the Soviet Union,
land conflict continued to be a primary emphasis of
the alliance, first in dealing with the disintegration of
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Yugoslavia, and then as NATO assumed a central role
in the Afghan conflict.
That said, naval power has historically been a defining feature of the alliance. While the United States
provided a preponderance of alliance naval power,
several allies—including the United Kingdom (UK),
France, Germany, Spain, and Italy—created fleets capable of global power projection, and others chose to
pursue niche capabilities to supplement the striking
power of the larger fleets. This chapter assesses the
state of the former group.
It is a propitious time to review NATO’s naval
capabilities. Continental Europe is at peace. The only
trouble has been on NATO’s eastern and southern
maritime flanks. Unrest throughout North Africa and
the Levant raises the very real possibility that NATO’s
European nations will have to shoulder a larger share
of a growing maritime security burden than they
have been accustomed to or have been preparing for.
The largest naval force contributor to the alliance—
the United States—is increasingly focusing its attention on the Pacific, and it has not routinely operated
large naval task forces in the Mediterranean Sea for
decades. The 2011 military intervention in Libya and
recent discussions about possible intervention in the
Syrian civil war raise questions about NATO’s ability
to project naval power effectively, especially without
the full participation of the U.S. Navy.
Several trends are evident among the major NATO
navies. First, they are getting smaller. All of the navies
analyzed here have fewer ships today than in the year
2000—in some cases, significantly fewer. While ship
counts do not tell the entire story of a nation’s naval
might (especially in the age of networked operations),
they remain a useful proxy for naval capability, espe-
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cially with respect to blue-water operations far from
home waters. The primary reason these navies are getting smaller is a decline in general defense spending,
including shipbuilding.
Second, the ships that are being built are increasingly capable and sophisticated—and therefore expensive—which serves only to drive down fleet size
in an era of fiscal restraint.
Third, historically maritime nations seem to desire
to retain broad, general purpose fleets even if it means
smaller fleets overall. For example, the once-mighty
UK Royal Navy is planning for a surface fleet of only
19 major surface combatants, while moving forward
on construction of two aircraft carriers and a replacement submarine class for its aging strategic deterrent,
both of which consume considerable shipbuilding resources.2
OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR
The controversy over the participation of major
NATO partners in the Libyan intervention has encompassed operational effectiveness as well as political will. The contributions of the five major allies surveyed in this chapter vary widely. Britain and France
proved both highly capable and highly committed,
while Italy, Spain, and Germany provided, respectively, partial, minimal, and nonoperational support.
NATO’s reliance on the United States from March
to October 2011 to carry out the allied mission—despite President Barack Obama’s admonition that the
United States would not take the lead in the military
operation—is the result of two distinct causes: NATOwide underinvestment in military capability and a
lack of political will on the part of uniquely capable
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countries. Capability is absent in some areas; in others, it is unevenly distributed. When key platforms
were present and fielded, they were often numerically
too few.
The case of the Charles de Gaulle demonstrates that
numbers matter. France’s aircraft carrier, the only
non–U.S. catapult assisted take-off but arrested recovery carrier in Europe, accounted for 33 percent of
allied-strike sorties before its withdrawal in August
2011.3 The endurance of even the largest ships is limited, however, by crew fatigue and maintenance requirements.4 When Italy, citing austerity measures,
withdrew its carrier, the Giuseppe Garibaldi, from the
Libyan operation, only amphibious ships and short
take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) carriers remained to replace the de Gaulle.5 Indeed, extended
global deployments preceding those to Libya taxed
even the endurance of U.S. amphibious warships,
which departed before de Gaulle and Garibaldi.6 The
remaining large-deck ships—the French landing platform dock (LPD) Tonnerre and the British vessels Albion and Ocean—supported only attack helicopters.7
Lack of available land-based aircraft would have
resulted in significantly slower operations.
Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, the NATO
name given to the Libyan campaign, cannot be considered a stressing scenario for NATO’s naval and air
forces. Targets were located primarily along Libya’s
coast, well within the range of land-based aircraft. The
enemy was entirely unprepared for NATO intervention.8 The strategic geography of the Libyan civil war
greatly facilitated intervention. To attack rebel-held
areas, Muammar Gaddafi’s forces often had to move
across long stretches of flat, exposed, sparsely populated terrain. The weakness of Libyan air defenses
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permitted relatively rapid degradation, reducing requirements for specialized electronic attack aircraft.9
Future operational environments may lack these favorable characteristics. Conversely, Libya’s operational strengths—for example, its air defenses’ ability to
leverage civilian networks to manage engagements—
are likely to exist in the authoritarian areas where future NATO interventions are possible.10
Some vital “niche” operational capabilities simply
do not exist in sufficient numbers within NATO. The
United States provided fully 80 percent of refueling
support during the course of Operation UNIFIED
PROTECTOR, spurring France, Germany, and the
Netherlands to announce cooperative tanker purchases.11 Standoff precision-strike firepower was also
lacking. France’s SCALP (long range standoff cruise
missile) naval cruise missile was not ready in time for
Libya.12 A report in The Telegraph suggested the UK
expended a high proportion of its limited stock of
Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) in the first
days of the conflict.13 In contrast, by May 2011, two
U.S. destroyers and one nuclear-powered Ohio-class
submarine launched 199 TLAMs, ultimately launching 220 weapons in the course of the operation.14 Similarly, the UK was short on advanced shorter-range
munitions in some key categories.15
UNITED KINGDOM
The Royal Navy has dramatically declined in size
by a third since 2000, but retains the desire and plans
to remain a “balanced force” capable of naval airpower projection, limited amphibious operations, strategic
nuclear deterrence, and sea control (see Figure 4-1).
This goal remains even in view of the 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 8 percent de71

fense budget reduction.16

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter 4,
Europe,” The Military Balance 2013, Vol. 113, No. 1, pp. 89-198; International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO and Non-NATO Europe,” The Military Balance 2000, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 35-108;
and International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO,” The
Military Balance 1995, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 33-67.

Figure 4-1. UK (Total Ships by Category).
A key question, however, is whether a balanced
force is ultimately in the strategic interests of the UK,
or whether such a force should be abandoned in favor of a “cruising” navy requiring a greater number
of frigates and destroyers and providing more naval
presence in a greater number of places than the current fleet plan can accomplish. The costs associated
with fielding two aircraft carriers and the air assets
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necessary to equip them, in addition to the costs of replacing the current fleet of ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) with four new boats, will strain resources
required for building surface combatants and attack
submarines.17 Considering the UK’s global economic
interests and its desire to remain closely aligned with
the U.S. Navy, a force of less than 20 combatants might
not suffice.
Upgrades to the Royal Navy will include fielding
two new aircraft carriers carrying the F-35 Lightning
II and the ongoing operation of the new, technologically advanced Type 45 destroyers.18 Other upgrades
include the continuing introduction of the five nuclear-powered, Astute Class attack submarines and the
construction of the Type 26 Global Combat Ships.19
Here as elsewhere in major NATO navies, numbers
are being traded for capability.
When assessed against the roles articulated in the
NATO Alliance Maritime Strategy of 2011—which includes deterrence and defense, crisis management, cooperative security, and maritime security—the Royal
Navy presents a mixed story.20 Continuing to move
forward with both an aircraft carrier development
program and a ballistic missile submarine program
demonstrates national resolve to contribute to collective conventional and nuclear deterrence. However,
the resources necessary to achieve these goals are to
some degree harvested from savings gained from a
significantly smaller escort and combatant fleet.
While the Type 45 destroyer is more capable than
the Type 42s it replaces, there will be fewer of Type
45s, as there will be fewer Type 26 frigates to replace
the Type 23s. This numerical decline creates presence
deficits that impact the navy’s ability to perform crucial traditional naval missions such as antisubmarine
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warfare (ASW) and antisurface warfare (ASUW),
which underpin both conventional deterrence and
cooperative and maritime security. Adding to a decline in traditional sea-control capabilities was the
2010 SDSR decision to eliminate the Nimrod maritime
patrol aircraft from the inventory.
In summary, the Royal Navy continues to maintain a balanced fleet, one that looks strikingly like the
U.S. Navy, except a fraction of its size. Its contributions on the high-end of the naval warfare operational
spectrum (strategic deterrence, attack submarines,
and anti-aircraft warfare [AAW] destroyers) are notable, while a declining number of surface combatants will bedevil its ability to remain globally postured and will contribute to naval missions of a more
constabulary nature.
FRANCE
French defense policy in the post–Cold War era
has tended toward greater equity among its armed
services, what one analyst called the “gradual equalization” between French ground power and air and
naval power.21 Nevertheless, the overall downward
trend in fleet size is clear (see Figure 4-2). In 2001, chief
of staff of the French Navy Admiral Jean-Louis Battet
identified a “2015 model” for the navy with a target
fleet of 80 warships; the current trajectory is far more
limited.22
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Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter 4,
Europe,” The Military Balance 2013, Vol. 113, No. 1, pp. 89-198; International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO and Non-NATO Europe,” The Military Balance 2000, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 35-108;
and International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO,” The
Military Balance 1995, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 33-67.

Figure 4-2. France (Total Ships by Category).
Generally, the French Navy is currently faring better than land or air forces, but the declining share of
French wealth spent on national defense—2.8 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 and 1.76 percent in 2013—has inevitably impacted the fleet. And
while the “main battery” of the French Navy—its aircraft carrier and 10 submarines—remain untouched,
France’s surface fleet will lose three destroyers and
one amphibious ship. If there is any good news on
this front, it is that France’s 2008 defense white paper called for deeper cuts in fleet size and, unlike the
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Royal Navy, the French Navy will not face, in the near
term, the budgetary pressure of having to replace its
relatively new SSBN force of four boats. Although the
French fleet is shrinking, its international responsibilities remain. The 2013 white paper defined French
geographic interests as “the European periphery, the
Mediterranean area, a part of Africa—from Sahel to
Equatorial Africa—the Persian Gulf and the Indian
Ocean.”23 This perceived gap between strategic vision
and actual capabilities has led some analysts to suggest
that congruence between British and French interests,
as well as a desire to control procurement costs and
improve coalition interoperability, is driving France
toward increasing cooperation with the UK.24
The 1998 Anglo-French Saint Malo declaration announced the beginning of heightened cooperation.25
Attempts to establish effective cooperation on aircraftcarrier procurement and operations consumed much
of the last decade. By 2007, an Anglo-French consortium looked to build three carriers for purchase by the
two governments to maximize interoperability, but
this plan did not come to fruition. Rumors that the
two countries would actually share individual warships were again raised but quickly deflated in 2010.26
In contrast to the UK, which has primarily exported
major warships and aircraft as second-hand articles to
close British Commonwealth allies, France’s defense
industry competes actively to sell major platforms in
the global market. The state-owned shipbuilder DCNS
is set to deliver six Scorpène-class diesel-electric submarines to the Indian Navy starting in 2015.27 The Indian order supplements two each already delivered to
the Malaysian and Chilean navies.28
Additionally, France’s DCNS shipbuilder and Italy’s Fincantieri have been cooperating on the multimis-
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sion frigate (FREMM) program. (At one point, France
was planning to build 19 of these ships, but cuts in the
ensuing years have dropped the buy to only 8.29) This
industrial capacity augurs well for France, regardless
of whether it increases the size of its navy, as international sales will protect a minimum level of shipbuilding capacity that is increasingly at risk in the UK.
With respect to NATO’s stated maritime roles, the
French Navy punches at a weight similar to the Royal
Navy, though the French Navy’s capacity for sea-control missions is somewhat better because of the numbers and age of its surface escort ships. Additionally,
the French Navy’s amphibious capabilities resident in
its three Mistral-class LHDs and its one Foudre-class
LPD provide a limited capacity for crisis response and
humanitarian intervention. France’s blue-water power-projection capability gives it the option of projecting power far from home waters, something the Royal
Navy appears very much to desire as it proceeds to
build its two Queen Elizabeth–class carriers.
Essentially, the Royal Navy and the French Navy
are roughly equally sized and structured. Yet to
many observers, the Royal Navy is in distress and the
French Navy sails in relatively calmer waters. This
stems at least in part from the pressure of history and
the place of the Royal Navy in the hearts of average
Englishmen.
GERMANY
Unlike the Royal Navy and French Navy, Germany lacks a history and culture (since World War II) of
a “balanced” fleet capable of the full range of modern naval operations. With no carrier or amphibious
fleet to speak of, and without a sea-based nuclear de-
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terrent, the German navy historically has focused on
sea-control missions centered around ASW, ASUW,
and maritime security. While the number of ships devoted to these missions has fallen from 28 to 23 since
2000, the most precipitous decline has occurred within
the submarine force, with older submarines having
been replaced by four more-sophisticated submarines
(Type 212As), and with two on order. (See Figure 4-3.)

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter 4,
Europe,” The Military Balance 2013, Vol. 113, No. 1, pp. 89-198; International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO and Non-NATO Europe,” The Military Balance 2000, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 35-108;
and International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO,” The
Military Balance 1995, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 33-67.

Figure 4-3. Germany (Total Ships by Category).
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Chief of Staff of the Navy Vice Admiral Axel
Schimpf wrote in 2011 that Germany’s armed forces
in general, and the navy in particular, are favoring
“width over depth” (or capability over capacity).30 For
the navy, which retained a greater share of its force
structure than the other services as a result of recent
budget cuts, this has meant continuing to build sophisticated air-independent propulsion diesel attack
submarines for both domestic and international sale
while maintaining a force of frigates and destroyers
for blue-water operations focused mainly on ASUW
and ASW. In fact, one reason the surface fleet appears
to be maintained in the numbers it has been stems
from the aggregate loss in ASUW power because of
the smaller submarine force.
On the high-end of the operational spectrum,
the three F124 Sachsen–class AAW destroyers are
equipped with the Evolved SeaSparrow missile, an
antiship defense missile, and the Standard Missile-3
Block IIA for point and area air defense. Of note, these
ships integrate an active phased array radar with
search and missile guidance capabilities, providing
protection against both advanced aircraft and cruise
missiles with reduced radar cross sections. When operating out of area, the German navy will likely deploy
an F124 to provide air and missile defense to other
less-capable German surface combatants. An interesting development in Germany has been the debate surrounding planning for the “common” procurement of
a joint support ship (JSS). According to Vice Admiral
Schimpf, such a ship (akin to a U.S. LPD) would have
several missions, including military evacuation operations, humanitarian aid from the sea, conduct of land
operations from the sea, special forces employments,
and “ensured military maritime deployability.”31 Cur-
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rently two are planned, but they have not been funded because of debate over the cost to be allotted to
Germany’s army and air force.
The German navy’s contributions to NATO’s
maritime roles fall mainly within the lower end of the
operational spectrum. Germany’s cruising navy provides little in the way of power projection, but, for outof-area operations, the fleet adds to alliance maritime
security and cooperative security, and, though the
sea-control capabilities resident in these platforms, it
can contribute to collective defense. Should Germany
proceed with the JSS, it would have greater capacity to engage in maritime humanitarian assistance
operations and to marginally increase its ability to
project power.
The German navy—unlike the Royal and French
navies—does not have a desire to be a balanced force
capable of significant power projection, amphibious
operations, and strategic deterrence. As its aims have
been historically more modest, they have been more
capable of being supported. To the extent that Germany continues to support NATO maritime operations
of a largely constabulary nature, Germany’s contributions to NATO remain consistent. The interesting
question is not whether the navy supports Germany’s
worldview and view of itself; it is whether a nation
as powerful, rich, and networked as Germany is underinvesting in naval power while free-riding on the
backs of U.S., UK, and French naval capabilities to a
greater extent than other European nations.
SPAIN
In the last decade, Spain appeared to be a nation
putting its best defense (and naval) foot forward.
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With a moderately rising defense budget in the first
half of the decade and a number of international shipbuilding partnerships underway, the Spanish navy
was quantitatively and qualitatively improving. This
progress was halted by the global economic crisis that
has caused Spain to cut defense spending three times
since 2008: by 3 percent in 2009, by 6.2 percent in 2010,
and by nearly 17.6 percent in 2012.32 Interestingly,
Spain has not announced any plan to reduce commitments, missions, or capabilities, deciding instead to go
the route of other European nations, which is to favor
cuts in capacity rather than capability.33
The financial crisis–induced cuts were made to
a budget that was already one of the worst within
NATO in terms of meeting the 2 percent-of-GDP defense-spending goal agreed to by NATO members in
2002. In 2010, Spain spent just 0.72 percent of its GDP
on defense, with no year in the previous 5 years even
coming close to approaching 1 percent.34
Spain has sought a balanced navy, operating a
flagship aircraft carrier (Príncipe de Asturias), five AEGIS-enabled guided missile destroyers (DDGs) of the
Álvaro de Bazan class, six frigates of the Santa Maria class—a Spanish version of the U.S. Navy’s FFG7-class guided missile frigates—and four Galernaclass diesel submarines, in addition to three principal
amphibious ships (see Figure 4-4).35
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Europe,” The Military Balance 2013, Vol. 113, No. 1, pp. 89-198; International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO and Non-NATO Europe,” The Military Balance 2000, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 35-108;
and International Institute for Strategic Studies, “NATO,” The
Military Balance 1995, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 33-67.

Figure 4-4. Spain (Total Ships by Category).
Spain’s shipbuilding industry has competed
strongly on the world market, cooperating with
France’s state-owned DCNS on the Scorpène submarine program, which morphed into Spain’s S-80 class,
four of which remain under construction even in light
of ongoing defense cuts.36 Additionally, Spanish shipbuilders are constructing the second of two 27,000-ton
Canberra-class LHDs for the Royal Australian Navy.37
The primary threat to Spain’s navy from ongoing
budget woes is its inability to modernize and maintain
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fleet size. Insufficient funds in 2012 caused the navy to
cannibalize one of its four Galerna-class submarines
for parts to keep the other three boats operational.38
Additionally, five vessels were decommissioned in
2012, and in early-2013, even the Príncipe de Asturias
was decommissioned. The 2012 budget virtually eliminated spending for the majority of Spain’s 19 major
defense-wide procurement programs.39
Spain’s contributions to NATO’s maritime roles,
while not in the class of the UK or France, remain
relatively strong in what is admittedly an increasingly
weak field. The loss of its aircraft carrier and the decline in ship numbers essential to complex ASW and
ASUW missions have been somewhat offset by the
emergence of the five highly capable F100 destroyers
equipped with the U.S. AEGIS system featuring the
SPY-1D radar. Additionally, Spain’s modest amphibious capability contributes to both power projection
and humanitarian missions.
ITALY
Italy historically fields a balanced fleet with aircraft
carriers, diesel submarines, surface combatants, and
amphibious ships. Without an undersea strategic deterrent, its navy resembles that of Spain, though somewhat larger and more powerful. Like the other navies
surveyed, it is getting smaller. Its shrinking predates
the global financial crisis, but financial restraints have
clearly accelerated the condition.
The Italian navy has a goal of allocating 50 percent
of its budget to personnel costs; 25 percent to investment and procurement; and 25 percent to operations,
maintenance, and training. However, personnel costs
have consumed upward of 70 percent of the budget in
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recent years, even as the navy strove to keep important acquisition programs going. This has inevitably
squeezed the operations, maintenance, and training
budget, which was allotted only 11.2 percent of the
2012 budget.40
In May 2012, in testimony before parliament, the
navy’s chief of staff called the current force structure
“unsustainable,” announcing plans to retire 26 to 28
ships by 2017.41 Recent austerity measures have seen
major purchases reduced or delayed. The head of Italy’s navy stated that “funding issues” exist with the
final two of the six frigates Italy has thus far ordered
from the Franco-Italian FREMM program.42 Two more
German U212A submarines will be purchased, but
likely at the cost of retiring the Sauro-class boats, reducing the current submarine fleet from six to four.43 Italy
initially planned to purchase six Horizon-class AAW
destroyers produced by an earlier joint venture with
France, but by 2006 judged two sufficient for escort of
its carriers or amphibious warships.44
With respect to NATO maritime roles, Italy, like
the UK, has favored power projection over sea control.
This is plain from Italy’s current order of battle, which
features an aging and shrinking frigate force (see Figure 4-5). The FREMM program appears designed to
bring additional balance to the fleet by increasing seacontrol capabilities. The navy’s chief of staff has reiterated the service’s strong desire for 10 FREMM ships,
while admitting that Italy’s shaky finances threaten
this goal.45
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Figure 4-5. Italy (Total Ships by Category).
With respect to higher-end missions including air
and missile defense, the new Andrea Doria–class destroyers are a formidable escort with capabilities tested against advanced cruise-missile targets. However,
they number only two. When the Durand de la Penne
class retires its medium-range surface-to-air missiles
in “5 to 6 years,” Italy will be left with only two effective anti-air escorts.46
The Italian navy is headed in the same direction as
the UK, France, and Spain: it will have a technologically advanced naval force structure that is balanced
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among power projection, amphibious operations, and
classic sea-control missions but that is dramatically
smaller than its year 2000 predecessor.47 Like other
NATO navies, Italy believes the prudent path is to
keep the basic architecture for a fleet with global influence while procuring ships in numbers that raise
doubt as to how influential such a navy could be.
WHERE STANDS NATO?
The major navies of the NATO alliance (including the U.S. Navy) have much in common. With the
exception of Germany, the focus remains on having
a “balanced fleet” capable of the spectrum of naval
operations from cooperative security through war at
sea and power projection. Of course, France and the
UK continue to maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent
through ballistic missile submarines.
It is not inconceivable that in the near future (early-2020s), only the United States, France, and the UK
will routinely operate aircraft carriers within NATO,
with the UK program seemingly always on the edge
of the budgetary chopping block. The difficulty
NATO had in waging air surveillance and strike from
the sea during the Libya operation, without a U.S.
carrier, is likely to be exacerbated. But even if the UK
and France continue to operate carriers, the likely cost
will be reduced global presence in maritime security
and constabulary missions that require a larger fleet
of blue-water surface combatants. Those countries are
likely to be willing to pay that price, as the ability to
contribute carrier-striking power to U.S.-led operations—NATO and otherwise—continues to provide a
sine qua non of naval relevance.
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The desire to maintain a balanced fleet—irrespective of its size—cannot help but raise the question of
whether what is driving these decisions is as much
about national pride as national or alliance strategy.
Certainly, eliminating either their aircraft carriers or
their ballistic missile submarines would free up funds
for an expanded French or British fleet of surface
combatants.
Moreover, China’s naval renaissance impacts
NATO nations’ force-structure decisions. As the United States turns more of its interest to the Pacific, baseline security requirements in the Mediterranean will
become more important to Europe’s NATO navies,
perhaps creating greater incentive to resource them.
Additionally, both France and the UK see themselves
as global nations with global interests that extend far
into the Pacific. If these nations perceive China’s rise
as threatening these interests, they will likely find their
navies too small to provide any real impact, given the
great distances involved and the paucity of ships to
maintain constant presence. There is a real tension between global presence and a “balanced fleet,” one that
currently only the United States is able to resolve, and
barely at that.
The United States must come to grips with the
likelihood that, even with its Navy declining in size,
over time, it will comprise an increasing percentage
of alliance striking power. The 2007 maritime strategy
designated the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf as well
as the Western Pacific as the U.S. Navy’s two major
operational hubs, recognizing in print what had been
practiced operationally since the First Gulf War. This
posture leaves the Mediterranean routinely without
carrier or amphibious striking power, something that
was evident in the early days of the Libya campaign.

87

With European carrier-striking power likely to wane,
the United States will find itself trying to stretch its
11-carrier fleet across three operational hubs, something it did in the 1980s with 15 carriers. While 11
aircraft carriers are currently written into public law
as the minimum number the Navy must maintain,
Congress can even change that if it sees fit.
Absent a crisis or a threat that manifests itself in
large part as a naval threat, Europe is unlikely to return to large, balanced fleets. Once lost, however, it
could take decades to rebuild naval force structure because of the capital-intensive nature of shipbuilding
and the time it takes to build sophisticated, modern
warships in an increasingly small number of capable
shipyards. NATO members should be wary about
continuing declines in force structure. While current
efforts to coordinate militaries (“pooling and sharing”) may on the surface seem beneficial, care must
be taken that such efforts are not simply window
dressing for further decline.
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CHAPTER 5
GERMAN HARD POWER:
IS THERE A THERE THERE?1
Patrick Keller
The opinions expressed in this chapter should be attributed to
the author alone. The author thanks his research assistant, Aylin
Matlé, for her support.

KEY POINTS
• G
 erman ambivalence on the use of military
power continues to bedevil German politicians
and leaders.
• A stagnant defense budget will be a challenge
to the German defense ministry’s plan to establish a leaner, more flexible, and more deployable
German armed forces.
• As Europe’s economic leader and central political actor, Germany should guide the way in
reversing the problematic decline in European
hard power.
Two very different stories are in competition for
the “grand narrative” of current German security
policy. The first could be called “look how far we’ve
come” and goes like this: Since reunification restored
the state to full sovereignty in 1990, a thriving Germany has accepted its increasing share of responsibility
in international security affairs. It has done so gradually—mindful of its historic baggage—but efficiently.
After the 1994 breakthrough decision by the Federal
Constitutional Court to allow out-of-area deployments
of the Bundeswehr (German armed forces), the forces
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have been partaking in many North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) missions, including the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan
and the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia.2
Currently, Germany deploys about 6,200 troops in
missions abroad; it is the third largest contributor to
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan and the lead nation in the NATO-led
Kosovo Force (KFOR). Thus, contemporary Germany
has finally established itself as a “normal nation” that
contributes to international stability. It does so—if
necessary—by military means as well, and certainly
in a manner that is commensurate with its size and
economic strength.
The other story could be called “too little, too late”
and scoffs at these alleged achievements. From this
perspective, German security policy during the last
25 years has always oscillated between two conflicting conclusions drawn from German history. One is
never again to stand opposed to the United States and
Germany’s (major) European neighbors; the other is
never again to experience war. Hence, although Germany has made military contributions to international
missions, it has never done so by its own initiative.
Germany’s allies (mostly the United States) and partners in the EU had to drag Germany into its commitments. As a consequence, German leaders of various
political persuasions have always tried to commit as
few troops with as many caveats (such as restricted
rules of military engagement) as possible without
losing face among allies and friends. One can debate
whether this is a prudent strategy and whether it
worked well, but few would argue that it is a policy
befitting the most prosperous, populous, and politically influential nation-state in the EU.
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Every German security policy expert puts forward
a version of one of these two stories or a combination
of both, depending on circumstance. (The politically
savviest tell the first story to international audiences,
while saving the second story for domestic consumption.) This unresolved “grand narrative” debate betrays German policymakers’ fundamental insecurity
about their country’s role in the world and about the
proper bearing for a leading power. What is even
more curious, however, is how abstract this debate really is: very few talk seriously about the fundamentals
of German security and defense policy—that is, about
Germany’s military capabilities.
Both narratives implicitly assume that German
military capabilities exist in sufficient number and
quality to give policymakers a broad range of strategic
choices, while in fact such hard power assets are waning in Germany and almost everywhere else in the
West.3 If current trends continue, a different pair of
competing stories might occur because “we cannot, as
we are simply lacking the capabilities to do so,” versus
the more sophisticated, “We cannot fight anymore because we do not want to and took all necessary steps
to prevent us from having those capabilities.” Either
way, the continuation of current trends will result in
calamity—not just for German security interests but
also for the overall stability of a liberal international
system.
GERMAN ARMED FORCES IN
TIMES OF AUSTERITY
Since 1990, the Bundeswehr has been undergoing
constant reform. Main drivers of these reforms were
the incorporation of the East German army (German
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Democratic Republic’s National People’s Army) into
the Bundeswehr, the adaptation to new tasks in a
changed security landscape after the Cold War, and
the constraints of a limited defense budget. In fact,
the military and the German ministry got so tired of
the unending reform cycles that current minister of
defense Thomas de Maizière prefers instead to call
his reform a new orientation (Neuausrichtung). Tellingly, this latest wave of Bundeswehr reform did
not originate with a security-political decision by the
defense minister but with a budget decision by the
finance minister.
This daunting requirement propelled then–minister of defense Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg to initiate
the most far-reaching reform of the Bundeswehr since
its founding in 1955. In a first step, he killed one of his
conservative party’s sacred cows: conscription. The
practicality (and feasibility) of maintaining a conscription army in a post–Cold War security environment
that required leaner and more professional forces had
been contested for years. Sold as a cost-saving exercise in dramatic financial times by Germany’s most
popular minister, protests against the change were
suddenly soft. As it turned out, however, ending conscription did not save money but created extra cost for
recruiting and maintaining salary levels competitive
with the private sector.
In response to the 2008 global financial crisis and
the ensuing European debt crisis, German Chancellor
Angela Merkel’s government adopted a constitutional
amendment limiting new federal debt to 3.5 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP). To comply with this
break on debt (Schuldenbremse), in 2010, Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble prescribed every ministry an
exact amount of money to be saved over the following
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4 years. In relation to its overall budget, defense had to
cut the most: €8.3 billion until 2014. Considering that
the annual German defense budget is only about €30
billion, the prescribed reduction was substantial—especially for a military establishment already existing
on limited means.
Thus, other elements of zu Guttenberg’s reform
package—downsizing the armed forces, reducing
procurement of new weapons systems and platforms,
trimming resources for research and development
(R&D) for future systems, and increasing cooperation with EU partners on military matters (“pooling
and sharing”)—became even more relevant. The actual concepts behind those general ideas, however,
remained nebulous. When zu Guttenberg had to resign in March 2011 over allegations of plagiarism in
his dissertation, it fell to de Maizière, zu Guttenberg’s
successor, to develop a strategy that satisfied both
the treasurers and the generals. Such a strategy, de
Maizière decided, should consider Germany’s negative demographic trend, should be derived from an
analysis of Germany’s political and security situation,
and should be financially sustainable.
Surprisingly, de Maizière—who is one of Angela
Merkel’s closest advisers and was, in her first term,
the chief of her chancellery—proved capable of working under less harsh conditions than assumed: the
prescribed cuts of €8.3 billion were taken off the table.
To the contrary, the administration and parliament
even agreed to a slight increase in defense spending
and to project more modest reductions over the next 2
years. (See Table 5-1.)
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Year

Defense Spending
(in billions of euros)

% of GDP

2006

27.87

1.2

2007

28.38

1.2

2008

29.45

1.2

2009

31.18

1.3

2010

31.11

1.3

2011

31.55

1.2

2012

31.70

1.2

2013

33.30

To be determined

2014

30.90 (projected)

To be determined

2015

30.40 (projected)

To be determined

Source: Federal Statistical Office of Germany, “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen” (National Accounts), available from
www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Indikatoren/Konjunkturindika
toren/VolkswirtschaftlicheGesamtrechnungen/vgr111.html; Federal
Ministry of Defence, “2012 Defence Budget,” August 14, 2012,
available from www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxBCoNADAB_tJFCL976iqqXJdYQg0kqa3b7ffVQhjkNDExw4diEMeTrqDDA-JF-_qXZGicT lyOoSLXUqATJIlydjxXrpUZ-dN0zLVQyblFJlfI_
wfueK8NIDrv Z6wSyiBio/; and German Bundestag, Unterrichtung
durch die Bundesregierung (Briefing by the Federal Government:
The Federal Budget 2011 to 2015), December 8, 2011, available
from dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/066/1706601.pdf.

Table 5-1. German Defense Spending
as a Percentage of GDP.
From 1991 until 1997, German defense spending
was continually decreasing (from about €28 billion to
€23 billion and, correspondingly, from approximately
2 percent of GDP to 1.6 percent). With the Kosovo
War, the “peace dividend” era was over. Since 2001,
defense spending has been on a slow but steady rise,
with only minor cuts in 2003 and 2010. The financial
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crisis, starting in 2008, did not have a discernible effect on this trend. Indeed, the projected cuts for 2014
and 2015 might yet be reversed—after all, the administration’s original projected defense budget for 2013
was €31.4 billion, well below the €33.3 billion that was
actually allocated.
At the same time, German increases in defense
spending have remained modest and have not even
offset the effects of inflation over the past 20 years.
In real terms, defense spending has been decreasing.
Moreover, with defense spending at around 1.25 percent of GDP, Germany obviously does not make defense a budget priority. (The budget of the ministry of
labor and welfare is more than four times the size of
that of the ministry of defense.) Needless to say, Germany does not meet the pledge made by the NATO
allies at the 2002 Prague NATO Summit to spend at
least 2 percent of national GDP on defense.
The budget increase of about 5 percent in 2013
seems striking, but it is because of a significant rise in
the personnel cost of federal employees and a projected
rent hike for some buildings used by the armed forces.
It is not a gain in substance for military planners;4 in
fact, the budget share allocated to the investment in
actual defense-related capabilities (including not only
military procurements but also R&D) has declined in
both absolute and relative terms. In 2012, R&D and
procurement constituted approximately 23.1 percent
(€7.4 billion) of the total defense budget, but was reduced to 21.4 percent (€7.1 billion) for 2013. The figures for military procurements alone also reflect this,
with a reduction from 17.2 percent to 15.4 percent (or
€5.5 billion to €5.1 billion in absolute figures).5
In an effort to ease the budgetary squeeze, de
Maizière proceeded to trim ministry structures and
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to downsize the armed forces. Upon completion of
his new orientation in 2017, the Bundeswehr is envisioned to consist of no more than 185,000 active duty
military and 55,000 civilian employees (down from
250,000 and 75,000, respectively, in 2010), with 10,000
soldiers deployable simultaneously in two areas of
operation (up from 7,000).6 In the new personnel structure, the army, air force, and navy will consist of approximately 62,000 soldiers, 32,000 airmen, and 16,000
sailors, respectively, and the Joint Support Service and
the medical service will consist of roughly 46,000 and
19,000, respectively.7 (The remaining members are
distributed among equipment, infrastructure, human
resources, and other services.)
This development is accompanied by reductions
in military materiel through cuts in prospective procurement and decommissioning of active systems.
Although the German Navy is to remain more or less
the same (albeit at a lower level of personnel), these
reductions will strongly affect Germany’s army and
air force.8 (Table 2 shows some of the prospective
changes.) To assess what this means for German defense policy, one needs to consider the strategic context of these changes.
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Current or
orginally planned
number

New ceiling

350

225

410/70

350/0

Armored howitzer 2000

148

89

Multipurpose helicopter NH-90

122

80

Support helicopter Tiger

80

40

Eurofighter Thyphoon

177

140

Combat aircraft Tornado

185

85

80/60

60/40

System
Combat tank Leopard 2
Armored personnel carriers Puma/
Marder

Transport aircraft C-160/A400M
Multipurpose warship (MKS 180)

8

6

Naval mine countermeasures unit

20

10

Source: Federal Ministry of Defense, “Ressortbericht zum Stand
der Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr” (Interagency Report on
the State of the Reorientation of the Bundeswehr), Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, May 8, 2013, p. 24, available from www.
bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYvBCsIwEET_aDcBRerNEhSvvdh4S9sQVpqkrJt68eNNDs7AO8 xj8Im1ye0UnFBObsUR7Uzn6QNT3AO8cuG6QqREb_FMJeKjfRYPc05eGsUnocrATjLDllnWZgpzNUALWqVNr7T6R3-70-1qzUEfzb0fc Ivx8gOBJaR2/.

Table 5-2. Change in German Defense Procurement.
STRATEGIC BACKDROP AND LEVEL
OF AMBITION
According to Minister de Maizière, the cuts described in Table 5-2 are not primarily dictated by budget constraints but reflect security-political considerations. Using Germany’s 2006 white book as a starting
point, the minister outlined the strategic thinking
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that was to guide the “new orientation” in a series of
documents and speeches. The most important of those
are the Defense Policy Guidelines (DPG) and and the
principles (Eckpunkte) papers, both published in May
2011.9 They provide a rationale for the German military in the early-21st century by explaining Germany’s
vested interest in a stable liberal international order
and by analyzing current and likely future threats to
that order.10 The ministry emphasizes that neither retrenchment nor the sole focus on traditional concepts
of territorial defense are promising strategies in dealing with these challenges. Hence, Germany should
take on a greater share of the burden in upholding
global order, including military contributions to UN,
EU, or NATO missions.
Consequently, the “new orientation” seeks to develop a sleeker force that is highly deployable and effective in crisis management and crisis resolution missions. “The ability to fight . . . is thus a benchmark for
operational readiness,” states the DPG.11 Because of
Germany’s size and geostrategic position, the ability to
fight cannot be limited to a few specialized and highly
qualified capabilities but must encompass a full-spectrum force, the DPG argues. Hence, a key slogan for
the new orientation’s force structure is “breadth rather
than depth” (“Breite vor Tiefe”), meaning a preference
for “a little bit of everything” over further military
specialization. This strategy incurs deficits in sustainability and effectiveness in operations but is said to
give Germany a key political role in cooperating with
European partners of small and medium size. By offering broad basic capabilities, Germany allows other
partners to develop highly specialized forces that can
then be pooled and shared in common operations—
presumably, at times, under German leadership and
with financial benefits for all.
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In assessing this strategy and its translation into
military reform, several problems stand out. For instance, with the end of conscription, it is yet unclear
whether the envisioned troop strength will be sustainable, and at what cost. To maintain a force of 185,000
troops, about 12,500 new career and longer-term service members need to be recruited each year.12 Given
the rule of thumb that the Bundeswehr needs four
applicants to fill one job satisfactorily, this is more of
a challenge than it might seem at first glance. Early
data on recruitment under the new system have been
inconclusive.
Even if the ranks can be filled, the restructuring
of the Bundeswehr into a rapidly deployable fighting force still stops half way. Of 185,000 troops, the
government is only aiming to deploy a maximum of
10,000. That is a low level of ambition, even if one
takes into account that to deploy 10,000, an additional
20,000 will be either in preparation and training to
deploy or resting from a previous deployment. The
political decision to limit each tour to just 4 months
(instead of the more common 6 to 8 months) adds further pressure on personnel planning. Finally, it should
be noted that having a capability to deploy 10,000 personnel is the defense ministry’s stated goal; it remains
unclear whether it will be achieved.
The idea of a force geared toward deployable operations abroad is not fully realized in terms of military
hardware either. The Bundeswehr still lacks essential
capabilities in areas such as tactical and strategic airlift.
The proposed further reductions in helicopters and
planned procurement of transport aircraft (A400M)
do not mesh with the strategic analysis set out by the
ministry, but they are a consequence of rising prices
for new equipment and limited budgets.13
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Especially in terms of capabilities, the current reform is designed very tightly, not allowing for much
wiggle room for when a specific system runs into development problems or fails to materialize altogether.
As the procurement process is notoriously unpredictable, this can thwart strategic planning—with serious
consequences for German freedom of action. The most
recent example of this is the cancellation of the unmanned aerial vehicle Euro Hawk because of licensing problems.14 The ministry’s decision, which came
rather late in the procurement process, prompted a
parliamentary investigation into whether money was
wasted on a system that was known to be unfit. In
the midst of a federal election campaign, that investigation received much attention, overshadowing the
more central question of why Germany needs (armed
and unarmed) unmanned aerial vehicles and how to
fill this capability gap.
Beyond these issues of manpower, hardware, and
procurement, there are also political problems. The
rather ambitious role envisioned by the defense ministry for German armed forces in international security
is lacking support from the public, parliament, and
even parts of Chancellor Merkel’s coalition government. Most Bundeswehr missions abroad are not supported by a majority of the German people. German
support for the largest and most well-known mission,
ISAF, has been dwindling for years, from 64 percent in
2005 to 44 percent in 2010 to 37 percent in 2011.15 More
consequential than this assessment of current or past
missions is the deep reluctance to engage in similar
operations again.
This tension is perhaps best encapsulated in foreign minister Guido Westerwelle’s self-proclaimed
doctrine, the Culture of Military Restraint, which is at
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odds with de Maizière’s plea to take on “more military responsibility.”16 It is no accident that the DPG
paper issued by de Maizière is only a ministerial one;
its bold assignment of tasks to the Bundeswehr would
most likely not be approved by Westerwelle’s foreign
ministry and would therefore not make it into a government-approved white book or similar statement by
the German government as a whole. This lack of strategic consensus, of course, also affects the reform of
the armed forces. In fact, it goes a long way in explaining the root causes of the problems outlined earlier.
These political divisions and the general desire not
to repeat the Afghanistan experience point to a larger
issue: Germany’s political leadership is instinctively
reluctant to use hard power. The use of military means
is suspected to be rarely effective in producing desired
political outcomes and always incurs political costs at
home. As a nation deeply ashamed of the horrors of
Nazi militarism and having been reeducated as freeriding consumers of security, Germany still struggles
with the appropriate approach to military means as an
instrument of foreign policy. Moreover, the average
German does not feel threatened by turmoil abroad
and sees little or no connection between safety at home
and the need to maintain a stable liberal international
order. It is little or no surprise, then, that so much of
German foreign policy is predicated instead on trade,
soft diplomacy, and on occasion, unilateral disarmament initiatives.
This combination makes Germany an unpredictable partner in international security affairs. There
is always a chance that Germany’s aversion to hard
power will trump its strategic interests. Most prominently, that was the case in Libya in 2011 when Germany abstained in the United Nations Security Coun-
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cil—the first time it did not vote with France or the
United States in that body—and subsequently refused
to let its airborne surveillance capability (AWACS)
contribute to NATO’s Unified Protector mission.17
AWACS is a typical multinational capability, the
very embodiment of the pooled and shared arrangements of “smart defense” that Germany keeps advocating in both the EU and NATO councils. Given
such an example, it is not surprising that pooling-andsharing arrangements are making little progress these
days. This is not just a problem for Germany’s and
the EU’s credibility as effective actors in international
security, but also for the “new orientation” that is
designed with a view to deeper European defense integration. The whole concept of “breadth rather than
depth,” for instance, will prove hollow without sufficient cooperation with others, especially in Europe.
CONCLUSION
Assessing Germany’s hard power is a treacherous
undertaking. There are two main reasons for this: first,
in the midst of far-reaching Bundeswehr reform, all
hard facts—from the eventual size of the force to actual capabilities—are uncertain and in flux. Minister
de Maizière aims to complete his new orientation in
2017; until then, many of the numbers discussed here
are goals or data whose programs are works in progress. While certain trends are discernible, their extrapolation is by no means reliable. After all, the Merkel
government has undertaken several surprising reversals on defense issues already—for example, the sudden suspension of conscription or the unexplained
retraction of the announced €8.3 billion in defense
budget cuts.
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Second, the development of German hard power
over the last 10 to 20 years has been characterized by
deep ambiguity, in terms of both posture and policy.
This is a reflection of the two competing stories about
the grand narrative of Germany’s security policy. In
describing this ambiguity, it is important to note that
the topic of German hard power does not lend itself
to a straight story of unmitigated decline. The study
of German hard power is not the opening line of a bitter joke. It rests on a modest but solid base of steady
budgets in recent years and acquisition programs that,
while modest in scale, are technologically advanced.
This cautiously positive assessment of German hard
power gains particular traction in comparison to the
developments of other European nations, large or
small. In the conventional military balance among
Europe’s big three, for instance, Germany is catching up—although admittedly, this is due in no small
part to the severe defense budget cuts in both France
and the United Kingdom (UK).18 While Paris and
London command crucial capabilities that Germany
does not—nuclear weapons, amphibious forces, aircraft carrier(s)—these high-value assets eat up much
of their shrinking budgets, giving Germany an edge
in other areas such as tanks (vis-à-vis the UK) and
aircraft (vis-à-vis France).
THE GERMAN MILITARY IN AFGHANISTAN
German military involvement in the ISAF in Afghanistan epitomizes the ambiguities of German security policy discussed here. It can serve as an example
for both narratives presented in the introduction: that
of a strong and increasingly confident nation shouldering its share of the burden of upholding interna-
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tional stability and that of an indecisive nation pursuing a minimalist approach to its role in international
security affairs because of its instinctive rejection of
hard power means.
After September 11, 2001, Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder declared Germany’s “unlimited solidarity”
with the United States, and it was in Germany’s former capital where, in accordance with the international Bonn Agreement, the foundation for ISAF was laid.
Schröder put his own chancellorship on the line when
he combined his decision to send German armed
forces to Afghanistan with a parliamentary vote of
confidence. He won narrowly. Also, it was Schröder’s
defense minister, Peter Struck (a Social Democrat as
well), who coined the enduring rationale for this mission of the Bundeswehr, reflecting a new reality in the
age of globalized threats such as international terrorism: “Germany’s security is also to be defended at the
Hindu Kush.”19
It is telling that such strong political backing was
required for a relatively modest contribution: the
initial number of German soldiers to be deployed
to Afghanistan was a mere 1,200. Today, almost 12
years later, the size of the mandate encompasses 4,400
soldiers. These numbers indicate that Germany underestimated the difficulty of the challenge at hand
and chose a strategy of minimalist incrementalism
in dealing with it. This is also evident from the fact
that German decisionmakers always emphasized
the nonviolent nature of the Bundeswehr’s job in the
stable northern provinces of Afghanistan: networked
security (Vernetzte Sicherheit), a German version of
NATO’s “comprehensive approach,” was the key
phrase, meaning that the armed forces did everything
from painting schools to drilling wells, but would
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refrain from engaging the enemy. In fact, one of the
German caveats in the NATO plan of operations for
Afghanistan dictated that German soldiers were to
shoot only in self-defense in face of an attack or imminent threat—after having yelled warnings in several
languages. The German parliament’s somewhat fanciful insistence on a clear separation between Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM (understood as the bloody
counterterrorism mission in which Germany could
not participate) and ISAF (understood as the civilian
reconstruction mission in which German soldiers participated as a kind of armed technical relief agency)
underscored this general discomfort with hard power
in action.
True to its reactive nature, German policy toward
Afghanistan did not change until the deteriorating
security situation in northern Afghanistan revealed
a glaring gap between rhetoric and reality. In April
2010, Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg was the first high-ranking German official who
called the Bundeswehr’s mission a war. Fearing the
legal and political implications, he added “colloquially speaking.” (Officially, “non-international armed
conflict within the parameters of international law”
remained the German phrase of choice.20) Around the
same time, some of the caveats were dropped, and the
extreme restrictions of the rules of engagement were
abandoned. As it turned out, despite limited equipment—in tactical airlift and reconnaissance, for example—the Bundeswehr performed admirably against
the insurgents.
Between January 2002 and July 2013, 54 German
soldiers lost their lives in Afghanistan. Although Germany has never before experienced such high casualties, public reaction was muted. Arguably, this is a
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sign of what former German president Horst Köhler
called the public’s “benevolent indifference” toward
its armed forces rather than an expression of general
agreement with Germany’s fight alongside its allies
and the Afghan government. After all, when in September 2009 an American fighter jet responded to a
German colonel’s call, striking two fuel tankers captured by insurgents and killing more than 90 civilians
in the process, Germany—8 years into the war—had
its first intense public debate about military operations
in ISAF. Former defense minister Franz Josef Jung; his
deputy Peter Wichert; and the highest-ranking German soldier, Inspector General Wolfgang Schneiderhan, lost their jobs over the incident.21
The debate also highlighted increasing frustration
with the perceived lack of progress in Afghanistan.
Given the length and cost of the mission, Germany
experienced the same kind of fatigue other allies did;
strategic concern quickly turned to finding an honorable exit strategy. The changing face of ISAF was the
main catalyst for this. The mission had been sold to
the German public as a stabilization effort in which
German forces would assist in Afghanistan’s peaceful development toward democracy and prosperity; it
was not advertised as a prolonged war against insurgents of dubious background and motivation.
Accordingly, NATO’s decision to redeploy by 2014
was met with an audible sigh of relief in Berlin and
in most other member states. As of yet, it is uncertain
how many Western troops will remain in Afghanistan
after that date—not as a fighting force, but as advisers
in training the Afghan security forces. It is a testament
to Germany’s complicated relationship with its hard
power that it was the first NATO state to specify an
“after 2014” contingent of about 800 soldiers. While
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most observers applaud this bold commitment to alliance solidarity and Afghan stability, German officials keep their fingers crossed that this training
mission does not evolve into a war-fighting operation
once again.
Moreover, the direction of de Maizière’s reform
is sensible: focus on deployability, create leaner and
more flexible forces, push for better cooperation
among EU and NATO partners, and emphasize the
need to be able to actually fight. So when the Atlantic Council states that “German military weakness is
NATO’s most significant problem,” one could easily
think of weaker and faster declining powers within the
alliance—and more significant problems, too, such as
diverging threat perceptions among most members.22
Still, there is something to the charge brought forth
by the council and others. The numbers—stable as
they may be—are not impressive for a state of Germany’s size, location, wealth, and political power. They
are, of course, even less impressive in comparison to
the increases in the defense budgets of rising powers such as China, Brazil, and India. If Germany will
one day be able to send 10,000 soldiers into combat
abroad equipped with some of the remaining Leopard
2 tanks, or to deploy abroad a dozen brand-new Eurofighter Typhoons (a nonstealthy aircraft of disputed
competitiveness), will it make much of a difference?
One of NATO’s lessons from the 2011 war in Libya
is that without U.S. support, the European allies, led
by Britain and France, could not mount a sustainable
campaign for lack of ammunition and planes, among
other things.23 Germany did not participate in that operation against one of the world’s weakest militaries,
but in terms of more effective air-defense suppression
and close-air support, it would hardly have improved
Europe’s performance in any case.
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That Germany did not even try to make a difference in this UN-mandated NATO mission makes matters worse. It is indicative of a disconnect between the
country’s strategic interests and its political will to use
force. For every step forward toward a normalization
of German security policy (Kosovo and Afghanistan),
there is a step backward (utterly restrictive rules of
engagement and Libya). When German armed forces
are sent into international missions, it is usually, first
and foremost, explained to the public as a necessary
act of solidarity with Germany’s allies. Although this
is a good argument, it should never be a substitute for
a lucid formulation of German interests and a cleareyed analysis of the threat to be countered.
One emerging threat is the increasing weakness of
the European states when it comes to their hard power
capabilities and thus their ability to secure their own
periphery, let alone their global strategic interests.
Germany, as the undisputed economic powerhouse
and central political actor in Europe, would be well
advised to lead the charge in reversing this dangerous
trend. This, however, would require much stronger
leadership on German security policy than the country has enjoyed over most of the last 2 decades.
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CHAPTER 6
SOUTH KOREA:
RESPONDING TO THE NORTH KOREAN
THREAT1
Bruce E. Bechtol
KEY POINTS
•	South Korea faces a clear, present, and evolving threat from North Korea, with Kim Jong-un
showing no indication of moving away from
his father’s violent and corrupt policies.
•	South Korea’s response to the North Korean
threat has been uneven, with increased capabilities in some areas but less than what is needed
in others.
•	A key issue facing the Republic of Korea (ROK)U.S. alliance is command and control of allied
forces during wartime on the Korean Peninsula. A combined operating force must continue
to exist to ensure full readiness and capability.
When analyzing the readiness, capabilities, and future initiatives of ROK’s military, one must take into
account the unique geopolitical position in which the
ROK government finds itself. There is no ambiguous
set of threats for South Korea. Rather, the largest and
most dangerous threat to the stability and security
of the Korean Peninsula is obvious: the Democratic
People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK).
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It is for this threat that policymakers in Seoul must
ensure their military is ready. Providing an adequate
defense against this threat is the cornerstone of the
ROK–U.S. alliance and the most important foreign
policy issue between these two allies. As survival of
the nation-state is the number one priority for any national leader, all other issues for Seoul will be ancillary
as long as there is a DPRK.
Recognizing that the threatening behavior of its
belligerent neighbor to the north is the key military
issue for the ROK, it is important to analyze that threat
to determine what the priorities of the South Korean
military will be and how the threat will influence planning for the ROK–U.S. alliance. Since 2010, North Korea has conducted two violent military provocations:
one with a submarine that sank a ROK naval ship and
one that involved an artillery barrage against a South
Korean island that killed both military and civilian
personnel.2 North Korea also conducted yet another
nuclear test in February 2013.3
In addition, the DPRK has shown with a test
launch conducted in mid-December 2012 that it is now
capable (or close to it) of building a missile that can hit
Alaska, Hawaii, or perhaps even the west coast of the
United States.4 Pyongyang also has the capability of
targeting all of South Korea and most of Japan with its
ballistic missiles.5
North Korea has also continued to advance the
capabilities and numbers of its armored forces, longrange artillery forces, and special operations forces.6
Finally, Kim Jong-un has shown no indication that he
has any intentions except to carry on the violent and
corrupt policies of his father, Kim Jong-il. This means,
of course, that South Korea and the ROK–U.S. alliance
must continue to prepare for the multifaceted North
Korean threat for the foreseeable future.
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INITIATIVES AGAINST THE NORTH KOREAN
THREAT
Despite calls by the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003–08) for a “balancer policy”—a policy that
moved South Korea away from its traditional security
ties with the United States to a more neutral or balancing role between the United States, Japan, and the
old communist bloc of China, Russia, and North Korea—the fact remains that the primary issue for which
Seoul must build its military capabilities and plan its
contingencies is North Korea.7 This process has been
exacerbated by the fact that the threat the DPRK presents has evolved and become even more complicated
in recent years.
Following the two violent provocations in 2010
already described, it became obvious that the South
Korean government and military needed to take steps
to counter future provocations from North Korea.
As noted North Korean specialist Robert M. Collins
has stated:
Since the end of the Korean Conflict in 1953, the ROK–
U.S. alliance has done a very good job of deterring
against a war initiated by North Korea. The alliance
has not done a good job of deterring North Korean
provocations.8

Thus, the planning, policies, and procedures South
Koreans initiated (and coordinated with their key ally
in Washington) are very timely and needed now more
than ever.
During April 2013, it was reported that the United
States and South Korea had finalized a plan to respond more forcefully and appropriately to North
Korean provocations.9 This new “counterprovoca121

tion” plan will ensure that there is a speedy “response
in kind” that still prevents escalation to all-out war.
The existence of the plan was also made public in part,
it seems, because Seoul and Washington wanted to
both warn the North Koreans and reassure the South
Korean populace.
In an earlier and equally important move, the South
Korean military established a separate Northwest Islands Command. The establishment of the new command and the appointment of a commander with the
autonomy to respond with necessary force in a timely
manner under more liberal rules of engagement empower the South Korean military to respond more effectively to violent provocations the North initiates in
the Northern Limit Line (NLL) area.10
Formally established in June 2011, the command
was first headed by Lieutenant General Yoo Nakjun, the commandant of the ROK Marine Corps, with
a Marine major general as deputy commander and
a staff that includes colonels from each of the ROK
military services. Built around a division-sized joint
unit, with the key contingents being the ROK Marine
Sixth Brigade and the Yeonpyeong Defense battalion,
the new command now has the ability to respond to
North Korean attacks more effectively and rapidly. As
such, ROK forces are now better positioned to deter
and defend against North Korean provocations.11
The attacks in 2010 and the rhetoric from North
Korea since have had the opposite effect of what
Pyongyang likely wanted. If anything, DPRK behavior has strengthened South Korea’s resolve to strike
back against North Korean aggression.12 The South
Korean Navy is now on a heightened state of readiness in the NLL area—the demarcation line in the
West (Yellow) Sea between the DPRK and ROK—and
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has been equipped with the best maritime equipment
that the government can provide.13
As part of its support for these new initiatives, the
United States also stepped up exercises and training
with ROK forces in the West Sea, close to the NLL
area.14 Although much of the effort for counterprovocation deterrence has focused on the NLL, this is not
the only area where readiness is being upgraded. For
example, in June 2013, additional self-propelled airdefense missiles were assigned to front-line units near
the demilitarized zone (DMZ).15
South Korea also faces a threat from the DPRK’s advances in cyber and electronic warfare. In recent years,
North Korea has engaged in a series of cyber and electronic warfare attacks against the South Korean military, government, businesses, and nonprofit entities.16
In response, the Defense Ministry established a Cyber
Policy Department in early-2013, and the National Intelligence Service announced that its third department
would give greater attention to “monitoring of cyberspace and telecommunications.”17 The North Koreans
reportedly have 3,000 to 4,000 personnel engaged in
cyber warfare. To enhance the ROK’s capability to
counter this rather large and well-trained force, the
Defense Ministry announced that it will be working
with the United States to deter and defend against this
emerging threat.18
Meanwhile, because North Korea used global positioning system (GPS) jamming on hundreds of commercial flights and maritime navigational units in
South Korea during 2012 and 2013, Seoul increased its
surveillance of North Korean electronic jammers. The
Ministry of Science and Future Planning announced
plans to set up a system that can track down the “attack point and impact of jamming attempts.”19
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The DPRK’s missile program has grown in both
numbers and capabilities. It poses a serious problem
to both South Korea and Japan. In response to that
threat, Tokyo acquired the land-based PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) from the United States,
deployed the Standard Missile (SM-3) on its Aegisequipped Japanese destroyers, joined the U.S.-led ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, and established
the Bilateral Joint Operating Command Center at Yokota Air Base with the United States to provide a common operating picture of any missile threat.20
In contrast, South Korea has not, as of yet, done
any of these things—though Seoul has begun to develop a less expensive and less capable BMD system of its
own. Despite the considerable threat the DPRK’s arsenal of missiles aimed at South Korea poses, as recently
as May 2013, the South Korean Defense Ministry reiterated the government’s intention not to participate in
a joint U.S.-ROK missile defense effort, let alone the
trilateral (Japan, U.S., and ROK) ballistic missile defense architecture suggested by the chairman of the
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey,
during a visit to South Korea in late April 2013.21
While keeping its distance from the kind of cooperation on missile defenses undertaken by Japan and the
United States, South Korea is moving forward with its
own missile defense upgrades; in a recent budget, the
defense ministry indicated it intends to spend nearly
14 percent of its entire budget on improving its missile defense capabilities.22 In 2012, for example, South
Korea purchased two Green Pine land-based missile
defense radars and, under new budget plans, recently
announced it would acquire PAC-3s.23 In addition,
South Korea announced in June 2013 that it would
equip its Aegis destroyers with the Standard Mis-

124

sile 6 (SM-6) for low-altitude defense against cruise
missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and aircraft. The
SM-6 is an upgrade to the SM-2s that were deployed
on South Korean Aegis destroyers.
More ambitiously, Seoul plans to establish a Missile Destruction System by 2020. According to reports,
the system will be designed to detect imminent North
Korean missile launches and enable South Korea to
strike missile sites before an attack can be carried out.
According to South Korean sources, the system will
involve “spy satellites, surveillance drones for monitoring and attack systems, including missiles, fighter
jets and warships.”24
Indeed, it appears that a key reason the United
States and South Korea negotiated new, more lenient
guidelines to the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MCTR) in 2012 was to give the ROK the option of
deploying longer-range missiles and more sophisticated drones to cover all of North Korea. Under the
previous MCTR 2001 agreement, South Korean missiles were limited in range to no more than 186 miles.
With the new accord, South Korean missiles will have
a maximum range of 500 miles, which is sufficient to
give them the capability of reaching any area of North
Korea from launch points well south of Seoul and the
DMZ.25 Although the new agreement regarding missile range adds to Seoul’s ability to target key nodes in
the North, actually doing so would be both an expensive undertaking and a capability the United States
already provides. In addition, it will do nothing to
enhance badly needed improvements in ROK ballistic
missile defense capabilities.
The fact remains that the missile defense systems
currently deployed by the South Koreans are inferior
to those currently deployed by the United States and
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Japan. If the ROK had simply purchased the systems
American experts recommended, such as the PAC-3
and SM-3, South Korea would be better prepared for a
ballistic missile attack from North Korea. In addition,
by joining a U.S.-led BMD system, the South Koreans
would have access to the U.S. Navy’s X-Band radar
and the U.S. Army’s land-based radar associated with
the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. The U.S.led system links together the capabilities of detection
and destruction systems around the globe and matches them up with mobile BMD platforms such as Aegisequipped ships.26 By going its own way when it comes
to missile defense, the South Korean government is
limiting its ability to defend itself and its citizens.
Cost Sharing and Repositioning U.S. Bases.
The cost for stationing U.S. forces in South Korea
has been, and remains, an important issue in both
South Korea and the United States. The perception
of some in the United States, particularly members of
Congress, has been that Seoul needs to do more to cover its “fair share” given the level of security the United
States provides its ally from North Korean aggression.
Americans see a South Korea that is now a thriving
democracy and an economic powerhouse and expect
the South Koreans to pay more of the cost for stationing U.S. troops there.27 Conversely, many on the left in
South Korea believe that their government is paying
more than its fair share, arguing that American estimates that South Korea has been paying 40–45 percent
of the basing costs are on the low side, and that South
Korea is already paying more than the 50 percent of
the costs for which Washington is calling.28
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The accord governing South Korean payments is
known as the “Special Measures Agreement” (SMA)
and covers nonpersonnel stationing costs (NPSC),
such as labor costs for South Korean employees working with U.S. forces, the purchase of logistics and supplies, and the construction of military facilities. The
first SMA took effect in 1991, and South Korea’s contribution levels have increased steadily as the costs
associated with NPSC have grown predictably.29 The
last SMA was signed in December 2009, with Seoul
and Washington agreeing that South Korea would
pay 760 billion won (roughly $570 million at the time)
for NPSC costs and Seoul also agreeing to cost hikes
not to exceed 4 percent a year.30 With the SMA set to
expire in December 2013, Washington and Seoul had
set the end of October as a deadline for reaching a new
agreement. Talks in October did not result in an agreement but the Americans keep pushing for an SMA
in which the South Koreans would pay 50 percent
of the cost. However, a new SMA was negotiated in
January 2014.31
Another important initiative is the Land Partnership Program, based largely on a 2006 agreement
between Washington and Seoul to consolidate significantly the U.S. military footprint in South Korea (see
Figure 6-1). The deadline initially set for completing
the consolidation was 2012, but, given the scale of the
endeavor, it is no surprise that the deadline has not
been exactly met, and a large portion of forces north
of Seoul are yet to be repositioned.
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Source: Ministry of National Defense, ROK, “Defense White
Paper,” 2006.

Figure 6-1. Projected Relocation of
U.S. Bases in South Korea.
Nevertheless, according to General James D. Thurman, commander of U.S. forces in Korea, “transitioning from 107 bases to less than 50” will ultimately
result in “enhanced force protection, survivability,
and lower cost maintenance in Korea.”32 The effect of
this plan is already saving money for both the United
States and South Korea.
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BUDGETS AND ACQUISITIONS: PAYING FOR
THE FUTURE
The Roh government in 2005 unleashed the most
substantial reform agenda in recent years for the
South Korean military, “Defense Reform 2020.” This
was the Roh government’s vision for a ROK military
that would be smaller, more modern, and capable of
global missions—not just one focused on dealing with
the North Korean threat. By 2020, the total military
manpower would be cut by some 25 percent, with the
ROK army seeing its numbers drop from 548,000 to
371,000—a loss of four corps and 23 divisions. These
cuts were combined with reductions in the time conscripts would have to serve in the nation’s army and
navy by 6 months and in the air force by 8 months,
with a deadline of 2014 for putting these new service
requirements in place. In theory, these reductions in
manpower would be made up with acquisition of
new, advanced military hardware and systems.33
The plan, however, suffered from a number of
problems. First, it required more resources than were
budgeted. Second, many experts assessed the original
schedule for systems acquisition and troop cuts to be
inadequate to account for North Korea’s own growing
asymmetric capabilities in nuclear and ballistic missile
weapons—a problem no doubt exacerbated by President Roh’s overly sanguine view of North Korea’s
own strategic intentions. Third, the plan did not anticipate the command-and-control requirements that
would flow from South Korea’s decision to transition
by 2015 to a more self-reliant force.34
Shortly after Lee Myung-bak was elected president
in 2008, his government moved to modify both the
substance and the timelines of Defense Reform Plan
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(DRP) 2020. Taking the threat from North Korea more
seriously, beginning in 2009, the ROK military reinforced plans to defend against the North Korean nuclear threat and to initiate troop cuts only after weapons systems have been brought online that would
make up for the decrease in manpower.
Specifically, the revised plan, made public in 2009,
included delaying the DRP 2020 reform endpoint to
2025, slowing defense budget increases as a result of
slowdown in the Korean economy, and raising the
planned 2020 troop level to 517,000 from the original
goal of 500,000. The Lee government also modified
the plan’s reduction in service time for conscripts,
with draftees in the army and the marines serving
21 months, navy conscripts 23 months, and air force
draftees 24 months. Even so, the country’s navy and
air force are still likely to face manpower shortages in
the coming years.35
The defense budget under President Roh began at
2.28 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) his first
year in office. This percentage gradually went up and
continued to go up after Lee Myung-bak assumed the
presidency. Under Lee, it peaked at 2.72 percent of
GDP in 2009 and was 2.60 percent in his last year in
office.36
Before assuming office in February 2013, South
Korean President Park Geun-hye stated that she intended to increase spending in light of Pyongyang’s
third nuclear test and its provocative behavior. In fact,
her announced plan is to increase the defense budget
at a higher rate than the overall state budget.37
In accord with those plans, the Defense Ministry
announced in April 2013 that it intended to spend an
extra $200 million during 2013—raising the 2013 budget from $30.5 billion to $30.7 billion. More recently,
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the ministry submitted a request to South Korea’s
legislature for a 2014-18 defense budget of $192.6 billion—an average annual expenditure of $38.52 billion. About half of 2013’s increase was earmarked
for strengthening defense capabilities along the ROK
western maritime border with North Korea, and a bit
less than half will be spent on upgrading existing conventional weaponry, such as South Korea’s self-propelled 155 millimeter (mm) howitzers (K9 Thunder)
and procuring additional unmanned reconnaissance
aircraft.38
But challenges remain—as shown by the sinking
of the ROKS Cheonan in March 2010 by a DPRK submarine. Increasing the ROK Navy’s antisubmarine
warfare capabilities should be a priority. Moreover,
some key mainline battle systems need replacing, but
replacements have been slow to come. One example
is the K-2 Black Panther, an indigenously produced
main battle tank intended to replace the Americanmade M-48 Patton tanks that the ROK Army still has
in its inventory. (M-48s date from the 1950s and were
the principal tank the U.S. Army used during the Vietnam War.) Mass production of the tank was originally
set to begin in 2011, but the project was set back by
numerous delays, including a failed engine durability
test just in 2013.39
Also worrisome is the fact that South Korea’s plan
to buy 60 new fighter jets has been delayed. Only
recently has the competition been reopened after all
three of the entries—Boeing’s F-15, Lockheed Martin’s
F-35, and European Aerospace Defense and Space
Company’s Eurofighter Typhoon—failed to fall below
the price level set by the ROK’s acquisition agency.40
The country needs to replace its very old fleet of F-4
Phantoms and F-5 Tigers, and the F-35 would be the
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most advanced aircraft of the three—but also the most
expensive. Whether South Korea’s defense budget can
accommodate such a purchase, whether offset proposals to reduce overall costs for the proposed acquisition can be arranged, or whether the government will
simply be forced to buy fewer planes remain open
questions.
WARTIME OPERATIONAL CONTROL: A KEY
DEFENSE ISSUE
Since 1994, the Combined Forces Command (CFC)
has had a planning staff of hundreds of ROK and U.S.
personnel. The staff is commanded by a U.S. fourstar general. During peacetime, ROK forces report to
their relevant commands, which then answer to South
Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. During wartime, designated ROK forces fall under the operational control
(OPCON) of the commander of CFC, who in turn
reports to the national command authorities in both
Washington and Seoul. However, this long-standing
agreement has been subject to intense negotiation and
a number of proposed changes.
In 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and
Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo reached an agreement
that CFC would be disestablished, and the two militaries stationed in Korea would continue to function
as allies but with two separate wartime operational
commands. The new command architecture was to
become operational in April 2012.41
The issue of American and South Korean forces
fighting a conflict with North Korea under two separate military commands became an immediate source
of contention in this new agreement. Senior politicians
on the right and many retired military officers were
highly critical of the change because they believed it
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was both premature and dangerous to the security of
South Korea.42
Under the current CFC structure, the military chain
of command is transparent and seamless while falling under two separate national command authorities
(NCA) in Washington and Seoul (see Figure 6-2). Although planning is conducted using a combined staff
and exercises are held every year that utilize that planning, the ROK military does not “come under” the
U.S. military even when CFC is activated because the
American CFC commander answers to both NCAs.

Source: Lieutenant General Stephen G. Wood, USAF, and Major
Christopher A. Johnson, MD, USAF, “The Transformation of Air
Forces on the Korean Peninsula,” Air and Space Power Journal, Vol.
22, No. 3, Fall 2008, p. 6, available from www.airpower.maxwell.
af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/fal08/wood.html.

Figure 6-2. Current Wartime Command
Relationships, ROK-U.S. Forces.
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As originally conceived in 2008 and agreed to by
Gates and Kim, the new command arrangement would
no longer have ROK forces being put under the command of the CFC and its U.S. four-star commander.
The CFC would no longer exist and, in its place, there
would be two separate war-fighting commands—one
American and one South Korean (see Figure 6-3). Unity
of command, so important in war, would vanish, and
U.S. and South Korean forces would be fighting in the
challenging and restricted terrain of the Korean Peninsula, while answering to two separate NCAs. Much
of the combined operations and planning today was
slated to become cooperative through newly created
boards, bureaus, coordination centers, and cells—a
bureaucratic and complicated endeavor, to be sure.

Source: Lieutenant General Stephen G. Wood, USAF, and Major
Christopher A. Johnson, MD, USAF, “The Transformation of Air
Forces on the Korean Peninsula,” Air and Space Power Journal, Vol.
22, No. 3, Fall 2008, p. 7, available from www.airpower.maxwell.
af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/fal08/wood.html.

Figure 6-3. Projected Wartime Command
Relationships Originally Slated for Post-2012.
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In June 2010, Presidents Lee and Barack Obama
agreed that the command changes would be delayed
until December 2015.43 This would give the ROK military more time to prepare for the types of planning
and operations that separate warfighting commands
would warrant; equally important, it would give the
American and South Korean militaries time to modify
and ameliorate some of the problems tied to the originally proposed command architecture.
Following Kim Jong-il’s death and the accession of
his son, Kim Jong-un, to the leadership of the DPRK
in December 2011, events on the ground caused many
in South Korea to again bring up the issue of the disestablishment of CFC.44 North Korea conducted two
long-range missile tests; staged another nuclear test;
and, during the early spring of 2013, upped its level of
threatening rhetoric.
As an editorial in a widely read South Korean
newspaper put it:
The South Korean government has proposed to the
United States that the two allies reassess North Korean threats and the South Korean military’s readiness
posture ahead of the planned [change] . . . scheduled
for December 2015. The proposal indicates that Seoul’s
security situation and its military’s actual capabilities are more important than implementing the OPCON transfer on schedule. What is important, is that
whether or not the OPCON transfer is implemented
on schedule, the combined operational capabilities of
the two allies’ militaries for coping with threats from
the North should not be weakened.45

But South Koreans were not the only ones to suggest the command reforms should be put on hold. In
April 2013, former U.S. Forces Korea (and CFC) Com-
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mander General B. B. Bell argued that, in light of the
DPRK’s nuclear and missile capability, the changeover should be delayed to sometime past 2015—this
from a general, who when CFC commander, had been
a strong proponent of the change in command arrangements.46
Nevertheless, in April, the ROK defense ministry
reiterated its intention to move forward with a new
command structure and have it operational by the
December 2015 deadline.47 By early April 2013, reports had begun to circulate that, following the disestablishment of CFC in 2015, a new combined command would be stood up to take its place—essentially
keeping the extremely important combined aspect of
the ROK–U.S. alliance’s fighting forces intact during
wartime—though details were sketchy at the time (see
Figure 6-4).48

Source: Song Sang-ho, “Allies Agree on New Combined Command,” Korea Herald, June 2, 2013, available from www.koreaherald.
com/view.php?ud=201306020000282.

Figure 6-4. Projected ROK-U.S. Combined
Command Structure Post-CFC, April 2013.
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Although many details still needed to be worked
out, in June 2013, it was reported that the new combined command would be headed by a ROK four-star,
with an American general serving as deputy commander of the combined forces and an American air
force general heading up the combined air component.
By some accounts, ROK officers would command the
other components.49
In July 2013, the South Korean government reportedly proposed to the United States that the originally
agreed date for disestablishing CFC be once again delayed in light of the ongoing threat from North Korea.
It is thus now unclear if “wartime OPCON” and the
end of CFC will once again be pushed back to a date
beyond 2015 or if the new combined command structure will, in fact, be implemented on that date.
According to press reports, in October 2013, U.S.
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and South Korean
Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin agreed to delay the
final decision until 2014.50 What is most important for
the future is maintaining a combined command that
gives these two long-standing allies the optimum capability for combat readiness and deterrence of the
North Korean threat.
THE U.S.–ROK NUCLEAR PACT
The United States and South Korea first signed a
nuclear cooperation agreement in 1956, and it was
last amended in 1974. With the accord set to expire in
March 2014, Washington and Seoul have been in negotiations for over the past 2 years to extend and update the agreement. The main sticking point has been
South Korea’s desire to reprocess spent nuclear fuel of
U.S. origin used in South Korean reactors—a practice
effectively prohibited under the previous accord.
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Unable to reprocess spent fuel, South Korea expects to run out of storage space for its spent fuel rods
by 2016.51 While Seoul has stated it wants to use “proliferation-resistant” technology for enriching uranium
and reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, Washington has
been hesitant to agree.
In light of North Korea’s nuclear violation of the
Nonproliferation Treaty and continuing nuclear program shenanigans, most states with an interest in the
region are highly sensitive to any programs that might
possibly increase the chances of weapons proliferation. Also, a likely issue for the United States is the
past history of South Korea’s own nuclear weapons
program. Although Seoul had denied that it intends
to engage in any effort that might lead it to acquiring
nuclear weapons, recent polls show that a majority of
the South Korean populace would support such an
initiative.52
By March 2013, the United States and South Korea
had failed to agree on how Seoul should (or should
not) enrich uranium and process spent nuclear fuel
rods. In talks held during June 2013, Ambassador
Park Ro-byug from South Korea and Thomas Countryman from the United States continued to discuss
the issues surrounding what Seoul would do with its
“nuclear waste.” As a temporary solution, the two
countries have agreed to extend the existing accord by
2 more years, to March 2016. The 2-year extension of
the present agreement must be approved by the U.S.
Congress.53
Both countries hope to have reached a satisfactory compromise by then.54 As long as the North Korean threat exists—and the perceptions about nuclear
weapons that come with it—prospects for a South
Korean reprocessing program will continue to be an
issue. (It is important to note that while this book was
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in production the U.S. and South Korea signed a new
nuclear energy cooperation pact on April 22, 2015.)
CONCLUSION
Since becoming an independent nation following the end of World War II, South Korea has never
been more powerful on the world stage—militarily or
economically. But the continuing unpredictable threat
from North Korea means that South Korea must make
significant investments in its national security.
South Korea needs to make important decisions
regarding BMD; the future of its air force; numerous
conventional systems that are vital to any conflict it
would have with the DPRK; and, perhaps most important, the ROK–U.S. alliance and the commandand-control issues associated with the projected disestablishment of CFC in December 2015. These decisions
are important, often quite expensive fiscally, and often
very controversial politically. But this is nothing new.
South Korea is in a unique position. It is a thriving, transparent democracy, with perhaps the most
ominous and imminent threat on its borders of any
democracy. Decisions regarding the ROK military in
coming years will be important to not only South Korea but also all nation-states that have an interest in
the region.
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CHAPTER 7
POLISH HARD POWER:
INVESTING IN THE MILITARY AS EUROPE
CUTS BACK1
Andrew A. Michta
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their contribution to this chapter.

KEY POINTS
•	Unlike America’s other major European allies,
Poland’s growing economy has allowed it to
increase its defense spending.
•	
Warsaw’s strategic focus has increasingly
turned to improving Poland’s territorial defenses and working with neighboring allies to
bolster regional security.
•	Poland has begun a major military modernization program whose success will depend on the
continued health of the Polish economy and the
transformation of the Polish defense industry
into an efficient producer of advanced military
equipment.
Poland’s security strategy rests on the twin pillars
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and the European Union (EU). As the American military presence in Europe continues to shrink, however,
Poland’s support for the EU has increased, benefitting
from EU structural-fund transfers, expanded trade,
and integration under the Schengen Agreement. Consequently, while NATO and the United States remain
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essential to Poland’s security, today Germany is Poland’s key ally on the continent, with Polish public
opinion showing for the first time in a 2012 survey a
preference for Germany over the United States.2
Though positive attitudes toward the United
States rebounded somewhat a year later, clearly the
Polish public has become more distant in its view of
America. The Barack Obama administration’s 2009
decision to cancel the George W. Bush–era missile
shield whose ground interceptors were to be based in
Poland was a shock to bilateral ties. Announced on
the 70th anniversary of the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland, it became a public relations debacle for Washington. Compounding problems is the administration’s
more recent decision to scrap its plans for deploying
high-speed Standard Missile 3 Block IIB interceptors
in Poland and Romania (Phase Four of the European
Phased Adaptive Approach) and Washington’s continued reluctance to lift the visa requirement for Poles
travelling to the United States. While there remains a
large reservoir of public goodwill in Poland toward
the United States, which has a large Polish-American
ethnic community and a history of close military cooperation in recent years, these decisions have chipped
away at traditional pro-U.S. sentiments in Poland.
Similarly, while Poland remains committed to
NATO as the military pillar of its national security
and, as such, a strong supporter of NATO’s Article
V tasks of collective defense, it has also become more
vocal in support of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy. Again, while the United States remains
Poland’s principal ally and the country has been an
active participant in American-led operations—with
the largest being in Iraq and Afghanistan—there has
been a marked decline in public support for current
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and future expeditionary missions, as exemplified in
Warsaw’s decision to not join other NATO allies in
Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, the 2011 Libyan
military campaign.
Poland’s increased focus on Article V matters is
tied largely to its growing concern about the resurgence of Russia’s power and influence along Poland’s
eastern border. Since eastward NATO enlargement,
especially to Ukraine, has all but vanished from U.S.
and European security policy agendas, Poland finds
itself in a border-state position within the alliance.
Warsaw’s perception of a changing regional power
balance has brought about a new emphasis on the defense of national territory in Poland, making Warsaw
refocus its attention closer to home as it plans to adapt
the armed forces accordingly.
Over the past 5 years, Poland has focused more and
more on its indigenous national defense capabilities,
with the government funneling resources for military
modernization. Because of its history of foreign invasions, the country has a keen appreciation of the vital
importance of a strong military to the nation’s sovereignty and security. An old Polish saying captures
well the public mood on national defense: “If you can
count, ultimately count on yourself.”
BUCKING EUROPEAN TRENDS
Amidst the current protracted economic crisis in
Europe and despite a 2013 slowdown in growth in
Poland’s own economy, Poland remains one of the
EU’s most dynamic countries. Today, it is its ninthbiggest economy, having increased by almost onefifth since 2009.3 Because the government is required
under Polish law to spend 1.95 percent of its annual
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gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, a growing
economy has allowed Warsaw to buck the general European trend of cutting national defense budgets (see
Figure 7-1).

Source: Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Poland,
“Basic Information on the MoND Budget, 2001-12,” available
from archiwalny.mon.gov.pl/en/strona/126/lg_89.

Figure 7-1. Total Defense Spending (Billions of
Polish PLN) and Defense Spending as a Percentage
of GDP.
With increased resources, Poland’s ministry of defense has launched “The Modernization Plan for the
Armed Forces in the Years 2013–2022”—the country’s
most ambitious program to date, which will include
new ships, helicopters, tanks and armored personnel
carriers, additional aircraft, and most importantly,
new air and missile defenses.4 The antiballistic missile
(ABM) system is the most significant of Poland’s military modernization efforts in terms of planned dedicated resources. The estimated cost of Poland’s ABM
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program is set between $4 and $6 billion, making it the
largest acquisition program in the country’s history.
In mid-2013, however, with the economy slowing, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was forced
to revise the government’s budget, resulting in a 10
percent cut to the defense budget.5 Despite these reductions, Minister of Defense Tomasz Siemoniak has
emphasized that the country’s strategic projects will
be protected, announcing in late September 2013 that
military modernization will reach PLN 91.5 billion
(approximately $30 billion) through 2022, covering 14
specific programs.
Consistent with Poland’s desire to develop its military capabilities, the Polish government has renewed
its focus on modernizing and expanding the country’s
indigenous defense industrial sector. In the fall of
2013, the government began the process of consolidating Poland’s defense industry into a unified Polish Defense Group (Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa [PGZ]) with
the expectation that it would improve the sector’s efficiency and competitiveness. The PGZ will combine
the flagship Polish Defense Holding [Polski Holding
Obronny, formerly Bumar] with Huta Stalowa Wola,
among others. The effort has just begun, so it is too
early to judge its ultimate impact on the industry. But
the decision indicates the seriousness of the government’s commitment to modernizing the defense sector and to making it more competitive in international
markets.
The immediate question going forward will be
whether the Polish military can still leverage available resources and complete the key elements of the
modernization program despite the 10 percent budget
decrease. Since it is government policy that modernization be done through the Polish defense industry
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whenever possible, there will be considerable focus on
whether those firms can, in fact, deliver the product
the military needs, and especially whether they can
partner with foreign firms to leverage synergies with
the domestic sector. In short, will Poland manage to
continue committing enough resources to remain
one of the few countries in Europe that is still serious
about military power, and thereby become a NATO
ally with growing capabilities and political clout?
MILITARY MODERNIZATION PLANS
Poland has doubled its defense spending over the
past decade. Initially, the government budgeted PLN
31.4 billion on defense (approximately $10 billion) for
2013. Even with the planned 10 percent reductions in
the 2013 defense budget, there has been a significant
infusion of resources into the Polish armed forces. The
current military modernization plan calls for spending PLN 91.5 billion through 2022 and stipulates that
PLN 16 billion will be expended by 2016. The government has also restated that maintaining 1.95 percent of
GDP on defense remains a priority.
As part of the modernization process, Poland began establishing two new high-level military commands starting January 1, 2014.6 The goal is to create a
joint operational command by replacing the separate
service commands, converting them into departments,
and turning the general staff into a strategic planning
and advisory command.
The government also intends to maximize the use of
the Polish defense industry with “Polonization” of the
defense modernization effort tied to technology transfer from international partners as acquisition plans
move forward. In addition, the government plans to
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spend PLN 40 billion on purchases not included in the
2014–22 operational plans. In total, Poland plans to
spend approximately PLN 139 billion ($U.S.46.3 billion) on equipment modernization across the services,
on added information technology capabilities, and on
increasing the overall combat readiness of the Polish
forces. In the process, Poland plans to build its modernization effort around 14 major programs.7 Considering the scope of programs and resources allocated,
a significant challenge for the defense ministry will be
to improve the acquisition process to ensure platforms
and equipment are fielded; in previous years, the ministry has even returned funds to the state budget.
For 2013, the Polish ministry of defense planned
to increase capital expenditures to 26.2 percent of the
budget—a 4.2 percent increase compared to the previous 3 years (see Figure 7-2).8 The structure of the
current Polish defense budget reflects the ministry’s
commitment to reverse the current approximate oneto-three ratio of modern-to-legacy military systems.
Polish military equipment remains a mix of Sovietera legacy systems (sometimes adapted with Western
equipment) and innovative Polish designs developed
in cooperation with Western firms.
For example, Polish land forces maintain 901 main
battle tanks, of which 128 are the older-generation
German Leopard 2A4s, 232 are PT-91 Twardys (a Polish modification of the Soviet T-72), and 541 are obsolete T-72s of three different types. Likewise, Poland
maintains a fleet of 1,784 armored infantry fighting
vehicles (AIFV), of which more than two-thirds are
legacy Soviet BMP-1s, but nearly 500 are the highly
capable KTO Rosomak, a Polish version of a Finnish
AIFV that has been battlefield tested in Afghanistan.
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Source: Ministry of National Defence, Finance Department, Podstawowe informacje o budzecie resort obrony narodowej na 2013 (Basic Information on the Ministry of National Defense Budget in
2013), Warsaw, Poland, March 2013, available from mon.gov.pl/z/
mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2013/09/informator_o_budzecie_
resortu_ON_na_2013_r..pdf.

Figure 7-2. Increase in Procurement Expenditures
(Missions PLN).
To help address this problem, however, in November
2013 Poland signed an agreement to purchase from
Germany an additional 105 Leopard 2A5s, plus 14
Leopard 2A4s and 200 support vehicles.9
Addressing deficiencies in air mobility also remains
a priority, as Polish military helicopters are currently a
combination of Soviet-era systems and the aging PZL
Sokół platform and its derivatives. To do so, the army
will be seeking to acquire up to 70 new helicopters.
The defense ministry also plans to issue funds for new
modular armored vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles
(including armed drones), self-propelled howitzers,
heavy mortars, antitank missiles, and new communication equipment.
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The Polish navy has five tactical submarines (four
German-built, 1960s-era Kobben class and one Sovietlegacy Kilo), two principal surface combatants (Oliver
Hazard Perry–class frigates), a corvette (Polish-built
ORP Kaszub class), and a number of mine warfare,
mine countermeasure, patrol, amphibious, and support ships. The navy’s aviation element includes
two naval aviation bases, with equipment deployed
in three locations. Two of those locations are home
to air groups that include planes and helicopters for
transport, antisubmarine, and search-and-rescue operations. The navy’s modernization program includes
new patrol boats, minesweepers, coastal-defense
vessels, and possibly up to three submarines.10
Of the three major services, the Polish air force
ranks as the most modern among post-communist
states of Central Europe, averaging 160–200 flying
hours per year (comparable to France’s and exceeding
Germany’s). The air force operates three squadrons
of F-16C/Ds, two squadrons of MiG-29A/UBs, and
two squadrons of fighter/ground-attack Su-22M-4s.
The Sukhoi aircraft have been slated for removal from
service, and Poland will be looking to purchase additional Western planes or unmanned aerial vehicles.
Two air force transport squadrons fly a combination
of C-130E, C-295M, and Polish PZL M-28 Bryza aircraft. The air force also operates two squadrons of
transport helicopters which, as noted previously, are
aging platforms.
On balance, the most successful air force program
so far has been the addition of F-16 jet fighters to its
fleet of aircraft, accelerating the modernization process and increasing NATO interoperability. A visible
sign of progress has been the opening of a U.S. training facility in the central Polish town of Łask for rotational exercises of U.S. and NATO aircraft.
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Air and missile defenses (AMD), however, remain
Poland’s top defense priority. A law Poland passed
this year appears to guarantee stable funding for the
systems.11 The program will combine a medium-range
missile and air defense system and a variety of shorter-range systems with plans to expand the coverage
for the country’s entire territory. The government will
allocate PLN 26.4 billion for AMD through 2022, with
PLN 1.2 billion planned for 2014–16.12
Overall, Poland’s shopping list is extensive; some
would call it overly ambitious. While the air and missile defense budget seems protected, in light of the
slowing economy and this year’s reduction in planned
defense expenditures, there is already talk of reducing
the number of helicopters in the initial order and of
cuts in other procurement programs. Indeed, there are
also questions as to whether—even if all the acquisition programs were fully funded—Poland’s defense
ministry would be able to meet its acquisition plans.
Some analysts have pointed out that based on the current track record of procurement, and especially the
rate of contract fulfillment in 2012, Poland may again
have a shortfall from the original spending plans.13
LEVERAGING DEFENSE FOR
INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY
The Polish government sees military modernization as a path to modernizing the country’s defense
industry. The increase in procurement funds has attracted a lot of attention from U.S. and European defense industries—something the Polish government is
determined to leverage for national defense industry
modernization. Until 2013, Poland spent between 15
to 22 percent of its defense budget on equipment mod-
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ernization. Poland’s expeditionary missions in both
Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for
a better equipment kit for its forces, and the current
program ultimately aims to shift about one-third of
the defense budget to equipment modernization over
the next decade.
Here, the AMD project is seen as central not just
to the national defense strategy but also to preserving
and expanding Poland’s indigenous defense industrial capacity. Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak has
repeatedly made clear that any AMD solution adopted by the government will need to involve extensive
cooperation with Polish defense companies. It must
include both long-term partnerships and significant
technology transfers.
The army expects the initial components of the system to be tested in 2017 and a working system capable
of defending national territory from an attack is to be
in place by 2023—all procured with the direct participation of the Polish defense sector. For the Polish
defense industry, this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to partner with the best Western firms. Eventually, the government hopes to shift up to 80 percent
of future work on particular defense projects to Polish
suppliers.
One aspect of Polish military modernization seldom discussed is its intra-EU political dimension. As
Poland undertakes its military modernization effort
and defense ministry officials push for the maximum
possible participation of Polish firms in plans to buy
missiles, ships, helicopters, tanks, and small arms, it
will run up against the growing pressure within the
EU to reduce national preference in defense contracts.14
The planned purchases also seek to leverage domestic industry on smaller ticket items such as the
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MSBS 5.56 program to develop a new modular assault
rifle for Polish forces and the Tytan program comprising a system of technologies, similar to the U.S. Land
Warrior, to be used by an individual soldier.15 This
effort to maximize domestic industry participation
applies to both equipment upgrades and new system
purchases; however, it may meet serious obstacles
considering the imbalances of expertise and capacity
in the Polish defense sector, as seen in the delays in
modernizing Poland’s Leopard 2 tanks.
The extent to which Polonization is likely to work
will be best tested on high-end systems. There will be
mounting pressure to give as much of the ABM work
as possible to Polish companies.16 Initial competition
for the AMD contract is already underway with U.S.,
French, and Israeli systems expected to emerge as the
principal contenders. But the key question for Polish
officials is likely to be: Which of the foreign contractors
can best coordinate with Polish defense firms to build
a long-term and mutually beneficial partnership?
STRATEGIC PRIORITIES
Poland’s level of defense spending and new acquisition programs reflects growing concern about the
changing geostrategic environment in Central Europe
following two landmark developments: The 2008 Bucharest NATO summit that, for all practical purposes,
ended prospects of NATO membership for Ukraine
and Georgia, and the 2008 Russo-Georgian war that
brought back the specter of conventional state-on-state
conflict along Europe’s periphery. NATO’s refusal to
offer Ukraine a Membership Action Plan, combined
with Russia’s growing geostrategic assertiveness, has
forced Poland to revisit traditional dilemmas associ-
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ated with being a boundary state along the frontier of
the West. More than anything else, Russia’s invasion
of Georgia drove home the critical importance of having workable NATO contingency plans and sufficient
capabilities to perform key national defense tasks to
make those plans credible.
The Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland, adopted in 2009, captures both the enduring principles
and the changing context of Poland’s strategic thinking.17 While NATO and the United States remain central to Poland’s security, there has been a reorientation in Poland’s strategy leading to an emphasis on
regional and traditional territorial defense tasks over
the past 5 years. Warsaw would like to keep relations
with Washington close, and military and intelligence
cooperation between the American and Polish militaries remains exemplary, with the Poles having accumulated a wealth of experience working closely with the
United States in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, there is a sense within Poland of
a growing “transatlantic deficit” in ties between the
United States and its NATO allies in Central Europe,
with the United States being seen as increasingly absent from the region. In particular, the Obama administration’s decision to cancel both the George W. Bush
administration’s plans for antimissile deployments to
Poland and its own plans to do the same—along with
its 2012 decision to reduce the number of American
forces based in Europe—has led Poland to give more
attention to its own strategic and military options
should the American security guarantee grow even
weaker.
While the Polish government remains committed
to NATO as the core pillar of its national security, Poland is also looking for greater regional security coop-
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eration among the Nordic, Baltic, and Central European states to bolster its own security plans. Warsaw
is also actively seeking to reenergize the Weimar Triangle (Poland, France, and Germany) and the Visegrád Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Slovakia). Although Poland considers the possibility of a large-scale conflict with Russia unlikely,
Poland has increasingly focused on the potential of local conflicts with states close to its border.18 Here, the
militarization of Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave in the
northeast has become a major issue.
Although Poland shares alliance-wide concerns
about cyber and other nontraditional security issues,
regional geostrategic considerations remain paramount to how the country approaches national security. Most importantly, while Poland continues to
invest in regional security cooperation, it has made
it clear that better regional ties should never come at
the expense of allied solidarity or weaken the NATOwide Article V security guarantee.
In 2013, Poland’s National Security Bureau [Biura
Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego], an advisory body to
the country’s president, published a comprehensive
review on Poland’s strategic position.19 Without naming Russia as an outright foe, the white paper reflects
Warsaw’s growing preoccupation with resurgent
Russian power as one of four key variables defining
Poland’s security (the other three being NATO, the
United States, and the EU). Though not ruling out the
possibility that Russia might choose a path of cooperation with the West, Poland’s strategists have been
skeptical about Russia’s willingness to abandon its
imperial aspirations, especially in light of reports that
Russia has threatened to deploy 9K720 Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad and Moscow’s actions in the postSoviet “near-abroad.”20
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The relationship between the two countries has
been further complicated by the aftermath of the Smolensk plane crash in 2010, which killed then-president
Lech Kaczyński, his wife, and more than 90 of Poland’s
most senior military and political leaders. Continuing
problems with Russia during and after the investigation of the crash, including Moscow’s refusal to return
the black boxes and wreckage of the Polish aircraft,
have caused further friction between the two countries and remain an important domestic political issue
in Poland.
Although few in Poland would argue that there is
an imminent threat of aggression from Russia, Poles
continue to see Russia as the principal threat to Poland’s security and sovereignty. For this reason, some
analysts have even suggested that if NATO solidarity
continues to weaken, Poland will need to seek bilateral security agreements with the United States and
Germany.21
Analysts have also been considering creating an
improved conventional deterrent posture at the national level by mixing defensive and offensive systems, and adapting planning accordingly. To that end,
Poland has closely followed the approach taken by the
Finns, exploring the option of equipping its F-16s with
stealth AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles. Another consideration has been the possibility
of purchasing tactical ballistic missiles for its Multiple
Launch Rocket System launchers and other systems
that would give Poland medium- and possibly longrange strategic strike capability.22
Both the 2009 Defense Strategy of the Republic of
Poland and the 2013 white paper reflect an evolving
consensus on defense policy. The 2009 paper emphasizes the core importance of the dual pillars of NATO
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and EU membership for Poland’s security. Recognizing the broadening array of nonstate and unconventional threats, the strategy paper emphasizes the
core importance of balancing collective defense and
international crisis response. The 2013 white paper
recommends an approach that combines ongoing efforts to “internationalize” Poland’s security within the
existing alliance structure to ensure that an attack on
Poland would generate a collective allied response.
Finally, the paper seeks to place Polish strategic priorities in a larger context, with uncertainty surrounding the future of the EU and with declining American
involvement in Europe—all pointing to the increasing
need for Poland to become self-reliant in security matters, commensurate with the country’s economic and
military potential.
POLAND’S MILITARY ABROAD
Poland has a strong military tradition, a reputation
it has lived up to in Iraq and Afghanistan. Poland’s expeditionary missions in Iraq in support of Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM and in Afghanistan as part of the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have
been instrumental in shaping today’s Polish armed
forces.
Poland was an early participant in the 2003 Iraq
military operation to oust Saddam Hussein, sending
a small contingent at the start of the war and 2,500
troops for security and stability operations after the
fall of Baghdad. Soon thereafter, on September 3,
2003, Poland assumed leadership of one of two multinational divisions and responsibility for a region
covering five provinces. The core of the Polish-led divisions consisted of three brigades: Polish, Ukrainian,
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and Spanish, with military contingents and personnel
from 24 other countries. Over time, the composition of
the division changed with different countries offering
contributions and others withdrawing their contingents. The mission evolved as well, changing from a
post-conflict stability and reconstruction operation to
one of combat and providing local security. Over time,
the number of Polish troops deployed decreased from
2,400 to 900, with the last Polish troops withdrawing
from Iraq in 2008.
On balance, Poland’s participation in the Iraq mission gave the armed forces invaluable experience,
laying the foundation for much of the country’s current modernization plans. On the political side of the
ledger, however, public support for the mission rapidly declined as Poles, contrary to expectations, saw
few reconstruction projects in Iraq go to Polish firms
and the security situation in Iraq worsened in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. In the end, Iraq inaugurated a new, more complex phase in U.S.-Polish
relations.
As Poland pulled out of Iraq, it increased its contribution to the ISAF mission. At its peak, Poland deployed 2,600 soldiers to Afghanistan, at one point assuming responsibility for the entire Afghan province
of Ghazni. The mission in Afghanistan was ultimately
on an order of magnitude more challenging than the
deployment in Iraq, both in terms of the threat environment and logistical difficulties. The Polish military
is largely responsible for the mission’s success, having
adapted both personnel and equipment to the task.
As the ISAF mission winds down, the key challenge
for the Polish army is to repatriate and refurbish its
equipment currently deployed in Afghanistan. Lacking indigenous capabilities for long-range lift, Poland
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will rely on the United States to facilitate the return of
Polish equipment.
As with the Iraq mission, however, the Afghanistan
operation has witnessed dwindling public support.
This was especially true after the Obama administration decided to scrap deployment to Poland of the antiballistic missile system, and Poles began to question
whether the sacrifices their military was making in
Afghanistan and before that in Iraq were duly appreciated in Washington. As a result, Polish support for
expeditionary operations has declined precipitously,
as has overall public confidence in NATO’s value to
Poland’s security. Polling data from a 2013 report by
the German Marshall Fund of the United States suggests that when citizens of various NATO nations
were asked whether NATO is still essential to their
respective countries’ security, Poles are 11 percentage
points behind the EU average.23
In late-2013, Poland had approximately 1,940 soldiers deployed on various missions abroad, with the
largest contingent deployed under ISAF in Afghanistan, followed by a contingent with the Kosovo Force,
troops with the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and a number of United Nations observers in Western Sahara, the Congo, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Liberia,
South Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire. Following the French
campaign in Mali, Poland has also deployed trainers
there. In addition, there are Polish military observers
as part of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia. The
total number of Polish military troops deployed outside of Poland was expected to decline further at the
end of 2014 as the ISAF mission shifted from a combat
to a support role.
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CONCLUSION
Poland is, by any measure, the most successful case
of post-communist political and economic transition
to market democracy in Europe. As a relatively new
member to NATO, it has made significant contributions to American and NATO military missions.
But Poland is entering an era of increasing uncertainty. America’s commitment to European security
appears to Poland to be waning, while Russia’s resurgence as a military power in the context of Europe’s de
facto disarmament and the economic crisis within the
EU raise even greater questions about Poland’s future
security environment.
To meet these challenges, Poland has clearly been
an outlier among European NATO allies when it
comes to national defense. Simply put, it is one of the
few remaining European states serious about investing in its military despite the current economic crisis.
As noted earlier, the primary focus of Poland’s 10-year
defense modernization plan is territorial defense rather than out-of-area capabilities, though Poland tries to
balance the two with planned capabilities important
to both, such as command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence as well as helicopter lift.
Two key questions loom over modernization
plans. The first is the potential risk associated with the
desire to use Polish defense companies to carry out
the bulk of the modernization effort. There is no question that giving the lion’s share of the work to Polish
companies has great potential benefits for industrial
modernization and employment, and employment is
no doubt important to the government in Warsaw as
Poland approaches its next parliamentary election in
2015. However, the record of the Polish industry has
been spotty, with program delays and cost overruns.
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The government seems aware of the risk. It has
pushed to initiate the consolidation of the industry
parallel with the modernization effort, as the Polish
defense sector gears up for its largest contracts to
date. However, the challenge will be to remain realistic about what can be achieved in the near term,
recognizing that some of these companies face a steep
learning curve when it comes to the kind of advanced
manufacturing and systems engineering required to
produce first-rate, up-to-date equipment. The key
will be successful partnering with top international
defense firms in a way that brings about transfers of
manufacturing technology and has Polish companies
focusing on those parts of the program where they are
most competitive. Most importantly—and politically
difficult—the government will need to be prepared
for a course correction in its plans should Polonization
of the modernization effort not deliver equipment and
weapons platforms on time and in sufficient quantities. While domestic industrial priorities are important, they cannot overshadow the strategic requirements of the Polish Armed Forces.
The second question is whether the Polish economy will continue to grow at sufficient rates to sustain steady defense spending allocations to make the
programs a reality. The 2013 cuts were not crippling
for the Polish modernization effort, but if the government fails to stick by the 1.95 percent of GDP formula
its ambitious program will need to be revised. The
squeeze already seen in the defense budget should
serve as a warning sign for the government that cutting defense—though politically seemingly less toxic
than cuts in public spending—will eventually damage
Poland’s procurement plans and ultimately the nation’s security. Hence, it is the 2014 state budget rather
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than the modifications to 2013 spending that will serve
as a clear indicator of whether Poland remains serious
about defense modernization.
With an economy that has performed better than
its European neighbors, a desire to bolster and modernize its military capabilities, and a record of commitment to the transatlantic alliance, Poland continues to
buck the trend when it comes to America’s continental
security partners. And with increasing influence in the
EU, Poland continues to rise in the ranks as a midsize
power and, as such, grow its potential to play an even
greater role in Western security affairs in the future.
But the budget decisions and program choices Poland
makes in the next year and over the next decade will
go a long way to determining just how great a role it
will in fact play.
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CHAPTER 8
FRENCH HARD POWER:
LIVING ON THE STRATEGIC EDGE1
Dorothée Fouchaux
KEY POINTS
•	With its 2013 defense white paper, France reaffirmed its intent to maintain its strategic autonomy by dint of its nuclear deterrent and by
retaining a conventional power-projection capability.
•	
To carry out this program and do so while
facing budget constraints, French forces will
continue to decline both in total numbers and
numbers deployable.
•	Meeting the white paper’s goals rests on potentially overly optimistic assumptions about
program savings, export offsets, and future European defense cooperation.
Before the publication of France’s latest defense
white paper in April 2013, French newspapers were
predicting a virtual “tsunami” in cuts to the country’s
defense budget and force structure.2 Although the finance ministry hoped to use savings from a greatly
reduced defense budget to help bring the country’s
public deficit down to less than 3 percent of its gross
domestic product (GDP), Defense Minister Jean-Yves
Le Drian, key members of the French Parliament, and
the French defense industry lobbied French President François Hollande to stave off deep cuts to the
military.3 Then, in a televised speech a month before
the white paper’s publication, Hollande said defense
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would not face greater budget reductions than any
other government ministry.
According to the appropriations statute that follows and implements the white paper’s program, the
French defense budget would flat line at €3.38 billion
over the next 2 years and creep ever so slowly to €32.51
billion in 2019. A decline, to be sure, from the resource
expectations set out in the 2008 white paper—but not
as precipitous as some had predicted.4
Although not as confident sounding as the 2008
white paper with regard to France’s ability to meet
the security challenges of the current year, the 2013
white paper nevertheless maintains the country’s core
strategic ambitions by protecting the defense budget
in three areas: “autonomy in decision-making, protection of the French territory, [and] nuclear deterrence.”5 The question, however, is whether even after
fending off more serious cuts, there remain sufficient
resources for France to retain its capacity to field an
adequately sized, fully trained, and modernized force
that can meet those strategic goals.
Indeed, there is already a gap of approximately
€45 billion between the military’s past plans and resulting budgets.6 Should the French economy continue to lag, there will be pressure again to look to the
defense budget for additional savings. In short, is the
2013 white paper a realistic assessment of the future
of French defense capabilities, or does it signal the
start of a subtle but noticeable decline in the country’s
strategic ambitions?
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TRANSFORMATION IN AN ERA OF
DECLINING RESOURCES
Since the end of the Cold War, France has, like
other major Western powers, set about reforming its
armed forces to meet the challenges of the new security environment. In 1994, a government white paper
sought to create a plan for the military that no longer
focused on dealing with a threat posed by the Soviet
Union, but instead was directed at dealing with pockets of instability around the globe, the increased risk
tied to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the appearance of asymmetric threats such
as terrorism.
To maintain strategic relevance, the government
reasoned that, while it needed to maintain its nuclear
forces as a hedge against the threat of proliferation
and to support French foreign policy independence,
France required a new model for its armed forces. The
Model 2015 (as it was then called) was to be:
a professional, more compact army, better equipped
and better adapted to actions outside the national territory. Its capacities were defined so as to allow, simultaneously, the development of permanent arrangement of prevention, a visible and significant presence
in an international coalition, as well as more limited
operations under national command, while providing
the protection of the territory and its approaches.7

When Jacques Chirac came to power in 1995 as
the French President, the government decided to end
peacetime conscription and create an all-professional
armed force. The goal was to form a military that
would be readily deployable; could operate modern,
complex weapon systems; and was capable of operating within an international coalition. This was a fun175

damental transformation of the French military both
in terms of capabilities and size. According to the
International Institute for Strategic Studies’ annual
Military Balance, France’s active duty forces in 1997
totaled 358,800 (203,200 army, 63,300 navy, and 78,100
air force); in 2002, the numbers were 259,050 (137,000
army, 44,250 navy, and 64,000 air force).8 In 2012,
French active duty personnel had shrunk to 228,850
(122,500 army, 38,650 navy, and 49,850 air force).9
By 2020, the expectation is that the military’s active
duty numbers will decline even further, dropping to
approximately 190,000.10
At the same time that France was moving to an allprofessional force, the government launched several
major acquisition programs. These included the Tiger
attack helicopter; the NH90 multirole helicopter; the
armored infantry combat vehicles (VBCI); the nuclearpowered Barracuda-class attack submarines; and surface-to-air missile platform/terrain, a theater antimissile defense system. During this period, France also
introduced into its fleet Europe’s largest warship, the
nuclear aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle; a new generation of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs); and launched two Helios 1 optical surveillance satellites.
Though France’s defense spending as a percentage of GDP started to decrease during that time, it
dropped even further between 1997 and 2002, when
France was governed by a coalition led by the Socialist Party. In 2002, the defense budget dropped to
€28.85 billion (excluding pensions)—the lowest total
since the end of the Cold War.11 In addition to cuts in
training and procurement, research and development
(R&D) funding decreased by some 30 percent between
1997 and 2002. As in other Western countries, cuts in
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defense spending were used by the government as a
means to reduce the public deficit.
The third white paper was released in summer
2008 following Nicolas Sarkozy’s election as president
the year before.12 The paper, which purports to rest on
a “strategic appraisal for the next 15 years,” highlights
the threats posed by cyber warfare, transnational actors, and nuclear proliferation. It puts special emphasis
on increasing French intelligence capabilities to meet
France’s evolving security needs. It also announced
the continued downsizing of defense personnel (civilian and military) by 54,900. To be carried out over a
6-year period, the downsizing was intended to free up
monies to spend on new modernization programs for
France’s conventional and nuclear forces and the continuation of existing acquisition programs such as the
army’s Fantassin à Équipement et Liaisons Intégrés
(Integrated Infantryman Equipment and Communications [FELIN]) infantry combat system and the navy’s
multirole frigate program (FREMM). The paper also
set a goal for the French government of it being capable of deploying 30,000 soldiers abroad, with necessary air and naval support forces, for 1 year.
The economic crisis that followed the issuance of
the 2008 white paper, however, made it fiscally challenging for the government to meet the paper’s goals.
As Figure 8-1 shows, the difference between planned
and actual procurement expenditures had risen to
more than €3 billion between 2009 and 2012. Several
factors explain this decline, including the unexpected
cost of operations in Libya in 2011, the expenditures
related to creating the French military base in Abu
Dhabi, and France’s reintegration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) military command structure. In addition, the government expected
to reap more savings than occurred with the previous
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downsizing of the French military and civilian defense workforce.13 Consequently, in 2012 the defense
ministry decided to postpone €5.5 billion in procurement to help bring the budget back in line with
existing resources.14

Source: French National Assembly, rapport d’information No. 1388
(Information Report No. 1388), September 18, 2013, p. 20, available
from www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap-info/i1388.pdf.

Figure 8-1. Planned Spending and Actual Spending
(Billions €).
A SHRINKING MARGIN OF DEFENSE
The next defense white paper was published in
2013. Though originally only intended to be an update of the 2008 white paper, the global financial crisis, Arab Spring, American pivot to Asia, and French
intervention in Mali necessitated significant changes,
resulting in a new document. The new paper also
provided the recently elected President François Hollande an opportunity to put his own stamp on French
defense policy.
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France had not had a Socialist president in nearly
2 decades, and the last Socialist government was perceived as particularly difficult for the French military.
Despite Hollande’s statements to the effect that France
needed to provide for its own security and maintain
its nuclear deterrent, the defense community’s memory of the previous Socialist government combined
with the ongoing economic crisis led many to expect
the worst. On its face, however, the 2013 white paper was not a major break from its 2008 predecessor.
Nevertheless, because the document calls for further
reduction in forces, argues for resizing the geographic
region in which French military interventions would
be legitimate, and indicates that military resources
will be divvied up depending on the readiness and
operational requirements of particular military units,
the white paper’s broader implications require more
analysis.
In addition to eliminating 24,000 employees from
the current staffing of the defense ministry, including
troops and civilians (a figure that increases to nearly
34,000 when the 10,000 planned but still unexecuted
cuts from 2008 are factored in), the white paper provides for a reorganization of the armed forces on the
basis of what it calls “the principle of differentiation.”
Although exact details on the principle’s implementation were not provided by the paper, it is described
as “giving priority to the equipment and training”
of some elements of the armed forces versus others.
When combined with the effort to save additional
monies by financing “costly or cutting-edge capabilities only when they are indispensable and benefit, in
particular, forces set up to combat state-level actors,”15
the two initiatives will undoubtedly have an impact
on the state of the French military going forward.
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The white paper appears to suggest that there will
be a two-tiered system for the armed forces: one wellequipped and trained, the other slated for domestic
security missions not requiring sophisticated or costly
equipment.16 The military personnel involved in domestic operations will have fewer opportunities to
participate in operations abroad and will train with
equipment that is less than state-of-the-art. On the
whole, this makes the French Army less attractive as
a profession, and could lead to major problems operationally should those troops be required to conduct
operations abroad.
A second major concern generated by the white
paper is its implications for military procurement. In
March 2013, France’s largest defense firms wrote a letter to Hollande expressing their concerns that when
it comes to possible cuts in defense spending, “it is
essential that industrial and socio-economic issues be
taken into account as seriously as budget issues.”17
The defense budget is perceived differently than
other elements of public spending. French defense
firms are seen as a pillar of French industry, providing high-skilled jobs and generating technological innovations that are of use in both the military and civilian domains. The defense industry also contributes
positively to the country’s balance of trade: one-third
of its annual revenue, nearly €15 billion, comes from
defense-related exports.18
To square the circle of saving money but maintaining France’s defense industrial base, Hollande decided to continue procurement of most major weapons
systems but simultaneously renegotiate the contracts
for those systems by either buying fewer allotments
or delaying deliveries and payments. Defense companies were compensated for the renegotiation of these
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contracts with firm orders in the amount of €45.2
billion (see Table 8-1).19 While the French military
remains one of the best-equipped militaries in the
world in terms of the systems themselves, there are increasing worries as to whether they will be fielded in
operationally relevant numbers.
2008 Planned
Orders

Firm Orders

A400M aircraft

50

50

Rafale aircraft

286

180

Programs

Barracuda-class submarines

6

3

FREMM frigates

11

11

ASTER missiles

575

535

Naval cruise missiles

200

200

NH90 helicopters

160

61

Tiger attack helicopters

80

80

22,588

22,588

630

630

FELIN equipment
VBCI armored vehicles

Sources: Directorate General of Armaments, “Equipement”
(“Equipment”), available from www.defense.gouv.fr/ga/equipement;
and French Court of Auditors, Le bilan à mi-parcours de la loi de
programmation militare (Midterm Review on the Military Programming Law), Paris, France, July 2012, p. 71, available from www.
livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/2012_07_11-cour-des_comptes_
rapport_thematique_bilan_lpm.pdf.

Table 8-1. Orders for Major Weapons Systems.
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STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE
FRENCH ARMED FORCES
Strategic Forces.
Nuclear deterrence remains at the heart of French
defense policy; it is seen as guaranteeing France a
prominent place on the international stage and, as
then–presidential candidate Hollande said in March
2012, protecting “the autonomy of our choices.”20
France’s nuclear forces consist of four ballistic missile–carrying submarines and a squadron of fighter
bombers carrying cruise missiles. Ten percent of the
overall defense budget and 20 percent of R&D funds go
to maintaining these forces.21 Although few in France
question the need to retain a nuclear deterrent, some
have argued that the aerial component is not required
to sustain deterrence and, hence, could be shed to save
money.22 But as a recent report of the French Senate
points out, the government is not facing an immediate
need to spend large new sums to maintain its nuclear
deterrent.23 Previous investments in modernization
have resulted in the deployment of a new generation
of SSBNs; acquisition of a new ballistic missile and an
advanced medium-range cruise missile; and the addition of the Rafale, a fourth-generation fighter jet, to its
aerial nuclear strike force.
Army.
The French army retains 106,000 soldiers in 81 specialized regiments, making it one of the largest armies
in Europe. It is also one of the best equipped with
VBCIs, a FELIN, CAESER self-propelled howitzers,
and Tiger attack helicopters.24 But getting the most

182

out of this equipment requires sustained training. In
2012, the army’s days for training were down to 105,
even though the law governing the French military for
2009–14 had authorized 120. The French court of auditors (Cour des Comptes) noted that even this level
was somewhat misleading in that much of the training
activity is focused on units deploying for low-intensity or counterinsurgency operations overseas, meaning
the army has less time to hone other skills in areas of
“high-intensity” conventional combat.25
Again, in an effort to reconcile reduced resources
with the necessities of keeping the force modernized
and trained, the white paper states that the army will
make significant cuts to existing fleets of tanks and
combat vehicles, while moving forward with a new
generation of SCORPION networked armored combat
vehicles. At the same time, however, the 2013 white
paper has called for cutting in half the 2008 white
paper’s goal of being able to deploy 30,000 French
troops. As the French chief of staff said, the 2008 white
paper’s objective was “unattainable,” given current
resources.26 This reduction in capability has been criticized by others, including General Vincent Desportes,
former head of the Joint Service Defense College, who
suggested that this and other measures laid out in the
2013 white paper would “[relegate] France to a second
tier. France will be unable to influence major strategic
options internationally. Its role will be that of a junior
partner.”27
Although the French army is relatively small, the
operational skills of its helicopter pilots are considerable, including the ability to conduct missions at
night.28 The recent experience in Mali, and, above all,
in Afghanistan, has shown the importance of having
a relatively large fleet of multirole helicopters avail-
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able. According to the 2013 white paper, the goal is
for the army to be equipped with 140 reconnaissance
and attack helicopters, 115 tactical helicopters, and 30
tactical drones.29
Navy.
The French navy now has one aircraft carrier, 75
vessels and logistics ships, four nuclear-powered SSBNs, six nuclear-powered attack submarines, and less
than 40,000 men. Since 2008, navy personnel have been
cut by 6,000. Nineteen ships were taken out of service
between 2009 and 2012, and only four new ships were
added. According to Admiral Bernard Rogel, navy
chief of staff, the size of the French fleet is “sufficient
but just barely.”30 That said, the navy’s budget for 2013
is set at €4.273 billion, the highest budget for equipment in the French armed forces.
Moreover, the French navy is one of the best trained
in Europe, with 91 days at sea in 2010 and 92 in 2011.
Major components of the fleet—SSBNs, amphibious
assault ships, naval fighters, marine helicopters, and
aircraft carriers—have recently been modernized or
are in the process of being modernized. Plans are for
France to replace its six Rubis-class, nuclear-powered
attack submarines with the latest generation of Barracuda-class submarines, although only one is currently
under construction. Finally, the 2013 white paper
states that existing shortfalls in other parts of the fleet
will be addressed with the acquisition of “15 first-class
frigates, about 15 patrol vessels and six surveillance
frigates, as well as maritime patrol aircraft and a mine
warfare capability sufficient to protect our approaches
and projection in expeditionary operations.”31
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Given budget constraints, however, there are concerns that orders for the FREMM frigates may still be
cut back. France has already reduced its orders from
18 in 2005 to 11 in 2008. In June 2013, reports said the
final number may be as low as nine or even eight.32
But since the purpose of this program was to acquire
frigates capable of performing missions that are currently carried out by several vessels, any reduction
in the order will both increase the unit price for new
FREMMs and require costly overhauls and modifications to existing platforms, such as the older La
Fayette–class frigates.33
Air Force.
The French air force has also undergone profound
changes since 2008. Personnel numbers dropped from
66,000 to 50,000, its air fleet was reduced by 30 percent, six fighter squadrons were disbanded, and eight
air bases in France plus another four overseas were
closed.
The 2013 white paper has announced that the air
force fleet will be further reduced; the stated objective
is 225 aircraft in place of the 300 planned in 2008. This
means the air force will also reduce its orders for the
Rafale multirole fighter and will look to extend the life
of existing Mirages. In addition, the air force will be
reducing the number of aircraft available for major
operations from 70 to just 45.34
The air force is the branch of the armed forces with
the most obvious capability gaps that, in turn, are in
tension with France’s efforts to maintain its strategic
autonomy. The French fleet lacks long-distance strategic airlift. France has no equivalent to the U.S. Air
Force’s C-5 Galaxy or C-17 Globemaster III. France’s
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fleet of smaller tactical transport aircraft is composed
of 54 C-130 Hercules and Transall aircraft.35 The lifespan of the C-160 Transall, which was put into service
in 1967, has had to be extended because of delays in
production and deliveries of Airbus A400Ms.
But with “downtimes” for repairs more frequent
than newer planes, the C-160 has been expensive to
maintain and operate. Further, the eight CASA/IPTN
CN-235s acquired to fill the gap do not meet force projection needs, as was the case of the 2013 operation in
Mali that required air logistic support from French allies.36 In addition, resource constraints resulting from
operations in Libya and Mali have impacted flight
hours available to French pilots for training. The situation is particularly worrisome for transport pilots,
who have had an activity level of only 287 hours instead of the planned 400.37 Finally, it is worth noting
that while the 2008 white paper set as an objective 70
tactical transport aircraft for the French air fleet, the
2013 paper lists “about 50.”
The second significant gap in the air force’s capabilities concerns tanker aircraft; in both the operation
over Libya and the operation over Mali, the French
required allied tanker support. In Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (Libya), for example, the United
States performed about 70 percent of in-flight refueling missions, whereas France performed only about
10 percent.38 The A330 MRTT is intended to replace
the current aging fleet of French tankers. The first
delivery of the plane, however, is not expected until
2017 at the earliest; the last is not expected until 2024.39
The air force was planning to order 14 planes, but that
number has now dropped to 12 tankers—a number
that is probably insufficient if recent operations are a
benchmark.40
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Finally, the military intervention in Libya in 2011
also revealed the French air force’s lagging capacity
to neutralize land-based air-defense systems. In this
instance, most Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) missions were performed by American
forces despite the fact that Libya’s air defenses were
relatively weak.41 France could potentially modify the
armement air-sol modulaire (AASM, a modular airto-ground missile) to carry a passive electromagnetic
homing system to give it the SEAD capacity it currently lacks.42 However, until it can acquire such a system,
the air force will not have the ability to take the lead in
similar air operations.
Intelligence.
The white paper says intelligence “must serve
political and strategic decision-making as much as it
serves planning and tactical conduct of operations. It
should also shed light on our foreign and economic
policies.”43 French intelligence services are known for
their efficiency even though they have fewer resources with which to work than their major allies: 1.3 percent of the defense ministry’s budget was designated
for intelligence, or €655 million in appropriations, in
2013.44
Since the 2008 white paper, the government has
placed increased emphasis on building up French intelligence capabilities, especially in the area of cyber,
with special attention being paid to creating an offensive capability and in air- and space-based intelligence
systems.45 The equipment France uses to gather and
analyze intelligence has changed significantly since
the end of the Cold War. France now has strategic
and tactical intelligence resources that it did not have
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during the wars in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia, when
France was largely dependent on American strategic
and tactical intelligence assets.
Maintaining and increasing that capability is also
key to the French government’s efforts to enhance
France’s strategic autonomy. While France was the
coalition’s second-largest contributor to intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance during operations in
Libya in 2011, and despite the United States declaring it was “leading from behind,” American Predator drones guided the French on their way to strike
bunkers in Tripoli.46 Accordingly, the French defense
minister has affirmed that:
several programs, too long delayed, have now been
decided on and amplified: observation satellites, electronic listening satellites, embedded resources in airborne platforms, combat and tactical unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), and light surveillance and observation aircraft with their sensors.47

To that end, France’s goal is also to have at its disposal 12 UAVs and seven detection and surveillance
aircraft, in comparison with the four detection and
surveillance aircraft in service today.48
Priority Zones and Pooling and Sharing.
For 20 years, the French military has been involved
in numerous operations abroad, with the justification
being, inter alia, the responsibility to protect the innocent, the war against terrorism, humanitarian crises,
and missions of stability or peacekeeping. A review
of French military interventions reveals that African
conflicts are a French trademark. Since 1990, French
armed forces have been involved in more than 20
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African operations including in Rwanda, Somalia,
Zaire, Comoros, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo,
Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
the Gulf of Aden, Chad, Libya, and Mali.
Several of these interventions have involved the
commitment of significant French military resources.
In Operation LICORNE in the Côte d’Ivoire, French
troop presence increased to a height of 1,600. In Operation HARMATTAN in Libya, France committed
fighter and reconnaissance aircraft, aerial refuelers, an
airborne command and control plane, an aircraft carrier, an amphibious assault helicopter carrier, frigates,
destroyers, and submarines. In Operation SERVAL in
Mali, more than 4,000 French soldiers were deployed
and more than 1,000 remain in country to support the
new government and conduct stability operations.
Even more recently, in December 2013, France sent
1,200 troops to the Central African Republic to help
restore order and disarm the Muslim militias who had
deposed the country’s president earlier in the year.49
French forces have been deployed outside the African theater as well. Since the Cold War’s end, French
troops have been involved in several multilateral interventions, including the First Gulf War (contributing nearly 18,000 military personnel); the conflicts in
the Balkans; in Lebanon as a major contributor to the
United Nations Interim Force; and in Afghanistan,
where France deployed more than 60,000 soldiers
from 2001 to 2012.
But the cost of these interventions combined with
the apparent lack of success in missions as in the case
of Afghanistan have resulted in France’s decision to
scale back its strategic sights and more strictly define
“priority zones” for its military interventions. These
priority zones are the European periphery, the Mediterranean Basin, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean,
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and Northern Africa from the Sahel to the equatorial
countries. The Sahel corresponds to the zone of vital
interest that France should, it believes, be able to defend. As a result of France’s historical presence, Africa
is home to one of the largest groups of French expatriates: more than 210,000 French citizens live there.50
Additionally, special defense agreements with Gabon,
Senegal, Djibouti, and Chad give France a higher degree of legitimacy and an operational advantage when
it comes to intervening in the region.
Moreover, major security challenges exist just outside the gates of Europe, with the rise in terrorism
and criminal activities resulting from instability in the
wake of the Arab Spring and the need to secure major
resource and supply routes from the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. Indeed, America’s planned pivot
to Asia and its reluctance to intervene further in the
Middle East was duly noted in the 2013 white paper:
The evolving strategic context may place our country
in a position in which we are obliged to take the initiative in operations, or to assume, more often than in the
past, a significant part of the responsibilities involved
in conducting military operations.51

Given this strategic context, it is no surprise that
France is attempting once again to jumpstart the European common defense effort. After the principle of
differentiation within French forces and the concept
of strategic autonomy, the white paper’s third pillar of
French defense policy is greater reliance on the pooling and sharing of defense capabilities by European
powers. The decrease of European defense capabilities combined with the budgetary crisis is seen as an
opportunity to promote greater cooperation among
countries in defense of European vital interests. As the
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white paper puts it, France aims for greater pooling of
capabilities on the European level to “replace forced
dependency with organized inter-dependency.”52 To
obtain this goal, however, Europe’s capitals will need
to establish a deeper consensus on the most important
security issues they might face and a greater willingness to address them by joint action.
It will also require a tough-love approach to Europe’s national defense companies who, with the continuing decline in European defense spending, face
a smaller market at home and increased competition
from the United States, Russia, and China abroad. The
risk is that the budgetary pressures on investment in
the short term will translate into a general decline in
the specialized industrial know-how that the companies must maintain if they are to remain competitive.
To avoid this, European capitals will have to put aside
the desire to protect their respective national companies and allow a continent-wide restructuring of
Europe’s defense industry to move forward.53
CONCLUSION
French military ambitions are increasingly limited
by the economic crisis and France’s fiscal problems.
As a percentage of French GDP, defense is less of a
national priority today. (In 1997, the military budget
equaled 2 percent of GDP; today, it stands at approximately 1.5 percent.) That said, France’s decision to intervene in Mali this past year is a sober reminder of
France’s need to maintain serious military capabilities
to protect its interests and address the existing gaps in
needed capabilities.
But the actual risk France runs lies less in the condition of today’s French forces than in their future
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state. Essentially freezing the defense budget for several years as planned will cost the French military in
a number of ways. By not replacing equipment in an
orderly fashion, an increasing portion of the defense
budget will go to maintaining aging equipment; already, the amount devoted to maintenance is up by 8
percent in 2013.54 Indeed, according to the French chief
of the defense staff, estimates in 2013 for the availability of armored personnel carriers, frigates, and combat
planes would be 40, 48, and 60 percent, respectively.55
While French forces are no longer in Afghanistan,
budget constraints will make it more difficult to keep
training levels up to previous standards, which is a
must for some units such as joint tactical battalions
that, moving forward, will be the core building block
for French interventionist forces. Moreover, if France
wants to continue to be a global leader in developing
and fielding military technologies, it will need to maintain a significant level of investments in R&D. In fact,
before the expiration of the recently passed military
programming law in 2019, France will need to have
begun work on next-generation weapons systems if it
expects to sustain itself as a modern fighting force.
Naturally consumed with dealing with today’s
problems, the fact remains that it is President Hollande’s responsibility to plan for the armed forces of
2035. Even though Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian has stated that he intends to safeguard the defense
budget until 2016, French Parliament members’ temptation to make defense even more so the “bill payer”
for reducing the government’s deficit will remain.
Past history provides little support for that pledge
as no multiyear military programming law passed
by the legislature has ever escaped modification by
the government and French legislators in subsequent
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years. The state of the French military is at a critical
juncture. A wrong step now could leave France with a
future military that can no longer adequately address
the country’s security interests or sustain its goal of
strategic autonomy.
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CHAPTER 9
TAIWANESE HARD POWER:
BETWEEN A ROC AND A HARD PLACE1
Michael Mazza
KEY POINTS
•	Over the past decade, the cross–Taiwan Strait
military balance has shifted in favor of the Chinese military.
•	Taiwan’s efforts to meet that challenge have
been slowed by insufficient defense budgets;
difficulties in establishing an all-volunteer,
active duty force; and a complicated political
and economic relationship with the mainland.
•	The United States has a statutory interest in
and obligation to help Taiwan maintain an adequate defense posture, but in recent years has
fallen short of meeting those goals.
Taiwan’s 2013 National Defense Report, a biennial
publication of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense
(MND), paints a bleak picture of the island’s future
security. It asserts that China “plans to build comprehensive capabilities for using military force against
Taiwan by 2020.”2 The People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) is apparently well on its way to achieving that
objective.
The report describes worrisome advances across
the spectrum of PLA capabilities. According to the
MND, the PLA’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are sufficient “to support
the use of military force for resolving the Taiwan issue.” The ground force can already conduct a landing
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on, and seizure of, Taiwan’s offshore islands, while
the Chinese navy can “effectively blockade the Taiwan
Strait and seize near shore islands” and “blockade key
air space.” The air force, for its part, is currently “capable of fighting for air superiority and control over
the first island chain,” which stretches from the Japanese home islands through Taiwan and south to the
Philippines.3
The report also highlights advances in China’s missile force, notably, the fielding of advanced anti-ship
ballistic missiles and the deployment of more than
1,400 missiles with conventional warheads aimed
against Taiwan. The bottom line: “Combined with the
Navy and Air Force, the PLA is now capable of conducting large scale joint firepower strikes and denying
foreign forces from intervening in disputes across the
Taiwan Strait.”4
Together, these developments mark a major shift in
the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Indeed, not
all that long ago, the balance favored Taiwan. For example, in 2000, Michael O’Hanlon argued that “China
cannot invade Taiwan, even under its most favorable
assumptions about how a conflict would unfold.”5 According to O’Hanlon, even coercive operations short
of a full-scale invasion would have been difficult for
the PLA to pull off.
In the MND’s previous National Defense Report, released in 2011, negative trends were evident but not so
starkly stated. Now the MND assesses that the PLA is
only 6 years away from fielding an effective invasion
force, and that it can already prevent outside powers
from intervening in a timely way. How did Taiwan
arrive at this juncture?
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DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS
While Beijing has sustained 2 decades of doubledigit growth in its defense budget, Taipei has not
evinced a similar commitment to defense spending.
In 1996, the year of Taiwan’s first free presidential
election, Taiwan’s military expenditures stood at
U.S.$12.9 billion (in constant 2011 dollars), accounting for 4.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
The defense budget’s share of GDP had already been
trending downward, but that trend accelerated from
1996 onward. Between 1991 and 1995, the average percentage change in the military’s share of GDP was -4.4
percent; between 1996 and 2000, that rate dropped to
-8.3 percent.6
Today, Taiwan only commits 2 percent of its GDP
to defense, well short of the 3 percent goal set by both
previous Taiwanese Presidents Chen Shui-bian and
his successor, Ma Ying-jeou.7 In 2012, Taiwan spent
U.S.$10.5 billion on defense, 20 percent less than it
was spending in 1996 (again, in constant 2011 dollars).
(See Figure 9-1.)8
Defense spending as a share of GDP provides a
rough measure of a country’s overall commitment to
its defense. The military budget’s share of the total national budget provides a similar indicator and points
to how the government prioritizes defense spending
in any given year. A Congressional Research Service
analysis found that Taiwan’s military budget was responsible for 22.8 percent of total government spending in 1996. In 2013, that share stood at only 16.4
percent.9
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Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Military Expenditure Database, available from www.sipri.org/
research/armaments/milex/milex_database.

Figure 9-1. Taiwan’s Defense Spending, 1990-2012.
TAIWAN’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
These trends are surprising when one considers
the inhospitable security environment in which Taiwan has found itself in the past 2 decades. In 1995,
the PLA conducted a series of missile tests in waters
around Taiwan to express its displeasure at former
Republic of China (ROC) President Lee Teng-hui’s
visit to the United States. China did so again in the
lead-up to Taiwan’s 1996 presidential election. In both
cases, the United States responded by sending aircraft
carriers to the region.
In 2005, Washington was seemingly preoccupied
with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and Beijing was
facing a Taiwanese president (Chen Shui-bian) who
prioritized asserting Taiwan’s status as an independent democratic state. Against this backdrop, Beijing
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promulgated the Anti-Secession Law “for the purpose
of opposing and checking Taiwan’s secession from
China by secessionists in the name of ‘Taiwan independence’.” Although the law asserts a preference for
pursuing “peaceful unification,” Article 8 stipulates
China’s right to use “non-peaceful means and other
necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity.”10
Kuomintang candidate Ma Ying-jeou’s election as
Taiwan’s president in 2008 and his subsequent crossStrait economic policies helped stabilize relations between Taipei and Beijing. Yet even as Beijing acted
with less overt hostility toward Taiwan, it pursued
policies that did little to reduce the ROC’s international isolation, continued to increase its military capabilities vis-à-vis Taiwan, and left the island generally less secure. In 2011, two PLA fighter aircraft even
entered Taiwanese airspace in an attempt to scare off
an American spy plane, a reminder that, to the leaders
in Beijing, Taiwan has no sovereign airspace.
China’s attempt to wrest control of the disputed
Senkaku Islands, which Taiwan also claims, from
Japan threatens to turn Taiwan’s northern flank. Beijing’s apparent aim of turning the South China Sea into
a Chinese lake likewise threatens Taiwan’s security.
Chinese success there would not only have implications for Taipei’s own claims in the sea but would also
enhance Beijing’s ability to coerce Taiwan militarily.
China’s East China Sea Air Defense Identification
Zone (ADIZ) and its behavior in the South China Sea,
moreover, amount to an outright challenge to freedom
of navigation through the seas and skies, on which
Taiwan depends for its economic vitality. In short,
Taiwan’s security environment has deteriorated substantially since the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96.
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POLITICAL ROADBLOCKS
With Taiwan’s transition to full-fledged democracy in the mid-1990s, Taipei began finding it difficult
to sustain previous levels of defense spending. As in
many democratic societies, the influence of various
interest groups has increased over time. Over the last
2 decades in particular, the Taiwanese government
has dedicated relatively larger shares of the national
budget toward social welfare, economic development,
education, and pension payments, putting downward
pressure on defense spending.11
Moreover, with Taiwan’s anemic birthrate, the traditional welfare system, in which children take care of
their parents, and siblings assist each other in times of
need, has shown signs of fraying. As a result, in recent
years the government has eased criteria for securing
access to welfare, which has once again lessened the
government revenues available for national security.12
Even when the leadership has wanted to spend
more on defense, domestic politics have gotten in the
way. Chen Shui-bian, who served as ROC president
from 2000 to 2008, was in favor of more social spending and a strong defense. In 2001, the George W. Bush
administration approved a major arms package for
Taiwan, which included submarines, antisubmarine
warfare aircraft, torpedoes, and anti-ship cruise missiles, among other systems.
But in the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan’s legislature),
the national security debate became highly politicized.
With the legislature failing to approve of spending
funds that the executive branch had earmarked for
these purposes, the defense budget actually declined
during the Chen administration.
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The Ma Ying-jeou administration likewise has had
difficulty boosting the defense spending level to its
stated goal of 3 percent of GDP. This has been in part
because of the global economic downturn and its impact on the export-dependent Taiwanese economy.
But Taiwan’s struggling economy does not alone
explain the administration’s failure to reach its defense spending target. Although President Ma has
consistently claimed a need for Taiwan to maintain a
strong defense, his cross-Strait policies may also make
it difficult to sustain public support for more defense
spending.
Under Ma, Taipei has succeeded in reducing tensions across the Taiwan Strait. The president’s “three
nos” policy—no unification, no independence, no
use of force—has served to reassure Beijing after the
8-year, independence-minded Chen Shui-bian administration. Ma’s cross-Strait policy has moreover emphasized opportunities for cooperation with the mainland. The signature achievement of this policy is the
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, which
loosened restrictions on cross-Strait trade and paved
the way for Taiwan to complete free-trade agreements
with Singapore and New Zealand.
Ma, of course, has been eager to tout the successes
of his policies. But a side effect has been for his administration to underemphasize those aspects of Beijing’s policies that continue to threaten Taiwan. To
emphasize those aspects would be to undercut, at
least rhetorically, the Ma administration’s claimed accomplishments. This perhaps explains why Taipei’s
reaction to China’s 2013 ADIZ announcement, while
critical, was more muted than that of its Japanese and
South Korean neighbors.
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President Ma has argued that a robust defense
allows Taiwan to deal effectively with China from
a position of strength. This is sensible. But in telling
the Taiwanese public that all is going swimmingly in
cross-Strait relations, he may well be weakening his
own calls for a strong military deterrent.
TAIWAN’S DEFENSE AND MILITARY
STRATEGIES
While the island’s level of defense spending may
fall short of stated goals, the military has nevertheless added new capabilities in recent years. Since
2001, Taiwan has purchased Kidd-class destroyers,
P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 (PAC-3) defense missiles, Black Hawk
utility helicopters, Osprey-class coastal mine-hunter
ships, Apache attack helicopters, retrofits of its 145
F-16 fighter jets, and numerous sea, ground, and airlaunched munitions, all from the United States.13 Domestically, Taiwan has been upgrading its Indigenous
Defense Fighters (IDFs), building fast-attack missile
boats, and developing anti-ship and land-attack cruise
missiles.
Taiwan’s second and most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released in 2013, lays out strategies that are both consistent with previous planning
documents and mindful of current conditions. Taiwan’s national defense strategy rests on five pillars:
war prevention, homeland defense, contingency response, conflict avoidance, and regional stability.
The strategy equally emphasizes measures aimed at
ensuring the Taiwanese military’s ability to fight and
those designed to ensure a fight will not be necessary.
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For example, the MND claims it will “develop
defense technologies, continue to procure defensive
weapons, establish ‘innovative and asymmetric’ capabilities, and strengthen force preservation and infrastructure protection capabilities.”14 However, the ministry also vows to institute “information transparency
measures” to “help enhance surrounding countries’
understanding of the ROC’s defense policy, objectives
of military preparation and readiness, and contents of
military activities,” the aim being to “reduce distrust,
miscalculation and misunderstanding.”15 The defense
strategy also emphasizes collaborative approaches
to security: promoting enhanced security dialogues
and exchanges, working with others to establish regional “security mechanisms,” and establishing programs to “jointly safeguard regional maritime and air
security.”16
Taipei’s military strategy is more narrowly focused
on how ROC forces will defend against threats to Taiwan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However,
the strategy’s overarching theme—“resolute defense,
credible deterrence”—is not well defined. MND’s
2013 National Defense Report describes “resolute
defense” thusly:
A defense force that is only used when attacked by
the enemy, and is the minimal force required only for
defense. The defense force is also limited to protecting
territorial integrity, and thus adopts a passive defense
strategy.17

The 2013 QDR’s description is somewhat more specific, describing a requirement “to be able to conduct
fortified defense, reinforce and support, and recapture
operations,” but the emphasis remains defensive in
nature.18
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Here, there may be tension with the “credible deterrence” aspect of Taiwan’s military strategy. As with
“resolute defense,” the QDR’s definition of “credible
deterrence” is problematic:
The ROC Armed Forces should continue force training and combat preparation, effectively integrate the
interoperability of weapon systems, enhance joint operational performance, and exert overall warfighting
capabilities, forcing the enemy to consider the costs
and risks of war, thereby deterring any hostile intention to launch an invasion.19

First, it is unclear what Taiwan’s military intends
to hold at risk that would effectively deter China. In
contemplating an invasion, Beijing can be expected as
a matter of course to consider the costs and risks of
war. The QDR fails to explain how Taiwan will raise
those costs and deepen those risks. Second, the military presumably wants to deter not only a full-scale
invasion but also a missile barrage, blockade, or other
coercive use of force. The omission is curious.
Looking beyond the “resolute defense, credible deterrence” slogan, however, the QDR offers more concrete plans for contending with the PLA. In particular,
the QDR describes requirements to counter a blockade
of the sea or air lines of communication, for joint interdiction of forces approaching from mainland China,
and for ground forces capable of denying Chinese
forces from establishing a beachhead.
The QDR goes on to emphasize the need for the continued development of joint warfighting capabilities
based on the military’s “innovative and asymmetric”
concept, which recognizes that Taiwan cannot compete with China on quantitative grounds and should
develop capabilities to target China’s weaknesses.
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Even so, the QDR describes a force that can contend
with PLA forces in the air, at sea, on the ground, and
in the cyber and electronic domains.
Enabling all activities in the future will be effective
joint command, control, communication, computers,
and ISR. According to the QDR, the military “must
strengthen battlespace management, command, control, intelligence and early warning capabilities to accurately monitor enemy activities and flexibly execute
force maneuver.”20
What Taiwan requires, in short, is a highly skilled,
innovative, high-tech force. But it is questionable
whether Taiwan can successfully create this defense
force, given resource and manpower constraints and
shortcomings in U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation.
SHIFTING FORCE STRUCTURE
Over the past 15 years, Taiwan has been shifting
to a smaller, more high-tech force. In 1999, its armed
forces consisted of 370,000 active duty members; that
number dropped to 290,000 in the first half of the last
decade. While Taiwan’s military has pursued modernization across all three services, the largest forcestructure changes have occured in the navy.
On the whole, the fleet has shrunk, both in numbers
of ships and in average ship size. At the beginning of
the century, Taiwan’s navy had a traditional surfacewarfare emphasis. The fleet included 12 destroyers,
which constituted more than a third of Taiwan’s principal surface combatants.
Since that time, the navy has retired all of those
ships, replacing them with just four Keelung-class destroyers. The Keelungs, former American Kidd-class
destroyers, are the largest warships the ROC Navy
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has ever operated. Equipped with SM-2 Block IIIA
and RGM-84L Block II Harpoon missiles, the ships
provided the navy with enhanced modern air defense
and anti-surface warfare capabilities.
The navy has also focused on recapitalizing its fleet
of small missile boats. Since 2005, it has retired all 48 of
its 1970s-era Hai Ou-class ships, replacing them with
31 Kwang Hua VI-class vessels. The larger but stealthier Kwang Huas carry a slightly larger, more modern
armament of anti-ship cruise missiles. In March 2014,
the navy received the Tuo River, the first of up to 12
new fast-attack missile boats that have been dubbed
“carrier killers” in Taiwan. Also described as corvettes, the craft will be stealthy and armed with eight
anti-ship cruise missiles.21
Taiwan’s navy continues to prioritize modernizing its undersea force as well. It has two Dutch submarines built in the 1980s and two World War II-era,
U.S. GUPPY-class submarines, all four of which are in
need of replacement. (The GUPPY-class submarines
are now used only for training.)
In 2000, U.S. President George W. Bush agreed to
sell Taiwan eight new diesel-electric submarines. For
a variety of reasons, none of them have been built or
sold. While the Taiwanese navy continues to insist
that acquiring new submarines is a priority—they
would be particularly useful for counterblockade and
anti-surface warfare missions—it has continued to upgrade munitions for its two deployable Dutch boats.
Last year, the navy received 32 submarine-launched
anti-ship cruise missiles from the United States, which
may also allow for strikes on Chinese coastal targets.22
The navy has been upgrading not only its fleet but
also its maritime air capabilities. Most notable in this
regard is the purchase of 12 P-3C Orion patrol aircraft
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from the United States. The navy received the first four
of these planes in 2013; five more are set for delivery
in 2014, with the remainder arriving in Taiwan by the
end of 2015. With China enhancing its undersea force,
the Orions will provide the ROC Navy with a proven
anti-submarine warfare capability.
The military has likewise pursued army aviation
upgrades, though new capabilities have only just
begun to enter the force. In November 2013, Taiwan
received the first batch of an expected 30 total AH65E Apache Guardian attack helicopters from the
United States, becoming the first foreign operator of
the updated chopper. The helicopters, which will be
a marked improvement over Taiwan’s current AH1W Cobras, will enhance Taiwan’s ability to counter
a cross-Strait invasion force and to prevent an enemy
from establishing a beachhead.
The first delivery of UH-60M Black Hawk utility
helicopters occurred in 2014; Washington approved
the sale of a total of 60 Black Hawks to Taipei. These
aircraft, which replace 1950s-designed UH-1H choppers, provide the army with greater mobility. They
will be key assets for an army expected to play a greater role in responding to natural disasters—to which
Taiwan is prone—and will provide the ability to move
quickly around the mountainous island in the event of
Chinese aggression.
One of the army’s most important acquisitions in
recent years has been the PAC-3 ground-based missile
defense system. Taiwan currently operates one battery on the northern end of the island and has plans
to add three more to the south.23 PAC-3 missiles provide defense against cruise and ballistic missiles and
enemy aircraft.
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Although the army and navy have been successfully upgrading their aerospace capabilities, the air
force has had difficulty doing so. The air force has
been able to secure from the United States munitions
and upgrades for its current fleet of F-16A/B fighter
jets, but those upgrades are now at risk.
In its 2015 budget request, the U.S. Air Force deleted funding for the Combat Avionics Programmed
Extension Suite, which was meant to “replace the
avionics and radars for 300 U.S. F-16s” and for Taiwan’s 146 F-16A/Bs.24 Upgrades will remain available
for Taiwan’s planes, but likely at an additional cost
of tens of millions of dollars. Whether those estimates
grow and whether the Legislative Yuan will approve
the additional expenditure remain open questions.25
Just as troubling, Taiwan has been unsuccessful
in securing new aircraft needed to replace old F-5s
and Dassault Mirage 2000s that must be retired. As a
result, Taiwan will continue flying legacy aircraft at
least over the next decade. Without upgrades to those
aircraft, a cross-Strait air-power capability gap will
continually grow in China’s favor (see Figure 9-2).
Taiwan’s Missile Program.
Taiwan has an active indigenous cruise missile
program. While U.S. officials have at times expressed
unease with the program, Taiwan has been undeterred
in producing weapons it believes are necessary for the
island’s defense. In recent years, Taiwan has fielded
two new cruise missiles: the Hsiung Feng IIE (HF-2E)
and the Hsiung Feng III (HF-3).
The less controversial of the two is the HF-3, an anti-ship cruise missile that can be fired from land-based
and seaborne platforms. Many of the navy’s ships are
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Source: The Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap, U.S.-Taiwan Business
Council, October 1, 2012, p. 27, available from www.us-taiwan.org/
reports/2012_the_looming_taiwan_fighter_gap.pdf.
Notes: Total estimated available signifies the total number of aircraft in the ROC fleet. Total estimated operational signifies total
estimated available minus aircraft not expected to be available
for use because of maintenance issues, aircraft out of service for
planned modernization, and aircraft based in the United States
for training.

Figure 9-2. Timeline of Estimated Total Fighters,
2012-23.
already outfitted with the missile; a mural at the 2011
Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology Exhibition
depicted the HF-3 sinking China’s sole aircraft carrier.
At the 2014 exhibition, the navy unveiled a prototype
of a road-mobile launcher carrier for the HF-3.26
The HF-2E, on the other hand, is a surface-tosurface cruise missile designed to strike the Chinese
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mainland. It has a reported range of 600 kilometers.
As recently as November 2012, former Taiwan deputy
defense minister Andrew Yang told Defense News that
“the U.S. is concerned about the development [of the
HF-2E]. They are encouraging [China and Taiwan]
to discuss the problem.”27 Even so, the HF-2E has entered active service and is deployed on road-mobile
launchers.
There are conflicting reports on a possible new
missile known as the Cloud Peak. Initial reports indicated that the missile would be supersonic, with a
1200-kilometer range allowing it to reach Shanghai
and, perhaps, Chinese naval bases at Qingdao and
Hainan island.28 More recent reports described the
Cloud Peak as a new land-based anti-ship cruise missile with a longer range than the HF-3.29 Regardless
of the precise nature of the Cloud Peak, Taiwan’s
missile program clearly remains a priority for the
armed forces.
Taiwan’s missile program flows in part from the
MND’s effort to develop “innovative and asymmetric” weapons and strategies to deal with the Chinese
threat. As China knows, cruise missiles are a relatively
low-cost capability against which it is costly and technologically difficult to defend. They are attractive to
Taiwan’s military for a number of reasons, including
the fact that, in the event of a conflict, cruise missiles
might be more likely than manned fighters to reach
targets on the mainland. Strikes on critical Chinese
command-and-control nodes could significantly
impede PLA operations.
In addition, in fielding modern cruise missiles,
Taipei conveys to Beijing that a war would not be
confined to the island and surrounding waters. Cruise
missiles allow Taipei to inflict costs on China, both by
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striking PLA targets and by bringing the war home
for Chinese citizens. Deterrence, Taiwan believes, is
enhanced as a result.
ISR.
To make effective use of all of these assets, Taiwan
requires a suite of ISR systems. The pride of Taiwan’s
ISR is the military’s new ultra-high-frequency (UHF)
radar, which can track ballistic and cruise missiles and
peer deep into China. A U.S. defense industry source
told Defense News that “it’s more of an intelligence collection system than a ballistic missile defense warning
system” and that “Taiwan can see almost all of China’s significant Air Force sorties and exercises from
this radar.” The radar is reportedly “capable of tracking 1,000 targets simultaneously.”30
The new UHF radar, however, is just one piece of
a larger picture. During the first decade of the 2000s,
Taiwan made a concerted effort to develop its Po
Sheng (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance)
system. According to Mark Stokes:
the original Po Sheng concept . . . envisioned the installation of more than 750 data link terminals on most
major weapons platforms that are integrated with joint
[MND], army, air force, and naval operations centers.31

These links would provide for a common operating
picture (COP), common operating environment, and
enhanced command and control. Although resource
limitations later restricted the scope of the system, one
U.S. defense analyst has suggested that “Taiwan has
the best common tactical picture in the world today,
outside of the United States.”32
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Going forward, however, Stokes argues that
Taiwan needs a “survivable network of sensors”
for “pervasive and persistent surveillance,” which
might include earth observation satellites, “manned
or unoccupied airborne sensors,” and passive and
active ground- and maritime-based sensors.33 The
MND shares a similar vision for its ISR capabilities.
According to the most recent QDR, to enhance ISR,
Taiwan will:
effectively employ mid- and long-range electronic
surveillance systems, extend ground, sea and air
surveillance capabilities, integrate C2 systems, establish COP, and share battlefield information to
enhance early warning capacity and battlefield
transparency.34

AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Setting aside Taipei’s difficulties in meeting its
own defense spending targets, Taiwan faces two other
significant obstacles to fielding the kind of force it envisions. First, the military’s transition to an all-volunteer force faces major implementation problems and
threatens to consume too many of the defense dollars
that Taiwan does spend. Second, Taiwan continues
to rely on defense articles from the United States at a
time when Washington has a decreasing appetite for
selling Taiwan the weapons it most needs and has an
increasingly different vision than Taipei of Taiwan’s
optimal defensive strategy.
The All-Volunteer Force.
On its face, the rationale behind Taiwan’s transition
to an all-volunteer force makes sense. With Taiwan’s
low birthrate leading over time to a smaller labor force
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and considering the pull of the island’s vibrant private
sector on the smaller labor pool, a smaller active duty
force has become increasingly attractive.
The MND has, moreover, reasoned that the development of high-tech weaponry allows for such a
smaller force but does require a more highly trained
one. Yet as the Legislative Yuan continued to reduce
the amount of time that conscripts were required to
serve in the military, maintaining such a highly trained
force became increasingly difficult.
Taiwan is accordingly in the process of shrinking
its military, which will come down from the current
215,000 personnel to between 170,000 and 190,000 by
the end of 2019.35 But the shift from a conscription
system to a voluntary system is not going as well as
hoped. For the first 11 months of 2013, recruitment
levels were at only 30 percent of the target; “in infantry and armored units, the recruitment rates are even
lower, at just 4 percent and 16 percent, respectively.”36
The MND had planned on having an all-volunteer
force in place by January 1, 2015, but that was postponed to 2017.37 To boost recruitment, the ministry
has plans to raise the starting monthly salary by more
than 25 percent and to provide retirement benefits after 4 years of service rather than 10 years.38
In 2011, spending on personnel was at its highest since 2000. Moreover, after several years in which
spending on personnel as a share of the total defense
budget was well under 50 percent, that share was
moving up again, hitting 45.36 percent in 2010 and
47.52 percent in 2011.39 According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), the rise in personnel costs is
already “diverting funds from foreign and indigenous
acquisition programs, as well as near-term training
and readiness.”40
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Not only will Taiwan’s transition to an all-volunteer force affect its ability to invest in new capabilities,
but it also may negatively affect Taiwan’s ability to defend against the most stressing of scenarios: an invasion by the PLA. The MND places an understandable
emphasis on mobilizing reserves during such a scenario. The military’s concept of “active duty force for
strike and attack, reserve force for homeland defense”
highlights the importance of the reserves, which is
tasked with carrying out (alongside the active force) a
key piece of Taiwan’s defense strategy.
But maintaining an effective reserve force and
promoting what the MND calls “all-out defense” is
likely to become a greater challenge. Although all men
of military age will continue to receive rudimentary
training, the reserve force will be less well-trained
than it was when all conscripts were required to serve
on active duty.41 While military personnel will serve in
the reserves following their active duty service, these
experienced servicemen and servicewomen will make
up a smaller share of the reserve force as the activeduty force shrinks.
Not only does this look insufficient for building
a force able to contend with a Chinese invasion, but
it would also seem inadequate in the vein of MND’s
efforts to accumulate all-out defense capabilities. The
QDR lists “all-out defense” as an important piece of
the defense strategy’s homeland defense mission:
Continue to promote all-out defense education, cultivate the public’s patriotism and support for national
defense; coordinate interagency efforts to establish a
robust all-out defense system; maintain capabilities
of reserve force through mobilization and training
to ensure rapid mobilization during peacetime and
wartime.42
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“All-out defense” includes an effort to improve
civil-military relations, encourage an esprit de corps
in the reserves, and promote willingness among the
general population to support defense initiatives (and
spending) and to actively contribute to defending the
homeland in an emergency. Rather than achieving
these goals, however, switching to an all-volunteer
force and providing a bare minimum of reserve training may put these goals further out of reach.
U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relations.
From 1983 until the spring of 2001, when the United
States held its last annual arms sales talks, American
and Taiwan defense officials met once a year to discuss Taiwan’s requirements and opportunities to acquire defense articles from the United States. The talks
were halted during the first months of the George W.
Bush administration, which had described China as
a strategic competitor and wanted to put America’s
relationship with Taiwan on firmer footing. The end
of the annual talks was envisioned as embodying an
upgrade in U.S.-Taiwan relations.
The effect, however, was to remove the institutional
impetus for regular arms sales to the island. Relieved
of the requirement to discuss Taiwan’s defense needs
formally on an annual basis, the U.S. Government has
frequently neglected to discuss them at all. The upshot
is that since the last round of talks, new U.S. approvals
of arms sales to Taiwan have been infrequent. In effect, the arms sales process has broken down over the
last 13 years, and Taiwan has found it more difficult
to purchase the defense articles it requires from the
United States.

221

Taiwan’s quest for new F-16 C/D fighter jets is illustrative. Taiwan first broached the subject with the
George W. Bush administration in 2006. In what was
then an unprecedented move, the administration refused to accept Taiwan’s letter of request. Rather than
approve or deny the request, the Bush administration
would not even consider it. The Barack Obama administration adopted the same approach to Taiwan’s F-16
C/D request, with the letter of request continuing to
sit unopened in some Foggy Bottom inbox.
In 2011, U.S. President Obama did approve the
sale of retrofits for Taiwan’s existing F-16 A/B fighters, which the MND saw as a necessary complement
to the acquisition of new fighters. But the decision to
do so, while essentially continuing to ignore the question of new C/Ds for the island, demonstrated with
surprising clarity a troubling development.
Under the Obama administration, the U.S.-China
relationship has become, at the expense of Taiwan’s
defense needs, an increasingly central factor in decisions on U.S. arms sales to the island. The Obama
administration’s decision to upgrade Taiwan’s F-16s
while refusing to discuss new jets reflected a split-thebaby calculus: Washington would do the minimum
for Taiwan, while keeping China happy. This sets a
troubling precedent for future arms sales to the island.
Not only has the arms sales process largely broken down, but Taiwanese and American defense establishments are also disagreeing over the optimal
strategy for Taipei to pursue and thus over what arms
the island needs most. The provenance of this division appears to be, or is at least related to, U.S. Naval War College Professor William Murray’s journal
article recommending that Taiwan adopt a porcupine
strategy. The article, which has been read widely at
DoD, argues:
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Rather than trying to destroy incoming ballistic missiles with costly PAC-3 SAMs, Taiwan should harden
key facilities and build redundancies into critical infrastructure and processes so that it could absorb and
survive a long-range precision bombardment. Rather
than relying on its navy and air force (neither of which
is likely to survive such an attack) to destroy an invasion force, Taiwan should concentrate on development of a professional standing army armed with mobile, short-range, defensive weapons. To withstand a
prolonged blockade, Taiwan should stockpile critical
supplies and build infrastructure that would allow it
to attend to the needs of its citizens unassisted for an
extended period. Finally, Taiwan should eschew destabilizing offensive capabilities, which could include,
in their extreme form, tactical nuclear weapons employed in a countervalue manner, or less alarmingly,
long-rang conventional weapons aimed against such
iconic targets as the Three Gorges Dam.43

The strategy, which DoD has apparently endorsed
in a less extreme form, calls for Taiwan to eschew expensive conventional capabilities—such as major surface and undersea combatants, fighter jets, and missile defenses—in favor of a ground-based, survivable,
relatively inexpensive defensive force. The armed
forces would focus on repelling an invasion and on
homeland defense, to the exclusion of other missions
such as counterblockade. Therefore, Taiwan would
achieve deterrence through demonstrating to China
that Taiwan would be a bitter pill to swallow, rather
than through doing so in addition to holding at risk
anything of value on the Chinese mainland.
While the argument for a porcupine strategy is
not without merit, adopting it would severely limit
Taiwan’s options in the event of a crisis. It would
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also require Taiwan to outsource the job of countering coercive uses of force short of invasion, when no
other country (including the United States) has made
a binding commitment to assume that responsibility.
Taiwan’s own strategy, explicated in its QDR and
biennial national defense reports, is less narrowly focused. Taiwan’s armed forces have identified a need
to counter China across the possible spectrum of coercive scenarios and in all domains of warfare. The
MND argues that it can adopt innovative asymmetric approaches to doing so, but it does not consider
hunkering down during a blockade or missile barrage
to be a realistic option, for reasons of deterrence or
domestic politics.
IS SECURITY WITHIN REACH?
Taiwan faces significant impediments to fielding a
force capable of carrying out its stated military strategy and, thus, to ensuring its security. The challenges
are few but significant: declining budgets, questions
about the viability of an all-volunteer force, uneven
and uncertain relations with the United States, and,
of course, the existence of an increasingly imposing
military force across the Taiwan Strait.
But no less an issue is the political-rhetorical problem in which Taiwan finds itself. To please Washington—Taiwan’s only real security partner—and
to claim success in managing cross-Strait relations,
Taipei has had to argue that those relations are better
than they have ever been. Of course, in some respects
that is accurate. However, it has not lessened the actual military threat posed by mainland China to Taiwan.
Simply put, Taiwan’s government must do a better
job of explaining that its policy of engaging with the
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mainland does not eliminate the need to provide the
island with an effective defense; indeed, only when
Taiwan is secure can it, over the long run, engage China with confidence. Given China’s assertive actions in
the East and South China Seas and the more forceful
and ambitious leadership of China’s new president, Xi
Jinping, addressing this shortcoming is more urgent
than ever.
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CHAPTER 10
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION’s
LAND FORCES: LOSING GROUND1
Guillaume Lasconjarias
The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s
own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the
NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

KEY POINTS
•	Of all the service branches, allied land forces
have borne the brunt of declining defense
budgets.
•	In recent years NATO’s land forces have been
professionalized and transformed, but their
ability to carry out the various missions they
might be tasked with is at risk because of a
shortage of men and key materiel.
•	
Maintaining the operational experience and
combat skills gained from deployments to Iraq
and Afghanistan will be difficult, although the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Response Force could, if properly structured,
help ease that problem.
The state of NATO’s land forces is something of a
paradox. Although the alliance has no equal in terms
of its gross domestic product, commands a wealth
of human and social capital, and boasts the world’s
largest aggregate defense sector, NATO’s land forces
in particular have lost ground when it comes to their
overall combat capacities.
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In member states, the effects of the worldwide
economic crisis on defense budgets have been compounded by dwindling public support for the continued commitment of national armed forces to apparently insoluble foreign conflicts. Nevertheless, as the
alliance draws down its longest and costliest mission
in Afghanistan, now is the time to review the lessons
learned from a decade of sustained combat operations
and to ensure they are implemented in time for the
next major deployment. Overall, the idea is to shift
from a “NATO deployed” to a “NATO ready” mode;
the challenge, according to U.S. General Philip Breedlove, current supreme allied commander in Europe, is
to maintain the operational excellence acquired over
the past decade.2
At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels,
land forces play a vital role, ensuring not only readiness for action at very short notice, but also ability to
stay the course. Ground action is a major requirement
in the three-step sequence of intervention, stabilization, and normalization and includes a wide range of
missions from coercion to civil assistance.3 To quote a
former chief of staff of the French Army:
Since war is mainly a question of controlling the population concerned . . . it will inevitably involve controlling the territories where these populations live—particularly urban areas, but also areas where ports and
airports are situated. This means that troops on the
ground will always be needed—and in sufficient numbers!—if one wishes . . . to obtain anything like a decisive victory. As a result, these troops on the ground
will remain at the core of any future forces system.4

This is all the more problematic with the types of
operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, where
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civil war-like conditions raised the need for a very demanding level of territorial control only achievable by
ensuring a high ratio of soldiers per inhabitant. Yet,
with few exceptions, European armies continue a deflationary trend, moving more and more toward the
status of “sample” or “bonsai” armies, which, in turn,
risks breaking these smaller forces when deployed
often and continuously.5
Some analysts see the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific
region as portending more generally the downsizing
of both land force capacities and the role of land forces
in future defense strategies. The growing emphasis on
a new anti-access and area denial paradigm prioritizes
air, naval, and amphibious operations. This idea is
also gaining currency in Europe, where some politicians have even gone so far as to propose excluding
land forces from any future operations.6
But many lessons learned over the past 2 decades
of alliance operations lend support to the idea of maintaining credible land capabilities of an appropriate
size and with a high level of technological sophistication. As Lieutenant General Frederick Hodges stated
when NATO Allied Land Command Izmir (Turkey)
became operational:
Our tradition after every war has been repeating the
mistake of reducing land forces to save money, believing that we can avoid casualties in future wars by
relying more on air and sea power . . . and each time,
we are required to hastily rebuild land forces to meet
the threats the nation consistently fails to accurately
anticipate.7

But whether NATO can avoid repeating this mistake in the face of eroding defense budgets and the
uncertainty of a larger allied strategic vision is a ques233

tion that remains both open and in need of answering
sooner rather than later.8
TRANSFORMING LAND FORCES
The major challenge NATO member states face
is to translate current security requirements into real
operational capabilities.9 Threats such as international
terrorism and failed states have emerged alongside
the more traditional threats posed by interstate tensions—a problem set that has reemerged with the
Russian invasion of Ukraine.
To meet this complex set of security problems,
since the end of the Cold War, NATO and its member
states have made extraordinary efforts to transform
their command and force structures, even in the face
of declining budgets. Among the European NATO
members, land forces have a number of common
features:
•	With few exceptions, conscription armies have
been superseded by wholly professional forces.
•	
The “heavy” equipment for land forces of
the Cold War period (for example, tanks and
ground-based artillery) geared to an East-West
conflict has given way to a new generation of
high-tech equipment based on the principles of
network-centric warfare.
•	
Command structures have been radically
changed with the advent of standing multinational commands.
•	New doctrines highlight the crucial role land
forces play in stabilization operations and need
to take a comprehensive approach involving
political, military, and civilian assets when
managing an armed intervention.10
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But these changes have, in the face of fewer overall resources, come at a cost. No armed-service branch
seems to have borne the brunt of these budget cuts
more than the land forces, with troop numbers in
some cases halved and equipment budgets slashed by
two-thirds.11
The professionalization of NATO armies began in
the 1990s. With the exceptions of Norway, Denmark,
Estonia, Greece, and Turkey, most armies are now
wholly professional. This meant a complete change
not only in format, but also in the very way forces are
structured. Thus, between 1996 and 2013, numbers
in the French Army decreased from 268,572 to just
more than 119,000. In the United Kingdom (UK), current troop numbers (99,800 in 2013) will be brought
down to 82,000 by 2020.12 For Germany’s army, the
trend is even clearer: the ongoing reform envisages
a maximum of 61,000 soldiers. This compares with a
total of 239,950 troops in 1996, of which 124,700 were
conscripts.
The cuts are even more substantial among the former Warsaw Pact members. Joining NATO spurred
them to place a priority on quality of land forces over
quantity. For example, Polish land forces now total
just 25 percent of the numbers they boasted just 20
years ago, while the Bulgarian army has shrunk from
50,400 (33,300 conscripts) in 1996 to 16,300 in 2013
and has eliminated all four tank brigades in favor of
lighter infantry and more mobile mechanized units.13
Throughout the alliance, units are being disbanded,
facilities closed, and territorial defense structures
reviewed.
This erosion of troop numbers limits the possible
number of operational commitments a government
can make and the size of the contingents that can be
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deployed. In France, for instance, the land forces envisaged under the 2014-19 military planning law will
total 66,000 deployable soldiers, with a maximum
commitment of 15,000 at any one time.14 This means
that, in little over a decade, France has gone from having a goal of being able to deploy 50,000 at any given
time to a number less than two-thirds that figure.
The UK, meanwhile, aims to have a rapid-response
force totaling five brigades, with the goal of having one
brigade available at all times.15 Based on a 36-month
training and potential deployment cycle, this would
allow the UK to undertake a brigade-level operation
and two additional missions, one complex (up to 2,000
troops) and one simple (up to 1,000 troops).16 Finally,
in the case of the other major European power, Germany plans to have the ability to deploy up to 4,000
troops in two operational theaters and contribute
about 1,000 troops for special operations, evacuation
missions, or the NATO Response Force and European
Union (EU) Battlegroups.17 Given the potential manpower and resources available to both of these countries, the goals set on the number of deployable land
forces are relatively modest.
For other nations, levels of potential operational
commitment are less clearly formulated. In Italy,
where land forces are still in the process of downsizing, projectable contingents are defined by the annual
budget. Poland, after having been heavily involved
in Iraq and Afghanistan, seems to be abandoning expeditionary capacity in favor of solely territorial deployment. In an official statement on August 15, 2013,
President Bronisław Komorowski announced that the
days of sending “Polish soldiers to the antipodes”
were past.18
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These limitations in deployable numbers are, theoretically, mitigated by the fact that national doctrines
in most cases assess the legitimacy of any potential
operation according to the number of democratic allies that would be involved. Thus, the general trend
is in favor of coalition-based operations, either with
a preferred partner (as in the case of the future Franco-British Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, born
from the November 2010 Lancaster House Treaties)
or by participating in an EU- or NATO-sanctioned
operation.
Further efforts at mitigating the impact of shrinking force sizes include the introduction of unmanned
robotic systems to replace personnel in certain functions—for example, the growing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the deployment of robots for
anti-improvised explosive device (IED) operations—
and the greater reliance on smaller, albeit expensive,
special forces to carry out specified missions.19 In addition, reserve troops in some countries are growing
in strength. Here, the British and Canadian models
seem to be better established than in most other member states. However, the use of reserve troops is still
subject to two major constraints: the actual availability
of reservists and the quality of their training.20
But the fact remains that the nature of the conflicts experienced by NATO members since the end
of the Cold War inescapably indicates that troops
are still needed on the ground—and sometimes in
considerable numbers if the overall mission is to be
accomplished.
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WHAT EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH OPERATIONS?
The economic crisis affects not only troop numbers
but also the ability to introduce new equipment, with
consequences for future force models. Further complicating the effort to upgrade platforms and weapon systems has been the constant pace of recent operations
and those operations’ particular equipment needs.
These considerations have led to radical choices in
some nations. One example is European allies decommissioning their heavy tank units. While the modern
tank is still a potent weapon and often overlooked as
an efficient and relevant tool in current stability operations, Europe may only have 450 to 600 modern main
battle tanks to be distributed among France, the UK,
and Germany in a near future.
In the Netherlands, battle tanks have been totally
eliminated. Interestingly, this decision was based not
on an analysis of the operational environment but on
budget-related considerations:
The cuts imposed on the Royal Netherlands Forces . . .
are an indirect consequence of the international economic crisis [and] there are no underlying strategic or
political considerations other than the obvious need to
recover economic health.21

Similarly, budget constraints have led Germany to
halve its orders for Tiger attack helicopters (from 80
to 40) and those for the multirole NH90s (first from
122 to 80, then to 64). The budget forecast for Puma
vehicles has been reduced from 410 to 342 while the
number of Leopard 2 tanks will drop from 350 to 225.22
The same trend can be seen in the UK, where 188 main
battle tanks are to be cut from the land force, and the
AS-90 self-propelling artillery system phased out.23
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Squeezed by tight budgets, governments tend to
view the modernization process as an opportunity to
maintain national industries. France, Italy, the UK,
and Germany, for example, each have their own model of heavy tanks. Meanwhile, in Turkey, where the
first wave of modernization in the late-1980s included
updating the oldest equipment with foreign buys, priority has now been given to the production and adoption of military equipment that has been domestically
produced since the late-2000s. Pride of place goes to
the $500 million Altay T battle tank project, with delivery scheduled to start in 2015.24 Poland, too, has
outlined a modernization effort it hopes to use to support and transform its defense industry.25
There is both an economic and political rationale
for nations to keep specific manufacturing competences. No nation with a defense industry wants to
give up such a resource, particularly when doing so
could cause an increase in unemployment. Yet, for the
period from 2010 to 2020, there are no fewer than 17
programs for the production of armored vehicles.26
Moreover, there is a tension between the desire to
quickly update obsolescent materiel and the need to
procure equipment over a period of years for budgetary reasons. This creates a stock of equipment from
different generations. The British FV432 armored
caterpillar-track troop carrier, first introduced in the
1960s, has received upgrades that would extend the
vehicle’s lifespan to 2020 and beyond and allow it to
operate alongside much more modern equipment.27
In addition, the need to test new materiel in real-life
conditions further draws out the lifespan of their predecessors.
Land forces have in some cases also benefited from
their combat deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan,

239

obtaining equipment they would otherwise probably
not have acquired as quickly. This can also result in
what some experts call the hyper-specialization of
land forces, with armies’ procurement and logistic
needs geared to the operational needs of a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.28 Admittedly, modernization has also been positively informed by the
practical experience of addressing urgent operational
requirements, even at great expense. For example,
when faced with new threats such as IEDs, allied land
forces have chosen to move rapidly toward adopting
better-protected vehicles.29
For many nations, the urgency to meet this need
required purchasing vehicles from outside their own
countries. Following its engagement in Afghanistan,
the Netherlands purchased 76 Thales Australia Bushmasters between July 2006 and August 2009. Similarly, after seeing dozens of their armored vehicles
destroyed by IEDs, the British contracted in November 2006 with Force Protection Inc., the producer of
the American-made Cougar Mine-Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicle (MRAP) and supplier to the U.S.
Marines Corps.
The Mastiff and Ridgeback variants of the Cougar
MRAP are major items of expense at $623,000 and
$600,000, respectively. One study estimates that the
UK purchase of more than 750 vehicles under urgent
operational procedures, mostly from U.S. suppliers,
cost more than £260 million (€313 million).30 Norway
has approached BAE Systems for the upgrading of
103 CV90 combat vehicles, which were purchased
from the mid-1990s onward, and the supply of 41 new
CV90s between 2015 and 2017, accounting for a total
outlay of about $1 billion.31 In these cases, fleets could
be too piecemeal or too small to be run effectively.
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Vehicles purchased in response to particular needs can
become the backbone of future fleets, compromising
plans to modernize future land fleets with significantly
different architectures.
Currently, European NATO member states are in
a paradoxical situation, with certain items of capacity
in excess (particularly infantry combat vehicles) and
glaring shortfalls in other areas. These shortfalls are
not tied to land forces alone, of course. For example,
while difficulties related to strategic aerial transport
should be corrected with continued procurement of
the A400-M common European platform, many states
depend either on extremely expensive outsourcing
agreements with the private sector or on help from allies with C-5 and C-17 transport aircraft in their fleet
inventory. Another well-known example is the shortage of UAVs, leading to almost exclusive dependence
on the United States for battlefield intelligence from
such platforms, as was the case in Libya and at the
start of the French operation in Mali.
Helicopters are in particularly short supply. NATO’s experience in Afghanistan has shown their importance in a broad range of missions including timely
transport, convoy protection, fire support, and intelligence gathering. Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR
also underlined the full extent of their importance for
strikes against Muammar Gaddafi’s army in 2011 and
in providing very close support for the rebel forces.32
Despite their proven utility, there are simply too
few helicopters and crews in NATO armies. Note the
British experience in Afghanistan: At the time of its
initial deployment in Helmand in 2005-06, the UK
command had eight Apaches and 10 utility helicopters. Parliament soon became concerned about the
insufficient number and availability of helicopters for
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a range of different missions.33 During the following
years, the number of helicopters deployed grew continuously, reaching a peak of 35 in 2011. Even so, the
Ministry of Defence had to outsource private helicopter services for delivery of supplies to their troops at
Helmand bases, at an estimated cost of £4 million per
month.34
Moreover, the helicopter fleets generally lack interoperability. European allies have two main types of
new-generation utility helicopters, which are slowly
being brought into service: the AgustaWestland Merlin HM1 and the NH90. A total of 58 Merlins have
been ordered by three countries (Italy, Denmark, and
Portugal), while 270 of the NH90s have been contracted for eight different countries.35 Both models are
more complex than their predecessors and capable of
a wider range of tasks, resulting in higher costs and, in
turn, smaller orders. At the same time, several former
Warsaw Pact members (namely Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Slovakia) still use old Soviet
Mil Mi-8s, Mi-17s, or Mi-24s. A declaration of intent
was signed in 2009 to speed up work on compatibility
between these helicopters and NATO’s standard for
its helicopters, but the economic crisis has hindered
progress.36
Finally, there is no joint multinational helicopter
command, and few NATO nations have the resources,
including pilots, for complex air-land operations involving large numbers of helicopters. Moreover, the
NATO standard of 180 hours of flying time per year is
rarely met. Pilots in Italy, Germany, and Spain log an
average of about 100 hours and Polish pilots fly only
about 40 hours, which is complemented somewhat by
training on simulators.37 Here again, cost is a major
consideration. According to one officer, the only way
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of ensuring adequate training for French pilots to deploy in operations was an appeal to superiors on the
need to meet the NATO requirement.38
Recently, increased efforts have been made to
enhance synergies, increase exchange programs for
pilots, conduct joint exercises, and develop compatible doctrines. But gaps remain, including the pressing need for allied agreement on the requirements
tied to the future development of a heavy-transport
helicopter.
LESSONS FROM THE PAST DECADE
After a decade of crisis management and peacekeeping, the return to war in the early-2000s has had a
lasting effect on allied land forces. Whereas the contingents deployed to the Balkans—the Implementation,
Stabilization, and Kosovo Forces—thought in terms
of stabilization and reconstruction, the turning point
came with the engagement in Iraq, and then again in
Afghanistan. In both cases, existing military resources
and doctrines were ill-suited to the complexities of
those environments and no longer attuned to the demands of the kind of asymmetric warfare allied land
forces faced.
Forces were maladapted to the specificities of this
new warfare on two counts. First, there was an urgent
need to update materiel with a view to protecting
forces. Second, there was a pressing need to face the
challenge of a different environment. From a doctrinal
perspective, this required an understanding of how
forces were to be used in COIN operations, which
was unfamiliar territory to all but a few allies. This
prompted urgent work on new field manuals by the
allies, borrowing heavily from the U.S. Army’s 2006
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Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency.39 NATO got into
the act as well, belatedly publishing the Allied Joint
Publication (AJP) 3.4.4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) in February 2011. While describing
the need for a “comprehensive approach” involving
multiple civilian, political, and military organizations
and agencies in the COIN effort, the document focuses, not surprisingly, on the political role played by
land forces in this asymmetric environment.40
Undoubtedly, the most significant takeaway from
allied armies’ experience in Iraq and Afghanistan is
that the expertise of land forces has to be extended to
new domains. Originally devised simply to coerce the
enemy, armies in these environments will now have
responsibilities across a broad spectrum and, hence,
will need additional capabilities to address them effectively. This means combining multiple approaches
to accomplishing strategic goals, emphasizing decentralized command and control, effectively training indigenous forces and, in general, being willing to work
in a joint forces setting and in conjunction with other
ministries to provide security in distinct regions, reassure local populations, and rebuild social and governing institutions to reattach the population to a legitimate political authority.
Another key capability that has already proved its
worth is the security forces assistance mission. Successful training missions can help prevent crises, help
failed states recover, shorten intervention times, and
facilitate the withdrawal of foreign allied forces.
From 2004 to 2011, NATO Training Mission-Iraq
trained more than 15,000 personnel with less than 200
trainers. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
(NTM-A) has been even more successful. At its peak,
NTM-A employed 2,800 trainers and was working
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with 34,000 Afghans across 70 training sites. Even today, there are 1,900 personnel from 39 nations, and
on any given day, more than 20,000 personnel are
being trained.
Before NTM-A was operational, only a third of Afghan soldiers met NATO marksmanship standards.
Today, that figure is 97 percent. The NTM-A’s desired
end state is one of Afghan ownership. Today, 95 percent of all conventional operations and 98 percent of
all special operations are conducted by Afghan military and security personnel. While allied and partner
forces have helped create a space in which a fledging
army in Afghanistan could get its feet on the ground,
it is the training mission that will ultimately provide
the Afghans with the capacity to secure their own
nation. All of this requires boots on the ground.
THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE
After years of discussion regarding the rationale,
effectiveness, and role of the NATO Response Force
(NRF), it has the potential to be a catalyst for maintaining a modern, allied land force.41 Conceived as a
multinational joint force, the NRF is intended to provide a robust and rapidly deployable coalition force to
meet a range of missions, from the evacuation of civilians to a high-intensity engagement. The makeup of
the NRF is straightforward: individual nations make
contributions to the force structure for 1 year while
a multinational rapid response command is kept on
standby. Once a command’s readiness is certified, it
is set to perform the tasks entrusted to it by the alliance. The NRF is also important as a setting for major
live exercises. The most recent, Steadfast Jazz 2013,
brought together some 6,000 troops in Poland. While
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there is still considerable discussion about the NRF’s
potential uses, the force is nevertheless a formidable
resource that ensures basic levels of training, available
manpower, and military capacity.
However, the present state of the NRF reflects the
strengths and weaknesses of the current state of allied armed forces. For 2014, the land component of
the NRF involves 12 allied countries and one partner
state, Ukraine. The challenge is keeping the dedicated
forces operationally prepared for possible deployment
at short notice. Here, the main problem is that the NRF
command is not directly in charge of the units that can
be assigned to it, which are spread out among contributing nations. In addition, there is the problem that
certain capacities—such as helicopters or UAVs—are
missing or insufficient in number.
According to some analysts, however, the real issue is somewhat different. The NRF is viewed by some
in the alliance as not so much a resource for actual use
as a test bed for increasing interoperability among alliance partners. From this viewpoint, the NRF is about
allied forces getting acquainted with each other, training under shared procedures, and exploring new operational possibilities. The NRF thus offers a platform
for operational convergence, promoting a common
spirit through a network of certified units.42
The NRF is particularly important in relation to
the upcoming withdrawal from Afghanistan and the
apparent end of alliance forces’ major foreign engagements. It can help ensure that standards are maintained and that some percent of the forces are kept in
a state of readiness. Participation in exercises and the
mandatory certification process also ensure that financial resources are earmarked by governments. Finally,
the NRF process allows alliance forces the unique
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opportunity to experiment with new technologies and
operational concepts, with an important trickle-down
effect on their respective militaries.
CONCLUSION
The ongoing reforms in European armies were initially nurtured in the 1990s by a number of illusions,
starting with the idea that land force-intensive wars
were a thing of the past and, in turn, that peacekeeping
or peacebuilding missions were going to predominate
future land force use. These reforms thus faced the
challenges of governments giving even greater priority to domestic programs and of a major economic crisis in recent years. The result: cost-saving became the
principal consideration, with the brunt of the related
cuts mostly borne by member states’ land forces. The
low level of overall strength they have now reached
leaves them weakened and even jeopardizes their
overall coherence. Facing on the one hand demanding
deployments over the past decade and, on the other,
continual attempts at reorganization and transformation, it is hardly surprising that, while Europe’s allies
have an abundance of manpower, in 2012 they had
some 1.56 million soldiers under arms, but less than 5
percent really deployable.
Concentrating on core combat capabilities at the
expense of combat support functions such as logistics
and engineering initially made it possible for defense
ministries to continue making substantial contributions to alliance military missions. However, the shortfalls are now apparent, with the major European land
powers (France, the UK, and Germany, followed by
Italy and Spain) struggling to maintain the necessary
component parts that constitute a land force capable

247

of joint air-land operations. They are now mere “sample” forces, kept at a level of numbers and materiel
that makes them increasingly irrelevant as individual
nation-state combatants.
How might the future look, then? One possible
model now being touted is that of the 2013 French-led
operation in Mali. With Paris in the lead and its forces
with resources in locations in and around the zone of
conflict, NATO and EU allies were able to support the
French operation by providing additional needed capabilities such as UAVs, airlift, and intelligence. But
this model might not be so easily duplicated, requiring a political leadership, like the French, willing to
assert its strategic will and have sufficient deployable
combat power both to address the contingency and be
the core element around which allies can help fill in
missing operation pieces. Whether this coalition of the
willing can be a true model for future force planning
is far from clear.43
But as Western armies have discovered in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Lebanon with Hezbollah, dealing
with irregular forces is operationally difficult, complex, and resource intensive. This has generated reluctance among both politicians and publics to deploy
their forces, especially their land forces, far afield and
for a long time. Not surprisingly, this has, in turn,
led governments and strategists to look to high-tech
weaponry and special forces conducting quick in-andout strikes to carry the load. But, like the Mali model,
there are limits to what U.S. General H. R. McMaster
calls “global swat teams” can accomplish.44
Nevertheless, a fundamental reality of war and
politics remains: at times, only the physical presence of
land forces can offer the hope of resolving a crisis and
stabilizing the situation on the ground. These forces’
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adaptability and capacity to engage in a broad range
of missions is thus part of the resources that government leaders must still have if they hope to meet their
respective countries’ larger foreign policy goals.45 War
weary or not, NATO members are ignoring tactical
and strategic realities—and, indeed, history—if they
believe that continuing to drain their land forces of
numbers and capabilities is either wise or sustainable.
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CHAPTER 11
UNITED KINGDOM HARD POWER:
STRATEGIC AMBIVALENCE1
Paul Cornish
KEY POINTS
•	On a comparative scale, the United Kingdom
(UK) remains a significant military power with
significant operational experience.
•	Since the Cold War’s end, Britain has attempted to adapt to a more complex set of security
problems while simultaneously cutting force
structure.
•	As a result, the UK strategic field of vision has
shrunk: it has increasingly adopted a preference for military operations that are far away,
fairly small, or relatively brief.
Over the past 2 decades, the relatively settled animosity of the Cold War has been replaced by a range
of diverse, complex, and often very urgent security
threats and challenges, albeit of a lesser scale. The 21st
century is not proving to be as dangerous as some had
feared, but neither is it as stable as many would wish.
As well as uncertainty, diversity, complexity, and
urgency, there are scarcity and austerity: national
strategy must compete for scarce resources and must
take its share of continuing retrenchment in public
spending. Pity the strategist expected to make durable
and coherent decisions under such circumstances.
Yet national strategy is not a fair-weather activity;
decisions must be made and cannot be postponed until
257

more favorable circumstances arise. Among the most
complicated of these decisions are those that concern a
country’s military force structure—the material basis
of its so-called hard power. These decisions require a
reasonably settled “threat picture” around which to
construct a military architecture; sufficient flexibility
to deal with unanticipated threats and challenges; political, public, and media support if the decisions are
to be maintained over time; advanced technological
knowledge; and, finally, a very high level of political
and institutional confidence in spending vast amounts
of public money on platforms and equipment that
might well be in service for decades.
The purpose of this chapter is to gauge the strategic
quality and vitality of UK hard power. I argue that it is
not currently in the best of health and for reasons that
are often misunderstood. There is widespread concern that UK armed forces have recently been reduced
too far and, furthermore, that these reductions are
symptomatic of a deep malaise in the British national
psyche: a form of strategic “declinism,” perhaps.
I do not believe that a narrow assessment of the
size, shape, and capability of a country’s armed forces
reveals all that is to be said about its strategic ambition and, indeed, its hard power. UK armed forces are
certainly smaller in 2014 than they were in 1945 (at
the end of World War II), in 1982 (at the beginning
of the Falklands War), and in 1989 (at the beginning
of the end of the Cold War), but these comparisons
tell us little. As well as assessing size and capability,
a complete analysis of a nation’s hard power requires
an answer to one further question: what will it be for?
Since the end of the Cold War, UK military power
has become less concerned with the defense of the
country’s territory (including its overseas posses-
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sions), its airspace, and its territorial waters and is
much more concerned with addressing strategic challenges to the UK at those challenges’ point of origin.
In his introduction to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review
(SDR), then-secretary of state for defense George Robertson argued that “[i]n the post-Cold War world, we
must be prepared to go to the crisis, rather than have
the crisis come to us.”2 This notion of self defense at
arm’s length subsequently became a leitmotif in UK
national strategy, attracting bipartisan consensus.
The first and most obvious indicator of the strength
and scope of UK hard power is the amount Her Majesty’s Government spends on the country’s military
force posture. The next indicator is capabilities: the
platforms, equipment, weaponry, and personnel necessary for military commitments and for what are now
described as expeditionary operations. Hard power is
also reputational, concerned with the nation’s experience with military operations and those operations’
effectiveness. Finally, hard power is the expression of
foreign policy outlook and strategic intent.
Although national strategy is concerned with the
future, a nation’s strategic posture—particularly its
hard power—cannot develop in an instant and must
evolve over time. This chapter covers the 15-year period from July 1998 to December 2013, beginning with
the publication of the newly elected Labour Party government’s SDR, which marked the beginning of a new,
genuinely post-Cold War era in strategic UK thinking.
UK MILITARY EXPENDITURE
Military expenditure can be surprisingly difficult
to track, as accounting procedures change from time
to time. Nevertheless, it offers some indication of a
country’s intentions and seriousness.
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The data in Figure 11-1 do not paint a picture of
radical decline in UK military expenditure since 1998,
nor even gradual decline, for that matter. On the contrary, annual spending has been held at a healthy
level, allowing the UK to maintain its position as
one of the world’s top military spenders, even in the
straitened economic circumstances following the 2008
financial crisis. Military expenditure as a percentage
of gross domestic product (GDP) has likewise remained above the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) benchmark: together with the United States
and Greece, the UK is one of only three NATO allies
to have held to the 2006 commitment to spend a minimum of 2 percent of GDP on defense.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military Expenditure Database, available from www.sipri.org/
reesearch/armaments/milex/milex_database.
Notes: Beginning in the late-1990s, UK defense budgeting was
moved over a period of years from cash accounting to resource accounting and budgeting. The percentage of GDP figure includes
military pensions, in accordance with NATO’s 2004 revised definition of military expenditure.

Figure 11-1. Military Expenditure, 1998-2013.
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This is not to suggest that discussion of UK military expenditure has been entirely free from contention. Since the transfer of power from the Labour to
Coalition government in 2010, the UK defense debate
has been dominated by the discovery of a so-called
black hole in the defense budget: an unfunded liability of committed expenditure (largely on new equipment) between 2010 and 2020. A figure of £38 billion
(roughly equivalent to the UK annual defense budget)
is most often cited, although there are uncertainties as
to how that sum was calculated.
Nevertheless, in September 2011, Defense Secretary Liam Fox announced that the shortfall had almost
been eliminated, and just months later, Philip Hammond, Fox’s successor, was reportedly confident that
the black hole had been entirely eliminated and that
the government would indeed be able to fund the Future Force 2020 (FF2020) modernization program that
was announced in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).3
In January 2013, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced that it was now in a position to commit as
much as £160 billion over 10 years to a defense equipment plan “that will enable the MoD to deliver Future
Force 2020.” In Hammond’s words:
This £160 billion equipment plan will ensure the UK’s
Armed Forces remain among the most capable and
best equipped in the world, providing the military
with the confidence that the equipment they need is
fully funded.4

Hammond’s confidence is open to question, however. In the first place, some defense industrialists and
acquisition analysts are concerned that the MoD has
simply replaced the irresponsibility of overspend261

ing with the neurosis of underspending. By one account, successive “reform,” “transformation,” and
“efficiency” programs have eroded the skills, morale,
and strength of the MoD’s civilian staff, resulting in “a
department of state which, rather unusually, is both
short of money and, with reduced personnel, lacking
the capacity to spend the budget allocated to it.”5
Furthermore, certain budgetary assumptions upon
which the FF2020 construct was based were challenged by a series of cuts and adjustments made in the
2013 UK government spending review. Not the least
of these was the decision to depart from past practice
in the funding of operational military deployments.
Whereas in the past such costs had come from the
treasury’s contingency reserve, henceforth, the MoD’s
main budget will be liable for as much as 50 percent of
operational costs.
With a recent assessment suggesting that the overall cost of UK involvement in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq could be close to £30 billion, operational
costs might represent a very significant new charge
on the defense budget.6 As Andrew Dorman and I
have argued:
for these financial reasons alone it is difficult to see
how the structure and goal of FF2020, as published in
SDSR 2010, can be considered affordable and therefore
achievable-unless, as some world-weary commentators suggest, 2025 is to become ‘the new 2020’.7

UK MILITARY CAPABILITIES
The picture is less encouraging when military capabilities are considered. Figures 11-2, 11-3, and 11-4
show trends in land, naval, and air capabilities, respectively. Each figure shows the regular (full-time
professional) personnel strength of its featured force
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and the key hard-power expeditionary capabilities in
each case.8

Source: “UK Defence Statistics Compendium,” London, UK: UK
Ministry of Defence, 1998-2013, available from https://www.gov.uk/
government/statistics/uk-defence-statistics-compendium-2013.

Figure 11-2. UK Land Forces: Strength and
Deployable Units, 1998-2013.
The principal land force capability is the battalionsized unit that could form the basis of a deployable
battlegroup: the army’s armored regiments and infantry battalions, together with Royal Marine commandos. Artillery tactical fire support would also be
essential to any operational deployment.
Figure 11-2 shows a reduction of land-force personnel by approximately 14 percent between 1998 and
2013, while the number of deployable battalion-sized
combat units (including Royal Marine commandos)
decreased by some 10 percent.9 Although these reduc263

tions could scarcely be described as radical, they are
certainly significant, particularly when lengthy operational commitments are undertaken: the fewer the
units, the greater the frequency of deployment, with
attendant effects on morale, family life, and retention.
Projections to FF2020 show a further 11 percent reduction in both personnel and deployable units from 2013.

Source: “UK Defence Statistics Compendium,” London, UK: UK
Ministry of Defence, 1998-2013, available from https://www.gov.uk/
government/statistics/uk-defence-statistics-compendium-2013.

Figure 11-3. Deployable Naval Forces, 1998-2013.
As well as the strength of regular naval personnel,
Figure 11-3 shows the number of warships in three
categories: attack submarines (SSN); aircraft carriers,
destroyers, and frigates (principal surface combatants,
or PSC); and principal amphibious ships (PAS).10
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The personnel trend in Figure 11-3 shows a reduction of approximately one-third in regular naval personnel between 1998 and 2013, with further reductions
to be implemented under the FF2020 plan. Although
the number of PAS has been held constant over this
period, the number of SSN has been reduced by more
than 40 percent, and the number of PSC by almost 50
percent. The PSC trend line includes the temporary
abandonment of UK aircraft carrier capability, but
with at least one of the two Elizabeth-class carriers expected to be in commission by 2020.

Source: “UK Defence Statistics Compendium,” London, UK: UK
Ministry of Defence, 1998-2013, February 25, 2014, available from
www.dasa.mod.uk/index.php/publications/UK-defence-statistics-compendium; International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance.
Notes: The six aircraft categories are fighter and fighter/ground
attack aircraft; attack helicopters; command, control, and communication aircraft; strategic transport/tanker aircraft; heavy/
medium transport aircraft; and transport helicopters.

Figure 11-4. Deployable Air Forces, 1998-2013.
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Figure 11-4 shows the regular personnel strength
of the Royal Air Force and the number of aircraft in six
key categories. Many UK combat aircraft (both fixed
wing and rotary) are manned by personnel from both
the Royal Navy and the British Army; these numbers
are not represented in the shown personnel strengths.
Between 1998 and 2013, the personnel strength of
the Royal Air Force shrunk by roughly 37 percent. In
the same period, the number of fighter and fighter/
ground attack aircraft—arguably the most vivid and
potent symbol of modern air power—were reduced
by more than 40 percent. Yet the deployable strength
of UK command, control, and communication aircraft
(C4ISTAR) and attack helicopters and transport aircraft (fixed wing and rotary)—collectively essential
for the projection of hard power in an expeditionary
setting—were held more or less stable.
Taken together, Figures 11-2 to 11-4 clearly indicate major reductions in the military capability and
personnel strength of UK armed forces since 1998. But
the deeper significance of these changes is harder to
gauge. Reductions in UK military power cannot be
said to have been negligible, but neither do they seem
to have been irreversible and fundamental.
Where national military posture is concerned,
balance should be measured both quantitatively and
qualitatively. Quantitatively, balance means consistency and equilibrium in political and budgetary commitment to land, sea, and air forces, respectively. By
this definition, an unbalanced force would be one that
sacrificed, say, air power to fund a naval construction
program.
Qualitative balance is achieved by setting the size
of a force, on the one hand, against its technological
proficiency and military effectiveness, on the other.

266

Thus, if a smaller force with better equipment can
achieve as much or more than a larger force with inferior equipment, then the smaller force might still be
said to be balanced.
There are, of course, important gaps in this overview—most notably in aircraft carriers, carrier-borne
fixed-wing air power, and C4ISTAR (including
maritime patrol). Nonetheless, equipment programs
are underway to help remedy these acknowledged
deficiencies.
What should also be borne in mind in this survey
of UK military capability is military equipment quality
(MEQ).11 For example, the MEQ of obsolescent aircraft
such as the Jaguar cannot usefully be set against that
of the Typhoon and the F-35 Lightning II; the Astute
class of submarines is more capable than its predecessor, as is the Type 45 destroyer; and the A330 Voyager
tanker aircraft will be more reliable than its predecessors. Old equipment is scarcely, if ever, replaced on a
one-for-one basis; where military force is concerned,
numbers and size are emphatically not everything.
It should also be borne in mind that “capability”
has long since ceased to be synonymous with “weapon” or “weapon platform”: modern military capability is best understood as a highly sophisticated, integrated C4ISTAR system. This is the case even at the
level of the individual combatant. The modern infantry soldier, for example, should deploy on operations
with a variety of high-quality personal, crew-served,
and indirect-fire weaponry at his or her disposal. Body
armor and vehicle protection have seen considerable
improvements, while advanced communications, reconnaissance, and surveillance equipment have ensured unprecedented levels of battlefield situational
awareness.
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UK MILITARY OPERATIONS
UK armed forces approached the end of the 1990s
having acquired considerable and varied operational
experience. With the bulk of an armored division supported by air and sea power, the UK was the largest
European contributor to the U.S.-led coalition operations in the 1991 Gulf War.
From 1992 to 1996, UK armed forces were closely
involved in conflicts resulting from the breakup of
Yugoslavia, contributing armed troops with air support to the “robust peacekeeping” mission of the
United Nations Protection Force and the NATO-led
Implementation Force. During the same period, the
Royal Air Force contributed to NATO air campaigns
in former Yugoslavia. It was not until the Good Friday
Agreement in 1998 that the UK could begin to make
substantial reductions in its considerable military
commitment to Northern Ireland, where UK army,
marine, and air force units had all acquired experience
over decades in urban counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.
In December 1998, the UK and U.S. air forces undertook Operation DESERT FOX, a 4-day bombing
campaign against targets in Iraq, in which Royal Air
Force aircraft flew some 15 percent of the sorties. The
following year, the UK air force participated in two
NATO campaigns: Operation ALLIED FORCE against
targets in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and, later, Kosovo Force. That same year, one Royal
Navy warship (HMS Glasgow) and a small contingent
of British Army troops (with transport aircraft and
helicopter support) participated in Operation WARDEN, the multinational peacekeeping force deployed
to East Timor under Australian command.
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In 2000, the UK mounted two joint operations
involving land, sea, and air forces in Sierra Leone,
Africa: Operation PALLISER to evacuate noncombatants from Freetown, and Operation BARRAS to rescue captured British troops. For some months during
summer 2003, a small contingent of British land and
air forces took part in Operation ARTEMIS, the European Union-led crisis management operation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
UK military involvement in Afghanistan began
in late-2001 with a series of joint operations, including Operations VERITAS and FINGAL. In June 2002,
Operation HERRICK, the UK contribution to the
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force,
was launched. Operation HERRICK has involved UK
land, air, and sea forces in a series of 19 deployments.
In 2009-10, at the height of the campaign, some 9,500
UK military personnel were deployed to Afghanistan,
including infantry, light armor, artillery, and support
troops, with fixed-wing and helicopter attack aircraft
and transport and surveillance aircraft.12
In terms of scale, the most demanding UK military
operation of the past decade was Operation TELIC,
the British contribution to U.S.-led operations in Iraq
in March 2003 and the subsequent civil-military occupation and counterinsurgency campaign that lasted
until 2011. The UK deployed no fewer than 46,000 personnel at the start of the commitment, and the force
comprised 30 navy warships and support ships, an
armored division with three combat brigades and a
logistics brigade, and the full range of fixed-wing and
helicopter attack aircraft and transport aircraft.13 As
with Operation HERRICK, Operation TELIC made
use of the roulement system, with 13 deployments between 2003 and 2011, each lasting about 5 to 6 months.
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Finally, the UK also contributed to the military
intervention in Libya from March to October 2011.
Operation ELLAMY was principally a joint naval-air
commitment: naval forces included principal surface
combatants, cruise missile-firing submarines, mine
countermeasure vessels, and a helicopter carrier (HMS
Ocean); air forces included fighter, strike, C4ISTAR,
and tanker aircraft, as well as attack and transport
helicopters.
The UK armed forces have acquired a very high
level of operational experience in the past decade and
a half. British land, sea, and air forces have been involved in a wide variety of operations: from the very
brief (4 days) to the very lengthy (13 years), from the
relatively small (Operation WARDEN) to the very
large (Operation TELIC), and in several different regions of the world (Africa, Europe, the Middle East,
South Asia, and Southeast Asia). Although the roulement system used in Afghanistan and Iraq imposed
significant strain on units and individuals, these longterm military operations in particular have spread the
direct experience of warfare across UK armed forces.
UK STRATEGIC INTENT
UK national strategic outlook and intent are revealed in four sets of documents that punctuated
its aforementioned operational experience: the SDR
(1998), the SDR: New Chapter (2002), the Defence White
Paper 2003, and the National Security Strategy and
SDSR (2010).
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1998: SDR.
The July 1998 SDR marked a fundamental transition in UK strategic outlook. The confusion and lack
of direction brought about by the collapse of the 20thcentury Cold War strategic order gave way to a mood
of cautious engagement with an emergent 21st-century strategic order characterized by insecurity, diversity, and urgency.
The SDR had six significant themes, each of which
has resonated powerfully in the UK national strategic
debate ever since. The first of these was the Labour
government’s determination to conduct a “foreignpolicy led strategic defence review”—an acknowledgement that in all the complexity of the emerging
international security order, it made little sense for
foreign policy and national defense to be considered
separate domains.14
The second theme was risk management. The tone
of the SDR was cautious:
there is today no direct military threat to the United
Kingdom or Western Europe. Nor do we foresee the
re-emergence of such a threat. But we cannot take this
for granted.15

Importantly, the argument advanced here was not
that a defense posture of the Cold War style should
therefore be maintained “just in case,” but that it was a
“vital British interest” that these benign trends should
be encouraged by UK foreign policy. The implication
for UK national strategy and defense was that they
should move from “stability based on fear to stability
based on the active management of these risks.”16

271

The third theme of the SDR was affordability. The
stated aim of the review was to “provide the country
with modern, effective and affordable Armed Forces
which meet today’s challenges but are also flexible
enough to adapt to change.”17 In an era where no
“existential” threat to the UK could be identified, the
defense budget would have to compete with other demands on public expenditure. In the uncertain times
of the 21st century, spending on security and defense would be expected to provide a certain level of
“future-proofing” in equipment acquisition.
Savings would also be achieved through technology, the fourth key theme, with the SDR calling for
“much more precise application of force as a result
of improvements in intelligence gathering, command
and control and precision weapons.” The fifth theme
was alliance building: “For the foreseeable future we
envisage that the largest operation we might have to
undertake would be involvement in a major regional
conflict, whether as part of NATO or a wider international coalition.”18
The sixth and final theme of the SDR is captured in
the term “expeditionary.” The SDR promised “a fundamental reshaping of our armed forces” resulting in
a “modernised, rapidly deployable and better supported
front line.”19 Emphasis was laid on the effectiveness
and efficiency of joint forces. The SDR confirmed
the decision to build two new aircraft carriers with
which UK maritime power would shift from “largescale maritime warfare and open ocean operations in
the North Atlantic” to “littoral operations and force
projection.”20
The SDR furthermore stressed the need to be able
to deploy land forces, making use of improved battlefield reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities and
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new platforms such as the Apache attack helicopter.
Air power, too, would be geared to expeditionary operations: the need for both air superiority and air defense would remain, but air defense of the UK would
be at a lower priority.21
UK expeditionary force posture also shaped the
SDR’s defense planning assumptions (DPAs), according to which the UK would either “respond to a major
international crisis” (such as a full-scale, tri-service
commitment along the lines of the 1991 Gulf War) or
“undertake a more extended overseas deployment
on a lesser scale (as over the last few years in Bosnia)
while retaining the ability to mount a second substantial deployment.” In the event of the latter, dual
commitment, the SDR would not expect “both deployments to involve warfighting or to maintain them simultaneously for longer than 6 months.”22
2002: SDR: New Chapter.
No further, more formal account of the UK strategic outlook was published before the July 2002 appearance of the New Chapter to the SDR.23 The New
Chapter was an acknowledgement both of the events
of September 11, 2001, and of the government’s determination not to hold a formal national strategy and
defense review so soon after the 1998 SDR. The new
focus on terrorism as a strategic threat did, however,
prompt an important change of emphasis in the DPAs:
our analysis suggests that . . . several smaller scale operations are potentially more demanding than one or
two more substantial operations. And there are now
signs that frequent, smaller operations are becoming
the pattern.24
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2003: Defence White Paper.
The expeditionary theme, coupled more closely
with the idea of long-distance counterterrorism and
stabilization missions, was taken up again in the 2003
white paper, which was intended to build on both the
SDR and the New Chapter “to provide a comprehensive statement of Defence Policy and an assessment of
the strategic environment in which our Armed Forces
operate.” The Defence White Paper would be the “security and policy baseline against which future decisions
will be made to enable the UK’s Armed Forces to meet
the full range of tasks they can expect to undertake
in the future.”25 The document remained true to the
expeditionary idea, albeit with a more pronounced
counterterrorist flavor than the SDR:
We must extend our ability to project force further
afield than the SDR envisaged. In particular, the potential for instability and crises occurring across subSaharan Africa and South Asia, and the wider threat
from international terrorism, will require us both to
engage proactively in conflict prevention and be ready
to contribute to short notice peace support and counter-terrorist operations.26

The Defence White Paper thus favored more, lighter,
and smaller missions for the armed forces. This position was encapsulated in a subtle yet important shift
in DPAs. Although the document insisted that “our
forces must retain the capacity to undertake Large
Scale operations at longer notice in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Gulf Region,” the underlying UK
strategic intention was clear enough: “Multiple concurrent Small to Medium Scale operations will be the
most significant factor in our force planning.” The
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Defence White Paper continued, “We must therefore
plan to support the three concurrent operations, of
which one is an enduring peace support operation,
that have become the norm in recent years.”27 This was
no minor reorganization of existing military means:
the 2003 Defence White Paper confirmed a significant
change in strategic outlook as the UK began to focus
more closely, and more explicitly, on “small wars.”
2010: National Security Strategy and SDSR.
The most recent formal UK strategic review was
published in 2010 in two parts: the National Security Strategy (NSS), published on October 18, and the
SDSR, published the following day.28
The NSS was clear in one important respect: “we
face no major state threat at present and no existential
threat to our security, freedom or prosperity.” Rather than thinking in terms of large-scale, traditional
threats, the authors of the NSS thought in terms of risk:
“The risk picture is likely to become increasingly diverse. No single risk will dominate.” In a three-tiered
list of “priority risks,” the NSS set out a familiar mix of
substrategic threats, in response to which UK conventional armed forces would most likely be used at long
distance and at a relatively low scale. The four Tier
One risks were international terrorism, cyber attacks
and cyber crime, a major accident or natural hazard,
and an “international military crisis between states”
involving the UK and its allies.29
Other than in the case of the “international military crisis between states” (Tier One) and the case of
the increased risk of terrorism resulting from “major
instability, insurgency or civil war overseas” (Tier
Two), the deployment of UK armed forces in the con-
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ventional role does not feature prominently in the first
two tiers of the NSS priority risks table. Significantly,
the possibility of a “major accident or natural hazard”
appears as the third of four Tier One risks (a higher
priority, therefore, than the “international military crisis”), while the prospect of a “large-scale conventional
military attack on the UK by another state” appears
only as a Tier Three risk.
To meet the wide and varied range of security risks
and challenges set out in the NSS, the SDSR offered a
new strategic policy framework that, in turn, generated eight national security tasks:
1. Identify and monitor national security risks and
opportunities;
2. Tackle the root causes of instability;
3. Exert influence to exploit opportunities and
manage risks;
4. Enforce domestic law and strengthen international norms to help tackle those who threaten the UK
and its interests, including maintenance of underpinning technical expertise in key areas;
5. Protect the UK and its interests at home, at its
border, and internationally to address physical and
electronic threats from state and nonstate sources;
6. Help resolve conflicts and contribute to stability
by, where necessary, intervening overseas, including
legally using coercive force in support of vital UK interests, and protecting overseas territories and people;
7. Provide resilience for the UK by being prepared
for all kinds of emergencies, being able to recover from
shocks, and being able to maintain essential services;
and,
8. Work in alliances and partnerships wherever
possible to generate stronger responses.30
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These eight tasks capture the wide-ranging and
generally sober tone of both the NSS and SDSR. Yet
they are not too narrowly concerned with hard power.
Similarly, of the SDSR’s 35 planning guidelines, only
eight are directly concerned with the traditional, conventional use of military power. In keeping with the
mood of caution and constraint, the SDSR’s DPAs
held to the pattern of the previous decade, expressing
a preference for military deployments that would be
either far away, fairly small, or relatively brief. The
DPAs gave the following alternatives:
1. Conducting an enduring stabilization operation
at around brigade level (up to 6,500 personnel) with
maritime and air support as required, while also conducting one nonenduring complex intervention (up to
2,000 personnel) and one nonenduring simple intervention (up to 1,000 personnel);
2. Conducting three nonenduring operations if the
UK is not already engaged in an enduring operation;
or,
3. Committing, for a limited time and with sufficient warning, all UK military effort to a one-off intervention of up to three brigades, with maritime and
air support (around 30,000, or two-thirds of the force
deployed to Iraq in 2003).31
Judging by the 2010 NSS and SDSR, the UK strategic outlook is one in which the country will encounter a wide variety of security risks and challenges,
ranging from natural hazards such as flooding to cyber crime to humanitarian crises to more traditional
defense tasks, yet stopping short of an “existential”
threat to the UK and its interests. Consequently, the
armed forces are expected to undertake a wide variety of tasks, including early warning and intelligence
gathering, aid to emergency organizations, the provi-
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sion of a defense contribution to UK influence, and the
projection of military power within the parameters of
the 2010 DPAs.
ASSESSMENT
This chapter has charted the recent evolution of
UK hard power in terms of four performance indicators. The first, military expenditure, has been relatively constant, while the second, military capabilities, shows downward trends, at least in quantitative
terms. A qualitative assessment of UK hard power
would certainly be more useful than a simple exercise
in counting numbers. But because assessment methodologies are relatively underdeveloped, a qualitative
assessment is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Operational experience, the third indicator of hard
power, is the only one to show a firm upward trend:
over the period covered by this chapter, and for several years previously, the UK acquired and consolidated
a very strong reputation in the effective use of military
force. The final indicator is strategic intent. Here, UK
strategic rhetoric has very clearly shrunk.
I suggest three competing explanations for this
mixed set of results. The first contender is that the evolution of UK hard power since 1998 has been driven
largely by austerity, and remains so. By this view,
the priority of successive governments has been to
reduce the proportion of public expenditure devoted
to defense as quickly as possible, accepting increased
strategic risk in what is assumed to be a more benign
world, to concentrate on restoring the health of the
national economy.
The “peace dividend” of the early post-Cold War
period, the argument might continue, was therefore
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no passing craze: it outlasted the 1990s and endured
until it could be reincarnated in the post-2007 mood
of austerity. There is a convincing aspect to this argument; UK defense is in the grip of austerity budgeting and will remain so for years to come, but it is
also somewhat exaggerated. Since the 1990s, the UK
government has, after all, spent a great deal of public money on defense: UK defense spending has consistently exceeded the NATO commitment to spend
a minimum of 2 percent of GDP on defense, and the
UK remains in the top ranks globally when it comes to
defense spending.
The second possible explanation is that in recent
years there has been a quiet campaign within government to design out UK capacity to act militarily. The
purpose of this “anti-strategic” effort has allegedly
been to dismantle UK hard power on the grounds
that the capacity to intervene gave rise to the temptation to intervene, resulting in the deaths, injuries, expense, and reputational damage to the UK caused by
Prime Minister Tony Blair-era wars, most notably in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Certainly, there are persistent, muttered allegations of government ministers and senior officials who
have taken it upon themselves to exclude hard power
from the UK strategic toolbox in preference for an emphasis on the so-called soft power of diplomacy, trading relations, and cultural interaction. By removing
the capacity to act, the high-minded, internationalist,
interventionist rhetoric of the government’s declared
strategic intent would thus become relatively free of
risk and cost, since little could ever be done about
it. Although national defense would still consume a
large share of public spending, that sum would be far
less than the cost of going to war.
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This explanation is also unconvincing, however.
Where defense, security, and military matters are concerned, soft power is valid and valuable, but it is best
seen as a proxy for hard power rather than a sufficient
alternative to it. It requires very little understanding
of strategy to see that the result of a self-emasculation
program would be for UK hard power to be replaced
not by soft power but by bluff, and there might be
nothing more expensive than the insecurity that is exposed when a bluff is called. Fortunately, it is barely
conceivable that senior people charged with UK national security could have adopted such a strategically
irresponsible, politically dishonest, and intellectually
weak position.
If neither austerity nor anti-strategy offers a convincing explanation for the evolution of UK hard
power, there is a third alternative. The only clear positive trend in the story of UK hard power over the past
15 or so years is the very high level of operational experience gained by UK armed forces. If the forces have
remained so effective even under conditions of austerity, then it is at least possible that their success might
have worked against them by providing a perverse
disincentive for sustained investment in hard power,
whether financial, intellectual, or political.
Operational experience might also mask the most
convincing yet least attractive explanation for the current condition of UK hard power: strategic ambivalence. It cannot be said that the UK has altogether lost
interest in hard power. But neither can it be said with
much confidence what that interest is: Why should the
UK remain interested in hard power? How important
is hard power to the UK national strategic outlook? Is
military expenditure seen as a government obligation
or as a burden to be offloaded whenever and wherever possible?
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Strategic ambivalence is a national strategic outlook that barely qualifies as such, where the aspiration is to commit as little as possible (politically and
financially) while retaining the widest possible range
of strategic options. Ambivalence can be seen at the
political, strategic, financial, technological, and moral
levels. Politically, the diminishing capacity for UK
major operational deployments chimes with public
antipathy toward large-scale military interventions,
yet does not remove that option altogether.
Therefore, the expeditionary rhetoric found in the
NSS and SDSR of 2010, as in earlier statements of strategic intent, need never be tested. Something of this
sentiment can be found in a comment made by Secretary Hammond in oral evidence to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee in October 2013:
It would be realistic of me to say that I would not expect—except in the most extreme circumstances—to
see a manifestation of great appetite for plunging into
another prolonged period of expeditionary engagement any time soon.32

Strategically, any adjustments in UK expeditionary hard power are offset by competence in other matters, such as counterterrorism and rescue operations,
which are still perceived by the public and media to
be serious national security tasks. Financially, the impressive reputation of UK armed forces holds out the
alluring possibility that further cuts might be made
(especially in personnel) without any obvious loss of
competence, particularly if the scale and duration of
operations are reduced.
Technologically, reductions in bulk hard power
might rationalize a shift to a more technologically
oriented posture involving intelligence, surveillance,
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precision strike, unmanned combat air vehicles, and
similar features. These equipment and platforms are
of interest not only because they are often less costly
to operate than their conventional equivalents, but
also because they offer a degree of political deniability
that is not so readily available when there are boots
on the ground. Technological warfare might even be
considered morally preferable in that it should mean
fewer troops being exposed to the risks of combat.
In some respects, strategic ambivalence is to be
welcomed. At its most constructive, ambivalence
could be the basis of a national strategy based on risk
analysis and management—an approach that is most
appropriate when national strategy must respond not
only to a diverse range of security threats and challenges but also to scarcity and austerity.
Yet where matters of hard power are concerned, a
national strategy based on ambivalence and risk must
be deliberate rather than accidental and must involve
careful and difficult decisions rather than expect to
avoid them altogether. For a risk-based national strategy to be effective, it will require serious thought and
investment in capabilities such as intelligence gathering, early warning, and communications.33 It remains
to be seen whether the UK government will remain
meaningfully committed to a risk-based national
strategy.
In his first speech as chief of the defense staff in
December 2013, General Sir Nick Houghton observed
that “[UK] Defence has for many years, certainly since
the end of the Cold War, and in strong international
company within Europe, been managing the decline
of military hard power.”34 But managed decline is not
the same as decline; there must be strategic capacity
and purpose in whatever remains of the process—
however inevitable—of retrenchment.
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As the basis for national strategy, ambivalence is
no substitute for analysis and decision, and it cannot
offer a reassuring glimpse of the future; national strategy will continue to require complex judgments that
are periodically revised as circumstances change. Finally, it is unwise to expect to be ambivalent about everything in national strategy, particularly hard power:
national hard power either exists on a militarily meaningful scale or it does not; it either has purpose or it
does not.
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CHAPTER 12
POOLING AND SHARING:
THE EFFORT TO ENHANCE ALLIED DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES1
W. Bruce Weinrod
KEY POINTS
•	In the face of declining defense budgets, transatlantic allies have shown increased interest in
pooling-and-sharing defense efforts.
•	The results have been mixed, with some notable successes, such as the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC), and other less-successful efforts,
such as the European Union’s (EU) attempt to
establish a common training program for jet pilots.
•	Large-scale pooling and sharing tends to infringe on national sovereignty issues. Consequently, successful programs are most likely
tied to discrete areas of cooperation and are
often carried out by smaller groups of nations.
Recent developments in Crimea and Ukraine highlight the crucial importance of robust transatlantic
military capabilities. However, these capabilities are
on a downward trajectory. If current trends continue,
the weakening of collective defenses may reach a tipping point where significant collective power projection would be problematic at best.
This need not happen. The transatlantic nations
have the collective resources to ensure a credible and
robust defense capability, and allied governments
continue to proclaim the need for a capable nation287

al defense while believing that their own security
can best be ensured by joining in common defense
commitments and programs.
To these ends, transatlantic defense officials are
giving increased attention to ways in which defense
budgets can be more efficiently and effectively allocated. Most allies are largely rejecting budget increases as
unfeasible in today’s economic climate and are looking to each other to better utilize existing resources
through pooling-and-sharing efforts.
This exploration is all the more urgent, given that
the United States may not always provide substantially more than its fair share of transatlantic military
resources. (According to most recent figures, the U.S.
share of allied defense expenditures was over 70 percent.2) The September 2014 NATO summit in Wales,
United Kingdom (UK), presents the most promising
overall opportunity for the highest levels of allied
governments to provide an impetus for the full development and implementation of pooling-and-sharing
initiatives.
BACKGROUND
“Pooling” and “sharing” are complementary
terms applied to various cooperative defense arrangements for bringing together the resources of two or
more nations to enhance effectiveness or lessen costs.
Pooling and sharing can be accomplished within a
transatlantic or European-wide framework (such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] or
the EU) or through dedicated bilateral or multilateral
arrangements.
Although pooling-and-sharing defense programs
have attracted substantial attention in recent years,
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such arrangements existed before the emergence of the
term. What is new is the high priority being placed on
pooling-and-sharing projects as a way to reduce costs
to individual nations, while ensuring the existence of
necessary military capacities.
At the same time, implementing pooling-andsharing programs on a large scale is challenging. For
example, programs tied to logistics or to tactical intelligence are relatively easy to implement. However,
activities that delve more deeply into operational capabilities can become more politically and economically complex. Further, nations considering pooling
and sharing can face difficult decisions regarding the
allocation of defense resources that impact national
defense industries and that rely on other nations to
provide necessary military capabilities in times of
crisis or conflict.
NATO POOLING AND SHARING
Pooling and sharing is a priority objective for
NATO and is included in its broad Smart Defence initiative, which was launched by current and outgoing
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in
2011 and was affirmed at the 2012 NATO summit.3
Pooling and sharing has a number of antecedents
within NATO.4 The best known is the NATO airborne
early warning and control system (AWACS), which
became operational in December 1978. The force consists of 17 E-3A aircraft and is supported by 18 participating NATO nations, which share operational costs.
The UK makes an in-kind contribution of its E-3D
aircraft. The AWACS has proven to be a successful,
cooperative program that has provided an important
operational capability, including, most recently, its
deployment in the Afghan theater of operations.
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Separately, NATO operates a jet-fuel pipeline linking 13 NATO nations to provide for NATO requirements. NATO also utilizes the NATO Support Agency, which handles the organization’s logistics and
procurement. The pipeline and support agency are
examples of pooling-and-sharing initiatives launched
in the early days of the alliance.
A more recent cooperative program that fulfills a
key operational need for participating nations is the
SAC, a 12-member consortium that, at present, deploys three C-17 transport aircraft. SAC aircraft are
available to contributing nations to meet their national
military needs, including those related to NATO and
European Union (EU) commitments. SAC consortium
nations include 10 NATO nations and NATO Partnership for Peace members, Finland and Sweden. Based
in Hungary, SAC aircraft utilize multinational crews
and are supported by personnel from all participating
nations.
SAC members need the lift capability of large aircraft, but most do not have the financial resources to
acquire or maintain such a major capability. Thus, the
SAC offers a cost-effective approach that permits participants to purchase specific sets of flying hours as
needed. All SAC partners pay operational costs and
can utilize the SAC for any purpose such as airdrops
and assault landings. The consortium has already been
used for operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and
Libya, as well as for peacekeeping and humanitarian
relief operations.
The SAC also provides an alternative structural
model to the AWACS. While AWACS aircraft are
owned by NATO and are thus part of NATO’s overall
structure, SAC aircraft are owned by a legally separate
consortium of nations that includes both NATO and
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non-NATO countries and that has an arrangement
that allows the SAC to use NATO support structures.
One advantage of SAC arrangements is that, while
the AWACS program requires unanimous consent
by its partners for use, the SAC does not have such a
requirement.
NATO is also currently developing another commonly supported capability known as the Alliance
Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, which is to include five Global Hawk high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), with operations expected to begin
in several years. These UAVs will be deployed with
sophisticated radars and will allow NATO to monitor ground activities over wide areas and under all
weather conditions.
The AGS will be purchased by 14 NATO nations.
Its infrastructure and operational support will be
funded through NATO’s common funding program,
which is composed of financial contributions from
all NATO members. In addition, France and the UK
will provide in-kind service support, while other nations will supplement the AGS with national air surveillance capabilities as required. Industries from all
of the AGS nations will participate in the AGS program, and all NATO nations will have access to AGSacquired information. As with the AWACS, AGS will
be a NATO system with the international status of a
formal subsidiary organization of NATO. Program
management will be provided by the NATO Alliance
Ground Surveillance Management Agency.
The aforementioned programs reflect the fact that
pooling-and-sharing activities can involve establishing a dedicated coordinating framework. Indeed,
NATO has established specific bureaucratic structures
for the AWACS and SAC. Other dedicated bureau-
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cratic structures that were launched in the early days
of the alliance, such as the NATO pipeline and NATO
Maintenance and Supply Agency, are also examples
of successful pooling-and-sharing programs.
There are also a number of more recently established NATO pooling-and-sharing arrangements. For
example, multiple NATO nations take turns providing fighter aircraft to patrol the airspace over the three
Baltic allied states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. As
a result, these smaller nations do not need to acquire
this capability and can spend their defense resources on other priorities. Similarly, Germany provides
maritime surveillance in the North Sea, thus alleviating the need for such a capability on the part of the
Netherlands.
Near-term projects envisioned by NATO include
the development of a multinational cyber defense capability; creation of a multinational chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalion with pooled
equipment and training; establishment of a multinational aviation training center for helicopter pilots
and ground crews; and pooling of allied maritime
patrol aircraft.
EU POOLING AND SHARING
Just as NATO has capitalized on the pooling and
sharing of resources, the EU has adopted pooling and
sharing as a focal point for efforts to develop common European security programs. In 2004, the EU
established the European Defence Agency (EDA) as
a framework for coordinating European defense cooperation activities.5 EU-EDA pooling-and-sharing
efforts have consisted of a modest number of specific
projects and a variety of planned initiatives.
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An important ongoing program area facilitated by
the EDA involves military air transport. In 2010, the
EDA began operation of the European Air Transport
Command (EATC), based in the Netherlands. The
EATC coordinates military transport fleets of its five
member nations (France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Luxembourg) and undertakes occasional exercises and training programs. In 2013, eight
nations—four EATC states plus the Czech Republic,
Italy, Sweden, and Spain, the host nation—participated in the European Air Transport Training Exercise.
In addition, the EDA has established the framework for a European Air Transport Fleet (EATF).
The EATF has 20 members but is currently more of
a notional structure than an operational enterprise.
Over time, the EDA would like the EATF to expand
to include the exchange or acquisition of aircraft and
supporting capacities, including maintenance, cargo
handling, and common training.6
An important recent development was the Ghent
Initiative, presented to the EU in September 2010 by
Sweden and Germany. The initiative proposed that
the EDA could, in close cooperation with other organizations, coordinate and potentially link various EU
pooling-and-sharing efforts. The initiative also urged
EU nations to divide their military capabilities into
several categories: capabilities that are indispensable
to the state’s security and need to be maintained exclusively by the state, capabilities that could be maintained in closer cooperation with partners without the
state losing authority over them (pooling), and capabilities that could be eliminated when provided by
other states (sharing).
Over the past few years, EU member states have
put forward many ideas for enhanced pooling and
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sharing in areas that are key military and operational
enablers: strategic transport, air-to-air refueling, medical support, surveillance and reconnaissance, maritime surveillance, pilot training, naval logistics, and
military communication satellites. As yet, however,
there has been halting progress in implementing these
ideas at the EU level.7
Independently, the EDA has offered to assist EU
nations with pooling and sharing in areas such as
shared use of fixed military infrastructure and in defense acquisition and manufacturing. The EDA is also
assessing potential projects in maritime surveillance
capabilities, surveillance and reconnaissance, military
satellite communications, smart munitions, and naval
logistics. Further, in November 2012, the EDA promulgated a voluntary code of conduct whose stated
purpose is to support cooperative efforts to develop
defense capabilities.
That said, a substantial part of EDA activities have
thus far consisted of studies and recommendations as
opposed to actual programs. The absence of more definitive defense projects is a result of several factors:
1) the lack of major financial commitments for such
projects, 2) the view in most EU nations that national
interests, including sustaining national defense industrial bases-take priority over cooperative endeavors,
and 3) the firm UK position that EDA programs must
be limited in scope and cost.
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS
In addition to pooling-and-sharing activities within NATO and EU frameworks, various European nations have developed bilateral or multilateral defense
relationships that include pooling and sharing. Such
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arrangements typically involve nations in geographical proximity. The following subsections detail some
of these arrangements.
Nordic Defence Cooperation.
Established in 2009, the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) framework has reinforced an already-existing history of cooperation among the Nordic countries of Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden,
and Iceland. Defense cooperation has focused on joint
training, exercises, and capability development.
Indeed, NORDEFCO holds promise to be the most
advanced regional grouping in the years ahead. At a
December 2013 meeting, NORDEFCO nations agreed
on a future plan of action, outlined in the Nordic Defence Cooperation 2020.8 The plan calls for air surveillance patrols (by Sweden, Finland, and NATO members, Norway and Denmark) over Iceland.
NORDEFCO also announced its Cooperation Air
Transportation initiative for using air transport assets
and, possibly, in the future, pooled efforts in the areas
of maintenance, spare parts, and procurement. Nordic
countries will also, according to the December 2013
plan, focus on developing joint rapid deployment
capabilities, including Arctic missions, along with developing new rules and processes for enhancing prospects for joint procurements.
The Visegrad Group.
The Visegrad Group (VG), established in 1991,
consists of the Central European nations of Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The VG
was formed to increase cooperation among the four
countries in a range of policy areas, including defense.
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Early VG efforts to enhance collaboration on defense projects were unsuccessful. More recently,
catalyzed by the EU Ghent Initiative and the NATO
Smart Defence program, the VG has given increased
attention to cooperation in this area. One tangible result has been an agreement to develop the Visegrad
Battle Group, with an operational target date in the
first half of 2016.9 The group is projected to consist of
approximately 3,000 troops, and Poland will serve as
its lead nation. In addition, the VG has helped coordinate training for helicopter pilots under the NATO
HIP helicopter support program.10 Separately, the
Czech Republic and Slovakia (both VG nations) have
joined with the United States and Croatia to develop a
Multinational Aviation Training Centre to train crews
of Russian-made, Mi-8-type helicopters.11
The Weimar Triangle.
The Weimar Triangle (WT) was established in 1991
as a mechanism for cooperation among France, Germany, and Poland. As with the VG, the WT has focused principally on political, economic, and cultural
relationships. Defense efforts have consisted mainly
of meetings and communiqués. However, as with
the VG, the WT agreed to develop a Weimar Triangle
Battlegroup consisting of 1,500 troops ready for rapid
deployment, which became operational in 2013.12
The France-UK Defense Treaty.
Seeking to work around constrained defense budgets, in 2010, the UK and France reached an agreement
envisioning significant pooling-and-sharing efforts in
which the two nations would share nuclear-weapons
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testing facilities, defense research, and aircraft carriers. The agreement also called for developing a joint
expeditionary force and for cooperation in maintenance, training, and logistics in connection with the
French and British air forces’ acquisition of the A400M
transport aircraft.13
Implementation of the agreement has been thus
far incomplete but has included regular joint military
exercises. Some British officers have been deployed
on a French aircraft carrier,14 and pilots from each
country have flown the other’s fighter jets as an initial
step toward establishing a combined joint expeditionary force by 2016.15 France has also agreed to a British
proposal to jointly develop and build a new anti-ship
missile and a new generation of advanced unmanned
aircraft.16
Benelux Defense Cooperation.
Defense cooperation between Belgian and Dutch
naval forces began in the early post-World War II period and has included the establishment of a single
commanding officer for the two navies, of an integrated naval staff, and of integrated support structures.17
An accord was signed in 2012 for increased joint naval
training between Belgian commandos and the Dutch
Airmobile Brigade. The two air forces also agreed to
cooperate more closely in using each other’s airfields,
in joint deployments, and in integration of materiel
support. Future areas of cooperation include logistics
and maintenance, military education, defense acquisition, and joint military operations.18
Another multilateral arrangement involving Belgium and the Netherlands is the European Participating Air Forces (EPAF) program, which also includes
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Denmark and Norway. EPAF emerged from the initial acquisition of F-16s by these nations. In the ensuing years, the nations have trained together and used
common logistics facilities. Although not formally a
part of NATO, EPAF fighters have deployed on NATO
missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan.19
KEY CHALLENGES FOR POOLING
AND SHARING
Pooling and sharing can be an important mechanism for maintaining transatlantic military capabilities over the longer term. At the same time, economic,
technological, military, and political challenges exist.
Any of these challenges, much less a combination of
them, can make the successful development and implementation of pooling-and-sharing projects difficult
to accomplish.20
Economic issues can delay or even block poolingand-sharing programs. Domestic-based defense industries can place great pressure on their respective
governments to gain the largest possible share of
work in any cooperative project. Resolving the conflicting interests may take lengthy negotiations that
can substantially delay, or even render futile, the
development of a new initiative.
For example, the AGS program discussed earlier
was first proposed by NATO in the late-1980s. Despite
AGS having been the top priority for NATO military
leaders, it took a decade and a half for NATO leaders
to reach the agreement to deploy AGS, with the delay
due largely to discussions about which defense companies in which countries would get what share of
the work.
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In addition, nations working together do not always produce a more cost-effective outcome or a
more effective capability. With shrinking defense
budgets, there is even more pressure to distribute
development dollars and acquisition dollars to keep
companies afloat. In some instances, this can lead to
the division of project work in inefficient or not-costeffective ways, including requirements that a certain
percentage of work be allocated to specific nations to
assuage domestic constituencies.
For example, the NH90 helicopter, developed
under a multilateral program by NATO nations, witnessed significant delays and a series of technical
problems in development, with further complications
arising from the fact that the helicopter was being designed for use by different military services and had
different design configurations for some nations. The
result was a significant increase in expected costs—
probably well above what the system would have cost
if the helicopter had been developed by one nation.
A similar story can be told regarding the multinational programs to develop and build the Eurofighter
Typhoon and A400M transport plane.
Coordination of pooling-and-sharing projects
among participants can also prove challenging. Nations have different planning, programming, and
budgeting cycles. For example, budget cycle variances were the principal cause of France’s hesitation
and delays in agreeing to a UK request to develop
jointly an anti-ship missile system. Moreover, nations
participating in pooling-and-sharing efforts need to
reach agreements on such matters as system ownership, military command structures, the use of bases,
and possible national caveats regarding the conduct
of actual military operations.
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The proposed Advanced European Jet Pilot Training System illustrates some of these difficulties. The
program, whose planning began a decade ago and
which was approved by the EDA in 2009, contemplated using European bases for pilots to train on a
common fleet of aircraft. However, national differences about key elements of the project—including
which bases and aircraft should be used—and about
training methods have prevented the program from
moving forward. Interestingly, a similar program already exists within NATO, which for many years has
conducted jet pilot training for 13 nations at Sheppard
Air Force Base, Texas.
Domestic considerations can also delay or block the
implementation of a project, even after a government
agrees to join a specific program.21 Finance ministries
or individual military services may balk at providing
the funding necessary to implement an agreement.
For example, the United States pledged at an early
point to participate in the NATO SAC program, but it
delayed signing the required memorandum of understanding to begin American participation because the
U.S. Air Force was reluctant to provide the necessary
funding from its budget. It finally did, but only after
being ordered to do so.22
It must also be kept in mind that both NATO and
the EU can only undertake those projects that member
nations authorize and are willing to fund. In addition,
there is at present an inherent limit on EDA activities,
given the differing EU member views on the nature
and extent of the EU’s role in security matters.
Pooling and sharing requires the cooperation of
national militaries, and while multinational coordination has occurred successfully at times, such arrangements face hurdles in overcoming differences in capa-
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bilities, in military doctrines, in weapons systems, in
training, and in personnel and command structures.
In addition, pooling and sharing has the potential to constrain collective military capabilities. If, for
example, a nation entirely gives up a certain capability in deference to another nation with similar capabilities, the loss of redundancy could be a problem
in protracted or large-scale conflict operations. Also,
interoperability gaps may make it challenging for a
nation with advanced capabilities to work effectively
with a smaller nation that possesses a similar but lessdeveloped capability.
Of course, a critical concern is whether shared capabilities will be available when needed. If a nation
possessing a necessary capability refuses to participate in a collective military action, this will obviously
make it more difficult to carry out an operation and
could even alter the calculus of whether to undertake
the operation altogether. Furthermore, a fundamental
concern standing in the way of large-scale pooling and
sharing is how it infringes on national sovereignty. By
eliminating a particular capability, it is argued that a
nation becomes dependent on other nations to provide capabilities necessary for its own security and,
in turn, risks its ability to carry out a core task of a
nation-state.
MAKING POOLING AND SHARING WORK
Even considering the limitations and challenges
outlined previously, pooling and sharing has the
potential to be an important instrument for helping
sustain necessary transatlantic military capabilities,
especially in the current constrained economic environment. Pooling-and-sharing efforts can be most
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successful if they follow the guidelines outlined in the
following list.
1. NATO should be open to creative pooling-andsharing arrangements, such as the SAC, which includes NATO (and non-NATO) members but is not
within NATO.
2. Although rarely popular in member states’ capitals, common funding (for example, NATO nations’
financial contributions for common endeavors) is
necessary to carry out new programs.
3. NATO should reform its decisionmaking processes (especially those NATO procedures that currently call for unanimity on all major decisions) to
ensure that one nation cannot block or delay a project
indefinitely.
4. NATO should explore pooling-and-sharing arrangements that are developing under the recently
proposed initiative to establish “framework nations.”
Under this approach, member states who have retained a broad range of military capabilities would
act as lead nations in coordinating programs with an
eye to meeting NATO defense planning targets on
a tailor-made, multinational, but not alliance-wide
basis. Smaller allied militaries would then plug into
the enabling capabilities that only the big nations can
provide (for example, air-to-air refueling or strategic
surveillance and reconnaissance).
5. Nations should be more forthcoming with defense plans. So far, the practice has been for individual member states to consider, decide, and announce
defense cutbacks without either consulting with or
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informing allies or NATO. Thus, under current circumstances, important NATO capabilities can be
weakened without any advance opportunity to consider how they might be maintained in different ways.
Such advance notice can allow time for an assessment to be made regarding the nature and extent of
any effect of a reduction in collective transatlantic
military capabilities. A dedicated evaluation center,
such as a consortium of independent policy organizations, should be established. This center could assess
national plans and their effect on collective capacities
and could suggest alternative approaches—including
pooling and sharing—that might maintain or develop
a needed capability.
6. It bears repeating that the EU and NATO must
avoid redundancy. There are simply insufficient resources for the organizations to be undertaking duplicative projects. At the same time, both organizations
should strive to identify synergies.
In theory, both organizations recognize the need
for enhanced coordination. The 2012 NATO summit
specifically endorsed European programs to strengthen air-to-air refueling capacities. Further, NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has developed
a number of potential pooling-and-sharing projects
that consult with the EDA. In addition, NATO and the
EU meet regularly in the EU-NATO Capability Group
to discuss common capability requirements. NATO’s
ACT and the EU’s EDA are also in regular contact.23
There may also be programs that NATO chooses
not to pursue that would nonetheless enhance overall
transatlantic security or provide capabilities helpful
for localized contingencies. In this regard, the EDA
Code of Conduct’s call for giving pooling-and-sharing
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programs priority protection from defense cuts is sensible, and the permanent, structured cooperation arrangements envisioned under the EU Treaty of Lisbon
could provide a mechanism for pooling and sharing
by small groups of nations.24
7. Pooling and sharing should focus on practical
cooperation that can truly enhance capabilities. Such
cooperation also has the added virtue of often being
the easiest to implement. Indeed, as described earlier,
there are already a number of ongoing pooling-andsharing arrangements in basic areas such as education,
training, and exercises. More advanced efforts could
focus on developing multinational logistics-andmaintenance support for selected capabilities. In any
event, NATO can and should build on the cooperative
efforts developed during its mission in Afghanistan.25
It could also make sense for multilateral programs
to address core mission or functional areas, as the
EATC does for airlift and air-to-air refueling. One approach would be to cluster nations by mission area
(such as maritime power projection), function (airlift),
or system (for example, NH90 helicopter users or F-35
users).26
8. Industry has an essential role in ensuring that
pooling-and-sharing projects are cost effective and of
requisite quality. To facilitate that goal, a focus on industrial issues must begin at the conceptual stage of a
project to work out arrangements that ensure positive
industry participation that continues throughout the
program’s operations or life cycle.27
External factors—including a more open European defense market, more cross-border cooperation,
or mergers among European defense companies—can
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also facilitate industry involvement in pooling and
sharing. Since most of the government-to-government
frameworks for international defense cooperation
have thus far been bilateral, the regulations and procedures for armaments cooperation need to be adapted
for multinational procurement and cooperation.
9. Enhanced coordination of national defense
programing timetables is also essential for significant pooling and sharing to succeed. Nations must
exchange information on projected national procurement processes to ensure that production cycles in
such areas as requirements, development, procurement, and maintenance are in sync. All such coordination should also be linked to NATO defense planning,
as appropriate.
Further, the number of variants of military systems
should be minimized. This will make maintenance
and training, coordination of doctrine and operational
concepts, and the use of common logistics easier and
less costly. Of course, the most effective allied cooperation requires that military systems be interoperable,
with common standards and certifications.
10. Bottom-up involvement in pooling and sharing is likely to be the most successful approach. As
described previously, pooling-and-sharing activities
by small groups of nations have been ongoing, for decades in some instances, and such regional and subregional arrangements will likely be the major engine
for more of these arrangements. Experience indicates
that projects organized by nations that are geographically close, that generally share common values, and
that have similar threat perceptions are more likely
to be developed and actually implemented. At the
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same time, such groups can take in additional participants when practical and when likely to enhance
capabilities.28
However, a challenge for such bottom-up initiatives is to ensure coordination with NATO. A multiplication of separate multinational arrangements might
not enhance overall transatlantic military capabilities,
so these efforts should be coordinated within a NATO
framework to ensure maximum results.
11. A key aspect of 21st-century NATO that is
growing in importance is NATO’s partnership structure. Non-NATO nations have in recent years assumed
an increasing role in NATO programs and activities.
Thus, it is essential to enhance NATO’s relationship
with its most militarily capable partner nations and
to identify further pooling-and-sharing programs in
which such partners can participate. Countries such
as Finland and Sweden bring much to the table and
are already working closely with NATO.29
12. Finally, and most crucially, concerns about the
potential availability of military assets during a time
of crisis or conflict understandably exist in a number
of nations. Unless or until this issue is resolved, it will
likely place inherent limits on the nature and extent
of pooling and sharing and, thus, pooling and sharing
will of necessity need to focus on discrete and manageable capabilities.
CONCLUSION
The protection of U.S. and transatlantic national
security interests and, indeed, the furtherance of crucial foreign policy objectives in general cannot be suc-
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cessfully managed without underlying credible and
robust military capability.30 While specific required
military capabilities may be different than those of the
past, the need for a highly capable and ready military
remains. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea is a useful reminder that military force
remains a fact of international life—if a reminder was
even needed.
Ensuring necessary defense capabilities has become much more challenging because of the economic downturn and the absence of a shared consensus about the threats the democratic West faces. As
a result, European military capabilities are without a
doubt in decline. However, collective European military resources can still produce capable military forces
if exploited in an effective manner. Such forces could
handle security issues within the European region
and adjacent areas, with the United States cooperating as appropriate, and be in a position to participate
in international security coalitions addressing broader
threats involving larger-scale cooperation between the
United States and transatlantic nations.
The September 2014 NATO summit should endorse a specific pathway for the development of a
robust transatlantic pooling-and-sharing program.
NATO and the EU can both provide structural frameworks for pooling-and-sharing activities, but NATO
can and should remain the principal mechanism for
transatlantic military cooperation. NATO remains the
strongest global military organization and is also the
institutional link connecting the United States directly
to transatlantic security.
That said, as previously noted, pooling and sharing need not always emanate from NATO or the EU.
Various regional groupings are already playing a role
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in enhancing cooperation, and these organizations
may well prove to be more effective in this regard
than either NATO or the EU. But this should be accomplished within broader institutional frameworks
and in a consistent manner with broader alliance capability requirements.
At the end of the day, it is most important that the
requisite military capabilities exist and are available
when needed to protect transatlantic security interests. If nations have the political will to allocate necessary funds and address coordination issues, pooling
and sharing can be a key mechanism for the development of necessary technologies and weapons systems
and can play an important role in the maintenance of
essential transatlantic military capabilities.
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11. See Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of the Czech
Republic, Multinational Aviation Training Centre Document
Signed by Four Nations, February 25, 2013, available from www.
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government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224227/
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Defence Co-operation,” Dutch Daily News, April 26, 2012,
available from www.dutchdailynews.com/netherlands-belgium-andluxembourg-enhance-defence-co-operation/.
19. For a concept paper regarding an expanded EPAF, see,
“Regional Fighter Partnership: Options for Cooperation and Cost
Sharing,” Kalkar, Germany: Joint Air Power Competence Centre,
March 2012, available from www.japcc.org/portfolio/regional-fighterpartnership-options-for-cooperation-and-cost-sharing/.
20. This chapter focuses on Europe’s role in pooling and sharing. The United States and Canada can, of course, participate in
such programs, but a primary objective should be to enhance
European capabilities. Canada has played an outsized role in
NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan and takes its defense capabilities very seriously. For a Canadian perspective, see Mike
Greenley, Canadian Views on Smart Defence, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries,
October 30, 2011, available from www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/
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21. It must also be kept in mind that both NATO and the EU
can only undertake those projects that member nations authorize
and are willing to fund. In addition, there is at present an inherent
limit on EDA activities, given the differing EU member views on
the nature and extent of the EU security role.
22. This made it somewhat awkward for U.S. officials at
NATO who were urging other nations to join the program while
the United States was not doing so.
23. However, while there is regular interaction between
NATO and the EU, much of it has been pro forma. Any truly significant enhancement of their relationship will most likely have to
await resolution of underlying political issues such as the TurkeyCyprus question.
24. This provision permits a few nations, rather than all EU
nations, to cooperate. As noted earlier, to date, much of the EU
pooling-and-sharing effort has consisted of analyses, communi-
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qués, speeches, and initiatives. At the same time, through this
process, the EU and the EDA have developed a wide-ranging and
very ambitious menu of program priorities, with some more practical than others. Of course, the fact remains that all EDA efforts
depemd wholly on having adequate resources made available
and, as importantly, on national government decisions to provide
funding and actual participation in specific activities. It remains to
be seen how much of this agenda can and will go beyond studies
and planning documents and be translated into active programs.
25. NATO is, in fact, developing a Connected Forces Initiative
to build on connections established in Afghanistan.
26. Multinational storage of Grippen aircraft spare parts is already taking place among Sweden, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Such pooling and sharing among European allies could also
facilitate better burden sharing with the United States in meeting
NATO capability and force generation requirements. There might
be instances where the pooling and sharing should include the
United States, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; special operations forces; and ballistic missile defense.
27. The principal NATO mechanisms for addressing industrial matters are the Conference of National Armaments Directors
and the office of the NATO assistant secretary general for defense
investment.
28. As noted previously, NORDEFCO is developing activities
with Baltic nations. A forthcoming opportunity for cooperation
will arrive with the acquisition by several European nations of the
F-35 jet fighter. Norway and Britain have agreed to cooperate on
their maintenance and use, and Norway will seek to extend that
cooperation to the Netherlands.
29. For example, the very first signer of the memorandum of
understanding for the SAC program was partner nation Sweden,
and both Sweden and Finland have been active in various NATO
military missions and activities.
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30. It should be kept in mind that strong European military capabilities are in the U.S. national interest and have the potential to
lessen the U.S. defense burden, especially given that U.S. defense
capacities are becoming increasingly stretched. The United States
does have very important allies and friends in Asia. Nonetheless,
it remains the case that when push comes to shove, it is, above all,
European nations that are most likely to join forces to assist the
United States in military operations when U.S. security interests
are at stake. In addition, NATO is the optimum mechanism for
enhancing the military capacity of non-NATO nations that could
contribute military forces to U.S.-led coalition military operations.
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CHAPTER 13
JAPANESE HARD POWER:
RISING TO THE CHALLENGE1
Toshi Yoshihara
KEY POINTS
•	Japan’s ambition to play a larger role on the
world stage and address the security problems posed by a rising China have led Tokyo
to undertake institutional, policy, and defense
reforms.
•	Japan’s military reforms are intended to move
its defense force from a posture of passive
deterrence to one that is agile and forward
leaning.
•	Given Japan’s budgetary restraints, however, it
is unclear whether its resources can match its
strategic ambitions.
No longer is Japan the political shrinking violet of the immediate post-war years. Historians will
look back on the first decades of the 21st century as
a turning point for Japanese strategy, both in East
Asia and beyond. From major national security decisions—including the recent move to assume a limited
right of collective self-defense—to a shift in military
posture to counter a rising China, Japan is steadily
loosening the constraints on its security policy. Japanese hard power, which includes Japan’s first rate
but constitutionally handicapped military, will correspondingly play a more prominent role in Tokyo’s
strategic calculus.
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Understanding how Japanese policymakers will
wield that hard power as an instrument of statecraft
is thus crucial to Asian and global security. To explore
how Japan’s newfound assertiveness will shape Japanese hard power, this chapter will 1) assess recent developments in Japan’s national security establishment
and the deteriorating regional environment, 2) evaluate Japan’s defense posture and military modernization efforts, and 3) identify the various financial and
demographic constraints that could limit the material
dimensions of Japanese strategy.
A “NORMAL” JAPAN AT LAST?
Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, who returned to power in late-2012 following the Liberal Democratic Party’s landslide victory in the Diet’s lower-house elections, has pushed aggressively to realize his ambitious
agenda. Within a year of being elected, Abe instituted
sweeping reforms to the national security apparatus.
In December 2013, Japan announced the formation
of a National Security Council (NSC) modeled after
that of the United States. The council streamlines the
prime minister’s decisionmaking process while breaking down the various bureaucratic barriers that have
impeded effective crisis management. Tokyo also enacted a controversial state secrets law that tightened
the government’s control over sensitive and classified information, enabling the NSC to centralize the
handling of intelligence.
Concurrent with the NSC’s creation, Tokyo issued three defense policy documents that furnish
the roadmap for developing and sustaining Japanese
hard power. The National Security Strategy (NSS), the
first of its kind, sets forth “Japan’s fundamental poli-

316

cies pertaining to national security.”2 The document
is a welcome expression of Japan’s long-term vision
for securing the nation’s regional and global security
objectives. The fifth National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) establishes Japan’s longer-term defense
policy and force structure.3 The Medium Term Defense
Program (MTDP) is a programmatic statement of defense requirements and acquisition plans over a 5-year
period.4 For the first time in Japan’s post-World War
II history, Tokyo has produced policy documents that
systematically align Japanese policy, strategy, and
capabilities.
Notably, the NSS promotes the concept of “proactive contribution to peace” that commits Japan to an
even more forward-leaning posture in world affairs.
Describing the concept as a “fundamental principle
of [Japan’s] national security,” the NSS argues that
the security of Japan and of the wider international
community have become indivisible:
Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan
to play a more proactive role for peace and stability
in the world, in a way commensurate with its national
capabilities.5

In other words, Japan advances global security
by safeguarding its own neighborhood, while Japanese defense of the international order benefits Asian
regional stability.
As such, the NDPG contends that Japan must:
contribute even more proactively in securing peace,
stability and prosperity of the international community while achieving its own security as well as peace
and stability in the Asia—Pacific region.6
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Indeed, Prime Minister Abe can look to Japanese
contributions to international peace and security since
the end of the Cold War as the basis for his foreign
policy vision.
In a concrete manifestation of this proactive stance,
the Abe administration relaxed Japan’s arms exports
ban, which had been in place for nearly 5 decades. Issued in April 2014, the new guidelines for transferring
defense equipment intend to enhance technological
cooperation with partners and friends, raising Japan’s
profile in regional and global arms markets. The move
quickly bore fruit. A week after the new policy was
announced, Australia and Japan agreed to a joint
research project on marine hydrodynamics for constructing new submarines.
In July 2014, the newly established NSC approved
Japan’s research with Britain on the Meteor air-to-air
missile and approved exporting a sensor component
for the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 air defense system to the United States. A network of defense collaboration centered on developing hard power among
like-minded nations could well emerge from these
joint ventures. A proactive contribution to peace is
thus as much about empowering other defenders of
the status quo as it is about strengthening one’s own
capabilities.
In an even more consequential move, Abe partially lifted Japan’s self-imposed ban on the right of
collective self-defense, the hallmark of the nation’s
post-World War II foreign policy. For decades, successive Japanese governments strictly followed the
constitutional interpretation that permitted Japan to
exercise the right of individual self-defense, which
forbids Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) from aiding
friendly or allied military units that have come under
enemy assault.
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This self-denial of a universal right, a right recognized under the United Nations (UN) charter, has
long imposed a highly asymmetric and awkward arrangement on the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Washington
would be obliged by treaty to defend Japan should it
be attacked, while Tokyo could not reciprocate without violating its constitution. To Abe and his followers, such a legal constraint has become untenable in an
increasingly dangerous security environment.
Among the scenarios used to advance Abe’s initiative, two relating to the U.S.-Japan alliance stand out.
Imagine that a Japanese warship were in the vicinity of
an American naval unit under attack, and the warship
took no action because of constitutional constraints.
Imagine, too, that a Japanese destroyer equipped with
the Aegis ballistic missile defense system were in a position to intercept a long-range missile headed for the
United States, but the destroyer failed to do so, owing
to Japan’s ban on collective self-defense. To Abe and
his lieutenants, if either of these crises occurred and
Japan did nothing, then the alliance might not survive the subsequent political blowback in Washington. Thus, adopting the right to collective self-defense
would signal Japan’s determination to act alongside
the U.S. military, sustaining the alliance’s integrity
while enhancing allied deterrence.
In July 2014, after intense negotiations with the
New Komeito—the Japanese government’s ambivalent junior coalition partner—Abe’s cabinet approved
the reinterpretation of the constitution, allowing Japan to nominally exercise its right of collective selfdefense. Under the new understanding, use of force
would be permitted “not only when an armed attack
against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack
against a foreign country that is in a close relationship
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with Japan occurs.”7 However, in a compromise acknowledging the New Komeito’s concerns, the Japanese government attached three key conditions necessary to invoke the right:
1. Only an attack or an impending attack that
“threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger
to fundamentally overthrow people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness” would meet the constitutional standards for engaging in collective selfdefense.
2. Moreover, policymakers must determine that
“no other appropriate means” were available to counter the threat to Japan.
3. Even then, the SDF must limit its use of force to
“the minimum extent necessary” to repel or defeat the
threat.8
Abe’s cabinet further acknowledged that “prior
approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders” to the SDF for collective self-defense missions.9 By no means, has Japan been unshackled from
its constitutional restraints or from its exclusively
defensive orientation.
The cabinet decision represents just the first step
in what will likely be a deliberate political process to
operationalize this broader constitutional interpretation. The Abe administration will need to submit a
legislative package to the Diet that would provide the
proper legal framework for the SDF to help assist or
defend allies and friends, should they come under attack. At least 10 existing laws would be reviewed, updated, and revised in this process. Opposition parties
will have another chance to litigate the issue.
In the meantime, changes in popular opinion or
other domestic political developments, such as local
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election outcomes, could influence the momentum
behind Abe’s initiative. Public debate and legislative
scrutiny—integral to Japan’s open democratic system—will inevitably accompany this important shift
in defense policy. Change will come incrementally
through careful and transparent negotiations.
It is still unclear how the concept of limited collective self-defense will translate into operational
practice for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Planned revisions
to the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, which spell out
the allied division of labor, will reportedly incorporate an expanded defensive and logistical role for
the SDF. Due for completion at the end of 2014, the
guidelines called on the SDF to provide maintenance,
supplies, and fuel to American military units heading
into a combat zone—all rear-area activities that were
previously prohibited.
In addition to improving allied cooperation, the
cabinet decision could broaden the scope of the SDF’s
out-of-area operations. For example, the Abe administration has identified minesweeping as a potentially
permissible action under UN Security Council authorization. Given Japan’s dependence on energy from
the Persian Gulf region, the mining of the Strait of
Hormuz could constitute a clear threat to the nation’s
survival and well-being. This and other scenarios will
likely be the subject of further debate when the government submits its legislative package to the Diet.
Japanese officials must strike a balance between
adhering to the constraints of the cabinet decision and
ensuring sufficient flexibility to account for the uncertainties of real-world military contingencies. Limited
collective self-defense will open the door for Japanese
hard power to play a more effective and meaningful
role in maintaining regional and global security.
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JAPAN’S NEIGHBORHOOD GETS ROUGHER
Mounting pressures close to home, including China’s rise and North Korea’s unpredictability, largely
explain the quickening pace of Japan’s normalization. China’s assertiveness in the East China Sea over
the past 5 years has been most troubling to Japan.
In September 2010, China reacted vociferously after
Japanese law enforcement arrested a Chinese fishing
boat skipper who was filmed ramming Japanese Coast
Guard vessels in the waters off the Senkaku Islands.
Beijing used economic coercion, cutting off Japan’s
only supply of rare earth minerals critical to electronic
manufactures.
After Tokyo nationalized the Senkakus in September 2012, Chinese maritime law enforcement flotillas
began making the rounds in the disputed waters near
the islands, and China has insisted that the regular patrols are routine. In response, Japanese Coast Guard
vessels have been working overtime to monitor and
trail every Chinese “intrusion,” lest Tokyo concede
Beijing’s jurisdictional claims. Japan and China have
been staring each other down in the East China Sea
ever since.
Beyond the Senkakus dispute, Japan and China
are locked in a budding naval rivalry. As China’s
rapidly modernizing navy extends its reach, it has become commonplace for Chinese naval flotillas to sail
through Japanese-held narrow seas. Beginning in 2008
as sporadic forays into the Pacific, these expeditions
now take place regularly year round. Moreover, the
Chinese navy has steadily expanded the scope of its
peacetime operations.
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Notably, in July 2013, a surface action group
steamed through the Sōya Strait (the first time Chinese
units had conducted such a transit), circumnavigated
Japan, and circled back to port by way of the international strait between Okinawa and Miyako Islands.
Reflecting Tokyo’s growing concerns about China’s
naval activism, Japan’s annual defense white papers
meticulously report the courses taken by Chinese
naval task forces.
Chinese military aircraft, including fighter jets,
have also ramped up flight operations over the East
China Sea. In July, September, and October 2013, Y-8
airborne early warning aircraft and H-6 medium—
range bombers conducted long range flight operations over the Pacific Ocean, passing between Miyako
and Okinawa to reach the open sea.10 Japan’s Air Selfdefense Force (ASDF) launched a record number of
intercepts against Chinese aircraft in fiscal year 2013,
surpassing the number of scrambles in fiscal year 2012
by more than 30 percent.11
In November 2013, Beijing unilaterally declared
an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the
East China Sea that requires all foreign aircraft entering the zone to submit flight plans to Chinese aviation
authorities. The Chinese ADIZ pointedly overlaps
with Japan’s, extending to the Senkakus. Given that
China is committed to making these increased naval
and air activities the new status quo, frequent run-ins
between Chinese and Japanese forces within the relatively confined spaces of East Asian seas will likely be
the norm in the coming years.
Japanese policy documents routinely express Tokyo’s misgivings about China’s maritime rise. The
NSS asserts:
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China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based
on their own assertions . . . in the maritime and aerial
domains, including the East China Sea and the South
China Sea.12

The NDPG further observes:
China has taken assertive actions with regard to issues
of conflicts of interests in the maritime domain. . . .
As for the seas and airspace around Japan, China has
intruded into Japanese territorial waters, frequently
violated Japan’s airspace, and has engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unexpected situations.

The report singles out China’s newly established ADIZ
over the East China Sea as destabilizing, concluding,
“As Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities it will need to pay utmost attention to them.”13
Successive editions of the Japanese Defense Ministry’s annual defense white papers have devoted more
attention to China’s maritime activism. In response to
recent Chinese provocations at sea, the 2013 edition
uses unusually blunt language to admonish Beijing:
Some of these activities of China involve its intrusion
into Japan’s territorial waters, its violation of Japan’s
airspace and even dangerous actions that could cause
a contingency situation, which are extremely regrettable. China should accept and stick to the international
norms.14

Since 2011, the defense ministry’s internal think
tank, the National Institute for Defense Studies, has
published annual reports on China’s security policy,
offering a valuable regional perspective and a second opinion to the Pentagon’s assessment of Chinese
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military power. Notably, the institute devoted the
entire 2012 issue to Chinese maritime strategy and
activities.15
In the meantime, North Korea refuses to fade into
the background. In a series of provocations in 2010,
North Korea sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan, revealed a new uranium enrichment facility, and
shelled an island along the inter-Korean frontier.
Pyongyang’s ongoing development of its nuclear
weapons and missile programs continues to pose a
major security threat to Tokyo. North Korea has thus
far conducted a nuclear test in 2006, 2009, and 2013.
A fourth test will reportedly provide the reclusive regime sufficient data to design a nuclear warhead small
enough to fit atop a ballistic missile.
Since the 1990s, North Korea has test-launched
a series of ballistic missiles, with varying degrees of
success. In December 2012, Pyongyang placed a satellite into orbit following a failed bid 8 months earlier.
Widely seen as a disguise for a missile test, the successful space launch demonstrated North Korea’s advances in long range rocketry and its potential ability
to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. After a
nearly 5-year hiatus, the country resumed testing of
its medium range Nodong ballistic missile, splashing
two into the Sea of Japan in March 2014. With an estimated range of at least 1,000 kilometers, the Nodong
can reach large parts of Japan. As the NDPG asserts:
North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such
as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, pose a serious
and imminent threat to Japan’s security.16
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THE DYNAMIC JOINT DEFENSE FORCE
Chinese naval and air activities in and around the
East China Sea and the employment of paramilitary
maritime units near the Senkakus pose particularly
taxing challenges for Japan. These peacetime tactics
have enabled Beijing to apply constant pressure on
Tokyo. China has thus far kept its frequent encounters
with the SDF and Japanese Coast Guard at a low simmer, avoiding escalation, yet ensuring that the standoff remains in play.
Short of capitulation, Japan has had no choice but
to oblige in the cat-and-mouse game, lest it concede to
China’s jurisdictional claims or to its larger strategic
aims in maritime Asia. Because Beijing has carefully
calibrated its displays of force, Tokyo must respond
judiciously to Chinese provocations. As China grows
more powerful, this twilight phenomenon—featuring nervy close encounters falling well short of armed
conflict—is likely to become a new “normal.” Japan
thus finds itself in a protracted contest of wills with no
end in sight.
As the NSS observes:
The Asia-Pacific region has become more prone to
so-called ‘gray zone’ situations, situations that are
neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests. There is a risk that these
‘gray zone’ situations could further develop into grave
situations.17

An incident at sea or a midair collision could trigger Sino-Japanese interactions that quickly spin out of
control. In January 2013, a Chinese frigate locked its
fire control radar on a Japanese destroyer, a threatening gesture that typically precedes weapons release.
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Chinese fighters’ dangerously close intercepts of Japanese surveillance aircraft in May and June 2014 lend
credibility to fears that frequent military encounters
could lead to accidents and even spiraling escalation.
The NDPG further notes:
Amid the increasingly severe security environment
surrounding Japan, the SDF, in addition to its regular activities, needs to respond to various situations,
including ‘gray zone’ situations which require SDF
commitment. The frequency of such situations and the
duration of responses are both increasing.18

Tokyo clearly recognizes that China’s aggression is
not a passing phenomenon; rather, it will likely intensify in the coming years. As such, the NDPG asserts,
“Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations including gray zone situations, and will establish the necessary posture to continuously address a
protracted situation.”19
To cope with the ambiguities and complex demands of gray zone contingencies, the NDPG
pledges to:
build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by
advanced technology and capability for C3I, with a
consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF’s operation.20

Such a force, according to the MTDP:
will provide an effective defense which enables the
SDF to conduct a diverse range of activities based on
joint operations seamlessly and dynamically, adapting
to situations as they demand, while prioritizing par-
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ticularly important functions and capabilities through
optimal resource allocation.21

Despite the impenetrable jargon typical of defense
reports, these stated objectives provide a roadmap to
the SDF’s modernization programs and future force
structure.
The Dynamic Joint Defense Force concept is the
product of a steady evolution in Japanese strategic
thought. Notably, the 2010 NDPG formally jettisoned
the Basic Defense Force Concept, a Cold War legacy
premised on strong, yet relatively immobile, defenses
designed to repel assault and predicated on a largely
passive deterrence posture. Instead, according to the
2010 NDPG, a dynamic defense force would take
the place of static defense, and agility would be the
watchword of the new force. Such forces could swiftly
deploy to remote islands for a variety of contingencies, meeting challenges as they arose. To develop a
dynamic defense force, the SDF would concurrently
rejuvenate aerial, surface, and underwater surveillance operations.
The dynamic joint defense force thus carries forward many of the key tenets developed in 2010. In addition to mobility and readiness, the 2013 NDPG emphasizes the close coordination among naval, air, and
ground forces. The inherently amphibious character
of the Japanese-held islands in the East China Sea demands such integration of capabilities. At the same
time, the 2013 NDPG calls on the SDF to establish an
effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) architecture that would blanket the East China
Sea with a variety of sensors to better monitor China’s naval and air activities. All three services would
benefit enormously from such an enhanced ability to
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keep track of Chinese forces. To meet the ambitions
of the dynamic joint defense force concept, the SDF
has embarked on a series of military modernization
programs.
FORCE MODERNIZATION TRENDS
Japan boasts one of the most modern and professional militaries in the world. During the Cold War,
the SDF complemented—and filled the gaps of—the
U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific. Japan’s
armed forces shielded the home islands while the
major forward bases along the Japanese archipelago
allowed the United States to project power across
Asia and beyond. The Japanese Maritime Self-defense
Force’s (MSDF) surface, undersea, and air units bottled up Soviet naval forces in the Sea of Japan. The
maritime service also kept open the sea lanes and secured the maritime approaches to Japan, which were
critical to the nation’s economic well-being.
The ASDF’s modern fighters ensured that Japan
could defend the airspace over and near the country. The nation’s Ground Self-defense Force (GSDF)
bristled with tanks and artillery to defend against a
full-scale Soviet invasion of the homeland, particularly against Hokkaido Island. The SDF was—and remains—largely a defensive force designed to maintain
the nation’s territorial integrity, possessing limited offensive power projection capabilities. Japan’s current
force structure and posture are thus legacies of this
superpower rivalry.
As a quintessential maritime nation, it is not surprising that Japan counts the MSDF as its leading service. Over the past decade, Japanese naval power has
evolved in both quantitative and qualitative terms. In
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2010, Tokyo announced its plan to increase its world
class submarine fleet from 16 to 22 boats, representing
a nearly 40 percent jump in size. The decision was all
the more remarkable because the number of boats had
stayed fixed at 16 since 1976.
Leading this growth is the cutting-edge Sōryūclass diesel-electric submarine. The largest of its kind
in the world, the Sōryū is superior to its predecessor
by virtually every index of performance. It is the first
Japanese boat fitted with air independent propulsion,
a fuel-cell technology that permits submarines to operate underwater for extended periods while quieting
their noise signature. In short, the MSDF leads the region in conventional submarine warfare, constituting
the benchmark against which other Asian navies will
be compared over the next decade.
Notably, Japan has been able to invest in its undersea prowess without imposing undue burdens on
its fiscal position. The MSDF has traditionally decommissioned its submarines unusually early, introducing more advanced boats to replace older ones that
could have stayed in active service for at least another
decade. To support the current buildup, the maritime
service began keeping its existing boats at sea longer,
allowing for a steady growth in fleet size without substantially increasing acquisition costs. Japan will likely
meet its 22-boat target before the end of the decade.
The MSDF’s surface fleet, comprised of nearly 50
major surface combatants, has also undergone a makeover. In 2009, the maritime service commissioned the
first of two Hyūga-class helicopter carriers with a full
load displacement of 19,000 tons. Capable of embarking as many as 11 helicopters, the carrier is a powerful
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) platform.
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In 2013, Japan launched the first of two Izumoclass ASW helicopter carriers that displace 27,000 tons
at full load and carry up to 14 helicopters. Measuring
nearly 250 meters in length, the Izumo will enter service in 2015 as the largest warship the Japanese have
built since World War II. It promises to boost substantially Japan’s ability to conduct and sustain ASW operations alongside the Hyūga-class carriers.
Additionally, two more Aegis-equipped surface
combatants will join the four Kongō-class and two
Atago-class guided missile destroyers to enhance Japan’s missile defense capabilities at sea. In 2012, the
first of four Akizuki-class guided missile destroyers
was commissioned to provide anti-air, anti-surface,
and anti-submarine cover for the helicopter carriers
and Aegis-equipped destroyers. For the MSDF’s air
fleet, the P-1s—the next generation maritime patrol
aircraft—will eventually replace the aging P-3Cs as
Japan’s main shored-based, fixed-wing ASW unit.
The ASDF fields a mix of fourth— and third—generation fighters, including nearly 200 F-15s, 90 F-2s (a
variant of the American F-16), and 60 F-4s. A modest
number of KC-767 aerial refueling tankers, E-767 Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, and E-2C
airborne early warning aircraft provide support to
Japan’s air superiority and multirole combat aircraft.
A fleet of C-130 and C-1 transports furnishes limited
strategic lift to Japanese forces.
The most prominent and expensive modernization
program for the air service is that of the fifth-generation F-35 fighters. Because of the prohibitive per unit
cost of the aircraft, which has risen further with Japan’s participation in the local production of the fighters’ parts, the ASDF currently plans to acquire only 42
F-35s. (See Table 13-1.)
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Japan is also developing its own stealth fighter, the
Advanced Technology Demonstrator-X, to replace the
F-2s. The C-2 transport, the successor to the C-1, promises to improve substantially the range and capacity of
the ASDF’s lift. Japan’s air service will acquire new
airborne early warning aircraft, aerial refueling tankers, and transports to augment the ASDF’s ability to
patrol the airspace around the Japanese islands. Japan
will also invest in UAVs—a joint asset available to the
three services—to enhance its ISR capabilities. The
leading contender to enter service with the ASDF is
the high altitude, long endurance Global Hawk.
The GSDF is undergoing the most dramatic restructuring and reorganization of recent years. Reflecting Tokyo’s judgment that the risk of a homeland
invasion is negligible, about 700 main battle tanks and
600 artillery pieces will be reduced to 300 and 300, respectively, over a 10-year period. Tank and artillery
units will also be removed from Honshu Island and
consolidated on Hokkaido and Kyushu Islands. (See
Table 13-1.)
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1995
NDPG

2013
NDPG

Future

145,000

151,000*

151,000

SDF
Active Duty Personnel
GSDF
Tanks

900*

700*

300*

Artillery

900*

600*

300*

Destroyers

50*

47

54

(Aegis-equipped destroyers)

--

6

8

Combat aircraft

170*

170*

170*

Submarines

16

16

22

Combat aircraft

400*

340*

360*

MSDF

ASDF

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, “Defense of Japan 2014,”
Figures II-4-3-2 and II-4-3-3, available from www.mod.go.jp/e/
publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_Figure_1st_0730.pdf.
Notes: An asterisk denotes approximate figures. The “Figure”
column derives from the 2013 NDPG’s discussion of a future
defense posture that will probably be achieved within a 10-year
period.

Table 13-1. NDPG Comparison of Personnel and
Equipment.
To enhance responsiveness and mobility, the GSDF
will form two rapid-deployment divisions and two
rapid-deployment brigades. Most notably, the ground
service will create a new marine brigade capable of
conducting amphibious operations to retake remote
islands seized by enemy forces. Japan will procure the
AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicles and V-22 tiltrotor aircraft that would provide Japanese marines with
organic lift capability to project forces ashore.
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It is worth noting that these modernization efforts
will likely strengthen the SDF’s capacity to project
only limited power in the coming years. Notwithstanding breathless commentary surrounding the
unveiling of the Izumo-class helicopter carrier, the
MSDF is many steps and years away from acquiring
a fixed-wing carrier strike force. Long range bombers
or intercontinental ballistic missiles are conspicuously
missing from the ASDF’s inventory, and the GSDF
can only conduct limited expeditionary operations for
territorial defense.
The SDF is still very much the shield that counts
on the American spear to fulfill the full range of missions in Japan’s defense. This is consistent with Tokyo’s current constitutional interpretation prohibiting
the possession of weaponry capable of prosecuting
offensive operations. Any attempt to depart from this
defensive orientation will not escape Japan’s democratic processes, involving painstaking negotiations
and debates. Fears of creeping Japanese militarism are
thus unwarranted.
DEFENDING THE SOUTHWEST ISLANDS
As successive policy documents make clear, Tokyo
will strengthen its defense posture along the Ryūkyū
Islands in the southwest, the geographic epicenter
of the Sino-Japanese rivalry. By beefing up defenses
along the Ryūkyūs, Japan might be able to exploit a
permanent geographic advantage. The island chain
gives the SDF the option of closing off Chinese access to the high seas—much as Japan’s Home Islands
formed a physical barrier that kept the Soviet Navy
bottled up in the Sea of Japan—and provide a form of
strategic leverage. Indeed, given Beijing’s deeply em-
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bedded fears of being denied access to the global commons, a powerful blocking force along the Southwest
Islands could bolster Japan’s deterrence posture.22
The MTDP directs the GSDF to establish a new
coastal reconnaissance unit on Yonaguni, the westernmost island of the Ryūkyū archipelago, strategically located about 70 miles east of Taiwan and about
100 miles southwest of the Senkakus.23 A garrison on
Yonaguni would extend Japan’s situational awareness to its largely undefended and potentially vulnerable southern flank. In a cross-Taiwan Strait war,
for example, Chinese forces would likely transit the
seas and airspace near Yonaguni to attack Taiwan’s
less-defended east coast. The ASDF will redeploy an
airborne early warning squadron and a fighter squadron to Naha Airbase in Okinawa, reinforcing the
squadrons already there. The MSDF will refit its three
Ōsumi-class tank landing ships to accommodate the
planned purchases of the MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft and
the AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicle. In June 2013,
in an early sign of Japanese intentions, a U.S. Marine
Corps MV-22 landed on the Hyūga helicopter carrier
during an allied exercise.
Japan is also applying lessons learned from its Cold
War experiences. In anticipation of a massive Soviet
amphibious assault on Hokkaido Island, the Japanese
developed an anti-invasion strategy that employed
shore-based missile units to strike approaching enemy
transports. Tokyo is now replicating this asymmetric
tactic in the south. The 2013 NDPG calls on the GSDF
to “maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units in
order to prevent invasion of Japan’s remote islands
while [invading forces are] still at sea.”24
Two years earlier, the GSDF deployed several units
armed with Type 88 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs)
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to Amami Ōshima, which is near the northern end of
the Ryūkyūs. In November 2013, the GSDF put ashore
Type 88 missiles on Miyako Island as a part of a larger
military exercise. These unprecedented shows of force
were no doubt directed at Beijing, as Chinese naval
flotillas frequently transit the strait between Miyako
and Okinawa Islands. The message was not lost on
the Chinese.
The GSDF’s truck-launched Type 88 ASCM makes
for an ideal weapon on the Southwest Islands. With
a range of 110 miles, Type 88s can strike warships at
sea from sites far inland. Well-placed ASCM batteries
could cover all Ryūkyū narrow seas, while converting
the eastern edge of the East China Sea into a no-go
area for Chinese surface forces. The GSDF has begun
acquiring the Type 12 ASCM, the successor to the
Type 88.25 Boasting greater reach, precision, and survivability, these new missile units promise to render
transiting straits or nearby waters even more perilous
for Chinese mariners.
As the Dynamic Joint Defense Force concept illustrates, an effective defense of the Ryūkyūs would
require unprecedented coordination among the three
services. The GSDF’s amphibious forces and shorebased anti-ship missile units would rely on the lift capabilities of the ASDF’s air transports and the MSDF’s
vessels to reach rapidly islands stretching over 1,000
kilometers between Kyushu Island and Taiwan. The
coastal reconnaissance garrison on Yonaguni would
provide early warning to air and naval units. The Type
88 and Type 12 ASCM launchers would require the
cueing and targeting data from the MSDF’s airborne
early warning aircraft to conduct over-the-horizon
strikes against enemy surface forces. When they enter
service, ASDF UAVs would enhance the situational
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awareness of all units operating around the Southwest
Islands. Above all, Japanese warships, submarines,
and fighters must ensure sea control and air superiority, without which amphibious operations and island
defense would founder. Mutual support among the
three services in a complex operational environment
is thus essential to success.
A CONVENTIONAL COUNTERSTRIKE OPTION?
If the military balance continues to tilt in Beijing’s
favor, Tokyo could feel compelled to deter by punishment, which could entail inflicting unacceptable levels
of pain on China should the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) ever attack Japan and Japanese forces. To retaliate directly against China with such force, Japan
would have to develop offensive strike capabilities
designed to hold at risk a range of assets, especially
those on the mainland that Beijing highly values. In
theory, Tokyo’s ability to impose prohibitive costs on
China would deter the Chinese military from acting
in the first place. Dating back to the 1950s, Japanese
debates about the constitutionality of attacking enemy
territory suggest that a decision to pursue deterrence
by punishment is not far-fetched.
While an offensive posture would no doubt stoke
political controversy, serious debates about acquiring land attack cruise missiles have surfaced in Japan
from time to time since at least 2005.26 The discourse
has centered primarily on the legalities of Tokyo’s
hypothetical decision to attack North Korean missile
bases in the event of a crisis. But it can be assumed
that Japan would not limit the missile’s use to Pyongyang if Japan ever acquired such a weapon system.
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In 2009, the subcommittee of the defense policymaking council of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
submitted a proposal endorsing the acquisition of
offensive missiles. The committee called on Japan
to “maintain the capability to attack enemy missile
sites” and recommended developing cruise and ballistic missiles and the space-based systems to support
missile operations.27 The LDP’s electoral defeat in September 2009 ended further discussions on this issue.
Nevertheless, the report represented a significant
milestone in post-war Japanese thinking about defense and helped legitimize the notion of going on
the offense. Prime Minister Abe’s electoral victory has
resurrected the debate. In reference to the North Korean missile threat, the latest NDPG and the MTDP
obliquely hint at revisiting a counterstrike capability.
The NDPG states:
Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the
deterrent of the Japan-U.S. alliance as a whole through
enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response
capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take means as
necessary.28

In other words, all options are back on the table.
What would a conventional missile option look like?
Tokyo would almost certainly limit itself to counterforce strikes aimed exclusively at enemy military
units. This would require Japan to plan for counteroffensive operations against Chinese military forces,
including those deployed on the mainland.
Equipping Japanese forces with conventional long
range precision-strike weapons, such as the venerable
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Tomahawk land attack cruise missile, would not only
be relatively affordable but also technically feasible.
In particular, Japanese destroyers, submarines, and
aircraft armed with Tomahawks or their equivalents
could strike large fixed targets, such as the over-thehorizon radars, essential for conducting Chinese
anti-access operations. As Chinese dependence on
land-based sensors to effectively employ its theaterstrike systems increases, Japan may find the strategic
dividends of a counterstrike capability operationally
attractive and, thus, politically persuasive.
DEFENSE BUDGET WOES
While Tokyo’s modernization plans are well tailored to address China’s growing challenge, Japan
may have trouble sustaining or expanding them to
keep up with the Chinese military. On paper, Japan’s
annual defense budget, at nearly $48.6 billion in 2013,
is impressive.29 Indeed, Japan is ranked fifth in the
world in military expenditures, following the United
States, China, Russia, and France. But such a high figure paints a superficial picture at best. For decades,
Japan capped its defense budget at 1 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP)—far below figures expected of great powers—as an expression of its pacifist
orientation.
Although Tokyo is not legally committed to such
fiscal constraint, longstanding practice has formed a
powerful normative prohibition against shattering
this ceiling. Consequently, the fixed defense budget
has plateaued alongside anemic economic growth
since the early-1990s. Moreover, Japanese government
debt is nearly 250 percent of GDP, and soaring social
security expenditures owing to Japan’s rapidly aging
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society have intensified competition over ever scarcer
financial resources. Such fiscal burdens could prove
crippling in the years ahead, draining the political will
to spend substantially more on defense.
The past decade’s budgetary trends reflect Japan’s
monetary predicament. The defense budget suffered
cuts for 11 consecutive years, dropping from ¥4.94 trillion in 2002 to ¥4.64 trillion in 2012.30 In 2013, Prime
Minister Abe’s government announced a very modest 0.8 percent budgetary increase over the previous
year, reversing the steady decline. The cabinet then
approved a 2.8 percent boost to its defense budget for
fiscal year 2014, the largest year-on-year increase since
the mid-1990s.
In light of the deteriorating security environment,
the decision to reverse the steady decline was long
overdue. While the spending hikes are welcomed
news, they are unlikely to provide sufficient relief.
Military modernization programs will compete with
other priorities. For example, compensation for government pay cuts following the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disasters could largely
nullify the growth in outlays. It thus remains unclear
how much more capability these modest increases
will buy.
Japan’s budgetary woes are even more alarming in
comparative terms. China has dramatically surpassed
Japan in defense spending over the past decade. The
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that the Chinese defense budget, measured in
constant 2011 dollars, grew from $52.8 billion in 2002
to $159.5 billion in 2012. Japan, by contrast, virtually
stood still, with its budget declining slightly from
$60.7 billion to $59.5 billion over the same period.31
The Japanese Ministry of Defense reckons that Chi-
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na’s defense spending grew by 350 percent from 2003
to 2012, while Japan’s budget shrank slightly during
that decade.32 The International Institute for Strategic
Studies paints a similarly stark picture. In 1990, Japan
spent, in nominal terms, nearly $29 billion on defense
compared to China’s $6 billion. By 2013, Chinese expenditures soared to $112 billion, more than doubling
Japan’s $51 billion defense budget.33 (See Figure 13-1.)
Such an extraordinary reversal in fortunes between
two rival regional powers is rare by historical standards. Ominously, Japan’s persistently low economic
growth rates will likely permit China to further widen
the spending gap.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, available from www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/
milex_database.

Figure 13-1. Japanese versus Chinese Defense
Expenditures.
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STRATEGY—RESOURCE MISMATCH?
Beyond budgetary constraints, Japan’s long-standing ambitions to fulfill wider international responsibilities befitting a major power—captured by Abe’s
concept of “proactive contribution to peace”—could
spread the SDF too thin. Since Japan’s dispatch of
minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the First Gulf
War in 1991, successive Japanese administrations have
deployed ground, air, and naval forces far beyond Japan’s own neighborhood to conduct “international
peace cooperation operations.”
The 2013 MTDP defines such operations as:
activities cooperatively carried out by the international society to improve the international security
environment such as UN Peace Keeping Operations,
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR),
and others in the fields of non-traditional security.34

Since Japan’s first peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in 1992, Japan has sent peacekeepers around the
world, including to the Golan Heights in the Levant,
to South Sudan, to East Timor, and to Haiti. Japanese
forces distinguished themselves in rendering assistance to stricken nations following the 2004 Indian
Ocean tsunami and to the Philippines in the aftermath
of the 2013 Haiyan typhoon.
In a post-September 11, 2001, show of solidarity with the United States, Tokyo committed MSDF
vessels to the coalition naval contingent supporting
combat operations in Afghanistan. MSDF tankers
resupplied coalition warships, and Aegis destroyers
guarded against air and surface threats in the Arabian
Sea. MSDF vessels supplied fuel oil and water to cus342

tomers from about a dozen countries—including the
United States, Pakistan, France, Britain, and Germany—until the mission lapsed in January 2010.
Over the past decade, Japan has participated in
various global efforts to secure peace. The country
was a founding participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative in 2003 and has remained one of the
initiative’s foremost proponents. Moreover, a modest-sized GSDF contingent deployed to Iraq in January 2004 for noncombat duty. Tokyo joined the fight
against Indian Ocean piracy in July 2009, committing
to an open-ended, out-of-area deployment. Finally,
Japanese mariners continue to ply the anarchic Gulf
of Aden and Arabian Sea alongside a multinational
contingent of naval forces. Tokyo subsequently established a military base at Djibouti to support forward
deployed MSDF units, Japan’s first overseas base since
World War II.
While these praiseworthy activities have set a
powerful precedent for fulfilling Prime Minister Abe’s
wider agenda, competing imperatives will likely force
Japan to prioritize narrower national interests above
global security. As the security environment deteriorates closer to home, Japan’s willingness to spend political and military capital on extraregional missions
will diminish commensurately.
Moreover, the Japanese government will place
greater weight on managing direct threats to sovereignty and material prosperity than on meeting
abstract, diffuse challenges in regions where Japan
remains a marginal player. As an economically dynamic, militarily strong China eyes the Senkakus and
the wider East China Sea, Japan’s SDF, which is already inferior in numbers to the PLA, is losing its edge
in its main East Asian theater, even as threats to Japa-
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nese interests in other parts of the world remain remote, ill-defined, and of indefinite duration. Whether
the Japanese government can allocate resources deftly
enough to balance traditional against nontraditional
military functions remains uncertain. If Tokyo fails
to prioritize, then it is entirely possible that Japanese
political ends will outstrip ways and means.
JAPAN’S LOOMING DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS
Over the long term, Tokyo will confront a structural and virtually irreversible challenge to its hard
power. Japan’s rapidly aging society is pushing the
nation toward an unprecedented demographic crisis
that could have dire implications for its defense posture in the coming decades. Owing to low fertility,
high life expectancy, and trifling immigration, Japan
will be significantly older and smaller in 2030 than it
is today. The population will likely decline from 128
million in 2010 to 116 million 20 years hence, averaging a loss of more than 660,000 Japanese citizens
per year.
During this same period, Japan’s working-age
population (ages 15 to 64) will shrink by 17 percent,
from 81 million to 67 million. The median age of the
population will rise from 45 to 50, and about a third
of the population will be over 65 years old by 2030.
Some forecasts estimate that Japan’s population may
shrink to 90 million by mid-century, representing an
astounding 30 percent decrease from its peak years in
the late-2000s.35
Population decline inevitably reduces the pool of
manpower available for military service. The figures
are sobering. The male population eligible to join the
SDF (ages 18 to 26) peaked at 9 million in 1994. In
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just over 15 years, this age group recorded 30 percent
drop, plummeting to around 6 million.
By 2030, SDF-eligible males will fall to less than
5 million. By contrast, the United States will likely
experience a 16 percent increase for the same cohort
between 2010 and 2030. The cost of fielding troops for
combat will rise as manpower availability dwindles.
In the coming years, maintaining satisfactory levels
of recruitment and retention will likely tax Tokyo’s
resources. Indeed, the 2013 NDPG specifically cites
the declining birthrate as a factor in pressurizing the
recruiting environment.36
Recent defense policy documents have held out
hope that technology will potentially lessen the effect of personnel shortages. But most military operations—ranging from high-end conventional wars to
post-conflict reconstruction—soak up manpower. Gee
whiz technologies, such as unmanned systems, only
go so far. Warfighters in the field and support crews
in the rear must still do much of the heavy lifting.
Japan’s response to the March 2011 tsunami was the
starkest reminder of this reality: Tokyo called up more
than 100,000 military personnel—about 40 percent of
the active duty force—for relief operations, the largest deployment of troops in Japan’s postwar history.
In short, boots on the ground still count as much in
peacetime as they do in war.
Unless Japan is prepared for a major military
buildup, which appears politically doubtful and fiscally unsustainable, the country’s shrinking pool of
manpower will weigh heavily on Japanese decisionmakers. It remains to be seen whether such socioeconomic pressures will increase temptations to turn
inward, even as Japan’s external security environment
grows more contentious.
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WILL JAPAN RISE TO THE CHALLENGE?
China’s rapid ascent has spurred Japanese policymakers to reallocate considerable material resources
and to expend intellectual energy on hard power
during an era of fiscal austerity. Chinese behavior
in recent years suggests that the stakes now involve
nothing less than Japan’s and China’s future places in
maritime Asia. At the very least, Tokyo’s choices have
narrowed: it can either accommodate Beijing in the
near future, or it can act now to preserve the freedom
of action it has enjoyed for decades. Not since the 1969
Richard Nixon Doctrine—a presidential call to America’s Asian allies to protect themselves against external threats, even as the United States retrenched—
has Japan confronted such strategic danger and
stark options.
Only sound strategy will help Tokyo navigate the
uncertainties of living in an unstable security environment. The extent to which Japan can shape its hard
power to serve an effective strategy will depend on
meaningful progress along multiple fronts. Tokyo
must pivot even more decisively away from its northward orientation toward Russia—an anachronistic
Cold War legacy—and toward its southern flank
along the Ryūkyūs. Japan must stubbornly hold the
line there, maintaining high levels of alertness, even
while keeping its cool in the face of persistent Chinese
probes and provocations. To do so, the SDF must develop unprecedented levels of cooperation and trust
among its services to secure an extended front far from
the Home Islands. Above all, Tokyo must sustain the
political will and invest in the capabilities necessary
to take up the Chinese challenge. Only thus can Japan
hope to stay in a competition that promises to be a
long one.
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CHAPTER 14
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION AIR POWER:
A SELF-RELIANT EUROPE?1
Craig Franklin
KEY POINTS
•	With a decreasing U.S. Air Force presence in
Europe and increasing pressure to address security concerns in Asia and the Middle East,
non-U.S. North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) air forces must shoulder more of the
burden in Europe and its periphery.
•	The strength of non-U.S. NATO air forces lies
in their personnel, tactical fighter strength, and
basing infrastructures.
•	
These air forces have plans to address key
shortfalls in intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; transport; air refueling; and
stealth aircraft, but successful implementation
will depend on Smart Defence initiatives and
stable budgets.
•	More broadly, two issues continue to hamstring
NATO planning and execution: the fact that the
alliance lacks a common understanding of the
threats it faces, and the trend of NATO members placing caveats on the types of missions
they will fly.
Although it is unlikely that NATO would ever
participate in a conflict without significant airpower
contributions from the United States, cuts to Ameri-
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can capabilities necessarily lead one to wonder what
America’s NATO partners can bring to the table. Certainly, the U.S. Air Force presence in Europe is nowhere near what it once was—or even what it was in
the 1990s.
In the 1990s, the U.S. Air Force in Europe had 25
main operating bases, 34 aircraft squadrons, and approximately 72,000 personnel. Today, there are just
five main operating bases, eight aircraft squadrons,
and approximately 25,000 personnel. Logically, this
should mean that an ever-increasing part of any
NATO air effort would be non-U.S. NATO’s Smart
Defence concept encourages NATO nations to shoulder a greater share of defense and to not just rely on
U.S. capabilities. NATO describes the origins of Smart
Defence as follows:
From 2008 the world economy has been facing its
worst period since the end of the Second World War.
Governments are applying budgetary restrictions to
tackle this serious recession, which is having a considerable effect on defense spending.
Furthermore, in the course of this crisis, the Alliance’s
security environment has been changing, and has become more diverse and unpredictable. The crisis in
Libya is a recent example, underlining the unforeseeable nature of conflicts, but also showing the need for
modern systems and facilities, and for less reliance on
the United States for costly advanced capabilities.
In these crisis times, rebalancing defense spending
between the European nations and the United States
is more than ever a necessity. The other Allies must
reduce the gap with the United States by equipping
themselves with capabilities that are deemed to be
critical, deployable, and sustainable, and must dem-
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onstrate political determination to achieve that goal.
There must be equitable sharing of the defense burden. Smart Defense is NATO’s response to this.2

This chapter provides an overview of non-U.S.
NATO air capabilities. It assesses the current state of
non-U.S. NATO command and control (C2), airmen,
aircraft, munitions, basing, air and missile defense
and readiness. It concludes with 10 challenges facing
America’s NATO partners in these fields and outlines
how NATO is or should be addressing each.
C2
NATO’s Allied Air Command at Ramstein Air
Base, Germany, is the singular NATO command for
organizing air operations and is led by a four-star
U.S. Air Force officer who is a dual-hatted U.S. and
NATO commander. His Allied Air Command staff
comes from a variety of NATO nations and currently includes a French three-star general as vice commander; a German two-star general as chief of staff;
and Turkish, American, and British one-star generals
as, respectively, deputy chiefs for plans, operations,
and support.
Presently, the command has established nine focus
areas: NATO charter Article 5 operations, NATO-integrated air and missile defense, NATO air policing,
ballistic missile defense (BMD), support to ongoing
NATO operations, Air Command (AIRCOM) joint
force air-component readiness, partnerships with
non-NATO member states’ air forces, air and space
advocacy, and air-capability development.3
Using lessons it has learned from NATO operations in the Balkans in the 1990s and Libya in 2011,
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NATO has streamlined and concentrated its air C2
structure, resources, and associated training efforts
at two static air-operations center (AOC) locations
(Torrejon, Spain; and Uedem, Germany) and in one
deployable AOC headquartered in Poggio Renatico,
Italy. This more focused effort has increased training
proficiency and readiness levels across the board in
support of current allied air operations.
NATO can also exercise tactical-level C2 closer
to actual air operations. NATO operates 17 E-3A airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft
stationed at Geilenkirchen, Germany. These aircraft
are part of the NATO Airborne Early Warning and
Control (NAEW&C) Program established in 1978.
The United States, Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Spain, and Turkey participate as full members in NAEW&C. The United Kingdom’s (UK) seven
AWACS aircraft also participate in the program and
would be a key part of any NAEW&C effort. With the
historic return of France to NATO military operations
in March 2009, its four E-3F aircraft could also now be
available.4
The current allied air commander, General Frank
Gorenc, recently highlighted the continuing value of
the AWACS:
The NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control E-3A
Force has been absolutely critical to the success of
NATO operations and providing Air Battle Management, Command and Control and Situational Awareness for the Alliance. The versatility of the E-3A force
continues to be demonstrated today as we have seen
during the ongoing crisis in the Ukraine.5
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AIRMEN
Air forces might have the best aircraft available,
but without solid airmen of all ranks to operate and
maintain them, they will not be successful. From general officers to midgrade and junior officers to the
noncommissioned officer and enlisted force, NATO
nations have air force leaders and airmen of great capacity. Senior leaders have a passionate vision of air
power’s importance to the security of the alliance and
to any military campaign or operation.
However, these leaders are also struggling with
how to provide the best airpower capability to their
respective nations and NATO under a fiscally constrained environment. NATO nations are making
huge strides in professionalizing and recognizing the
value of the enlisted force. For example, Poland, a relatively new member of the alliance that has a military
that once largely consisted of conscripts, has made
significant investments in training and professionalizing its air arm.
AIRCRAFT
NATO member nations collectively have well over
3,000 tactical-fighter aircraft of various types and capabilities. Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK all operate the modern Eurofighter Typhoon. France operates
the fourth-generation Rafael and the latest versions of
the Mirage. Several countries fly older F-16s, but ones
with midlife upgrades— Denmark, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, and soon Romania.
Turkey flies newer Block 30, 40, and 50 F-16s,
and Greece and Poland fly Block 52 F-16s. Spain and
Canada operate very capable F-18s. Several countries
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still fly older but very capable aircraft, such as the Tornado, Mirage, and Phantom. Finally, some countries
fly fleets of Russian-produced aircraft with Westernstyle, NATO-compatible modifications. For example,
Poland recently deployed four MiG-29s to do Baltic
air policing over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.6
NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations—
Sweden, Finland, and Austria—also have advanced
fighter capabilities. While there are more than enough
aircraft available, the issue is whether nations will
commit enough of these aircraft to fly specific types
of missions in particular NATO operations. As former
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and
NATO policy Ian Brzezinski has noted, “Little more
than a handful of NATO’s 28 members proved willing
to fly strike missions in Libya.”7
Areas for improvement in non-U.S. NATO aircraft
are 1) stealth capability, 2) air-refueling tankers, 3)
strategic airlifters, and 4) intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. NATO operations
have long relied on the U.S. Air Force for the bulk
of these types of aircraft. These challenges and nonU.S. NATO nations’ efforts to address them will be
discussed later.
MUNITIONS
Collectively, NATO nations have a variety of
close-in, precision-guided weapons. They also have a
number of precision standoff munitions that can suppress enemy air defenses and conduct standoff precision strikes so aircraft do not have to penetrate lethal
air-defense rings. However, potential adversaries’ air
defenses continue to advance and mature, creating increased risk and difficulties for air forces to provide
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traditional close-in, air-to-ground weapons employment. As Brzezinski said:
The preponderance of the initial salvo that disabled
Gadhafi’s air defense came from U.S. forces, and afterwards U.S. aircraft were relied on heavily for intelligence gathering, surveillance, air-to-air refueling,
electronic jamming, and the suppression of enemy air
defenses. European allies soon ran out of precisionguided munitions and other key wartime consumables
and had to turn to U.S. inventories for replenishment.8

At a 2014 Air Force Association conference, General Philip Breedlove, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, also addressed the need to maintain
larger NATO stockpiles of standoff and precision
weapons:
. . . what we learned in Libya and other places, we do
not have enough precision strike munitions to carry
on a concentrated campaign at length helping all of
our allies to be there with us. I think we need to think
through where we are on precision munitions.9

Likewise, upgrading these weapons’ precision and
survivability in response to evolving and improving
enemy defense countertechnologies will be essential
for any future operations.
BASING
Basing is a tremendous strength for NATO. It is superb across NATO and at the extreme edges of the alliance. Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey provide
excellent airfields in the far eastern portions. When
Kyrgyzstan asked the United States to depart Manas
Air Base by July 2014, Romania quickly volunteered
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Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base as the new multimode
logistics location for flow in and out of Afghanistan.
Greece, Italy, France, and Spain also provide firstrate bases in the extreme southern boundaries, as
seen during Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. Portugal provides basing in the far western boundary.
Iceland, the UK, Denmark, Norway, Lithuania, and
Estonia provide robust basing options for operations
in the northern borders. The question, again (as with
aircraft), is whether nations will make some or all of
their bases available for a specific NATO operation or
even restrict the type of aircraft and mission that can
fly from a base.
Basing is a straightforward example of NATO’s
Smart Defence principle. Not every nation needs to
have every aspect of airpower in its inventory. Estonia is a good example. The Estonian Air Force is small
but has a great airfield, and it makes available to all
NATO air forces. Likewise, Estonia provides some of
the best cyber expertise to the alliance and hosts NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.
In brief, Estonia provides the kind of pooled, shared,
and coordinated capabilities that NATO needs in a
time of budgetary austerity.10
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
Many NATO nations have surface-based airdefense systems to defend against aircraft threats.
Surface-based air-defense missiles and surveillance
radars are spread among various service components
in each country, but for any NATO operations, they
would fall under the C2 of the Allied Air Command.
In combination with advanced air defense, multi-role
fighters, and AWACS, non-U.S. NATO nations can
adequately defend airspace against enemy attack.
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However, there is a shortfall in BMD capabilities.
Both the 2010 and 2012 NATO summits identified the
need to strengthen BMD. At the 2012 summit, NATO
declared that it had an interim BMD capability based
largely on U.S. contributions under the U.S. Missile
Defense Agency’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).11 The NATO interim capability consisted of the integration of a U.S. Navy Aegis ship; a
U.S. land-based, long-range radar; and a C2 capability
located at Allied Air Command.
A second phase of the EPAA, to be implemented
in 2015, will make this BMD capability more robust
through improvements to the Aegis radar and its defense missile capabilities. This phase will also add an
Aegis-ashore system in Romania and upgrade the C2
systems.
In 2018, phase three will provide another round
of Aegis software and missile updates, add a second
Aegis-ashore system in Poland, and provide more advances in C2 systems at Allied Air Command. NATO
leadership continues to encourage alliance nations
to provide additional capabilities (or funding) to improve NATO coverage against ballistic missile threats,
and NATO nations are responding, as captured in the
2014 Wales Summit Declaration:
58. Today we are also pleased to note that additional
voluntary national contributions have been offered,
and that several Allies are developing, including
through multinational cooperation, or are acquiring
further BMD capabilities that could become available
to the Alliance. Our aim remains to provide the Alliance with a NATO operational BMD that can provide
full coverage and protection for all NATO European
populations, territory, and forces, based on voluntary
national contributions, including nationally funded
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interceptors and sensors, hosting arrangements, and
on the expansion of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) capability. Only
the command and control systems of ALTBMD and
their expansion to territorial defence are eligible for
common funding.
59. We note the potential opportunities for cooperation on missile defence, and encourage Allies to explore possible additional voluntary national contributions, including through multinational cooperation, to
provide relevant capabilities, as well as to use potential synergies in planning, development, procurement,
and deployment. We also note that BMD features in
two Smart Defence projects.12

With the Syrian civil war potentially spilling over
into Turkey in 2012, Ankara requested support from
its NATO allies to bolster its air defense and BMD capabilities. In response, On December 4, 2012, NATO
foreign ministers agreed to the request, with Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States deploying
a total of six Patriot-missile batteries in response. By
February 16, 2013, the last battery had arrived and
was operational. This deployment should be hailed as
an example of successful collaboration and flexibility
in NATO’s growing BMD role.
Spanish Defense Minister Pedro Morenés announced in September 2014 Spain’s intent to deploy
Patriots to Turkey in January 2015. Spanish missiles
and soldiers are expected to replace the two Dutch
batteries deployed in Adana, Turkey.13
A near-term challenge for NATO air and missile defense, however, will be intertwining various
defense systems. Currently, there is a mix of former
Soviet and current western systems. Possibly adding
to this problem, in September 2013, Turkey publicly
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announced that it intended to procure Chinese-made
air-defense systems.14 The United States and other
NATO countries made their displeasure with that decision clear, and Congress took the unusual step of actually writing into the defense authorization bill a provision denying the use of any American government
funds to help “integrate the Chinese missile defense
systems into U.S. or NATO systems.”15 Ankara has
since postponed its decision to procure the Chinese
systems to consider purchasing alternative systems.16
READINESS
Regular NATO exercises are intended to hone
NATO airmen’s skills at both the operator and command-and-control levels. Likewise, individual NATO
nations often host or participate in bilateral and multilateral exercises. For example, three to four times a
year, Spain hosts the Tactical Leadership Program to
train aircrews in large mission employment, and Portugal hosts the multilateral Real Thaw exercise every
year. NATO nations also participate in air exercises
outside of Europe. Israel’s most recent Blue Flag exercise included aircraft and airmen from the United
States, Italy, and Greece.
NATO’s Allied Air Command recently conducted its largest exercise to date, Ramstein Ambition II
2014—a computer-assisted, command-post exercise
simulating continuous operations—in which 400 airmen from 26 nations participated. According to General Gorenc, Ramstein Ambition II 2014 is a great
validation point on the march toward AIRCOM’s full
operational capability.17
However, it is important to note that each nation funds its own participation in most exercises. If
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NATO nations continue decreasing defense funding,
the level of participation in NATO-level exercises and
nationally hosted multilateral or bilateral training will
almost certainly fall as well. To forestall this, NATO
and alliance militaries should be examining increased
use of linked, high-end simulators.
Simulation capabilities are advancing every year,
enabling aircrews to make “fatal” mistakes that they
learn from without experiencing the costly loss of
life and aircraft resources. The challenge with linking high-fidelity aircraft simulators is that it requires
a significant upfront investment from NATO nations.
CURRENT CHALLENGES
NATO’s leaders currently face 10 key challenges
to the alliance’s air capabilities and operations. The
following subsections detail NATO’s current plans
to address these issues and identify what it can do
to overcome these shortages in a more effective and
sustainable manner.
Stealth Capability.
Stealth capability is not a luxury; it is a necessity
in the context of the advancing defense designs that
NATO airmen could face. Currently, the United States
provides the only stealth aircraft capability. But the
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will fill this void for
non-U.S. NATO nations, seven of which have ordered
or stated intent to buy a total of 512 F-35s: the UK,
the Netherlands, Italy, Canada, Denmark, Norway,
and Turkey.18 This international venture is a win for
NATO. The fifth-generation F-35 provides a commonality of logistics and tactics for any future NATO
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operation and reduces the number of support-package aircraft required, such as those used for dedicated
electronic attack or air superiority.
ISR.
The strategic level of ISR can be divided into spacebased and aircraft-based systems. The larger NATO
nations have their own space-based systems or have
collaborated for many years to cooperatively fund,
develop, launch, operate, and sustain various types
of space surveillance systems that would support a
NATO military effort.
Regarding aircraft, both the French and the British
have strategic- and operational-level ISR aircraft. For
example, the UK operates five Sentinel aircraft that
have advanced surveillance radars mated to Bombardier Global Express business jets. The system reached
initial operational capability in July 2008. The UK
also just received the first of two Northrop Grumman
E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
aircraft from the United States to replace their aging
Nimrod R1.
Likewise, the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)
system is scheduled to reach initial operating status
(with basing in Italy) by 2016. NATO AGS will use
five remotely piloted Block 40 Global Hawks. Fifteen
NATO member countries are currently contributing
to the acquisition of the aircraft—Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United States.19 These highin-demand, short-in-supply aircraft will undoubtedly
be a great utility in almost any NATO contingency.
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The UK and Italy provided remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) for NATO operations in Afghanistan
(MQ-9 and MQ-1 RPAs, respectively). Italy began accepting six total MQ-9s in 2011, and France accepted
two of an eventual 12 MQ-9s in January 2014 in an
effort to replace its less-capable Harfang RPA. Germany and the Netherlands have also expressed interest
in operating tactical-type RPAs. The NATO alliance
is growing its ISR capability and must maintain this
momentum in light of the reduction of RPA systems
in future U.S. defense budgets. ISR is one of the main
focus areas for NATO’s Smart Defence concept.
As NATO increases its ISR capability, it must also
grow a parallel processing, exploitation, and dissemination capability for the data it gathers. The United
States learned some hard lessons in this area when it
rapidly grew its MQ-1, MQ-9, and Global Hawk force.
The U.S. Air Force is sharing these lessons with NATO
nations to help them avoid similar growing pains.
Investment Levels.
NATO has a long-established defense spending goal of 2 percent of each member nation’s gross
domestic product (GDP). Unfortunately, only four
nations (the United States, the UK, Greece, and Estonia) achieved that goal in 2013, and many even decreased spending levels.20 The general trend is in the
wrong direction, but Poland is a notable exception:
it has increased defense spending, up to 1.9 percent
of GDP in 2013,21 and discussions at the 2014 Wales
summit indicated a commitment and intent by the nations to reverse the trend. An excerpt from the Wales
summit states:
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We agree to reverse the trend of declining defence
budgets, to make the most effective use of our funds
and to further a more balanced sharing of costs and
responsibilities. Our overall security and defence
depend both on how much we spend and how we
spend it. Increased investments should be directed
towards meeting our capability priorities, and Allies
also need to display the political will to provide required capabilities and deploy forces when they are
needed. A strong defence industry across the Alliance,
including a stronger defence industry in Europe and
greater defence industrial cooperation within Europe
and across the Atlantic, remains essential for delivering the required capabilities. NATO and EU efforts to
strengthen defence capabilities are complementary.22

In these austere times for most of Europe, nations
are carefully balancing defense dollars across personnel, training, sustainment, current national operations,
and future capabilities. Nations should consider making the same tough decisions the United States had
to make in carefully cutting personnel to afford more
military hardware.
Notably, when it comes time to deploy for a
NATO operation, it is a pay-your-own-way system.
Establishing a common fund for operations could
encourage more national airpower contributions to
any NATO operation. But creating a common operational fund is problematic, since NATO would either
have to look for donors or tax each nation a percentage of its defense budget (or GDP). At this point, it
may be easier to simply continue with the pay-yourown-way model.
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National Caveats.
Once NATO becomes engaged in a particular operation, nations will sometimes have caveats (or particular restrictions) on the types of missions they will fly
or how they will execute portions of missions. Though
not insurmountable, this effectively handcuffs the
NATO joint force air-component commander (JFACC)
planning and execution. When allocating forces to a
mission, the JFACC must consider these caveats and
plan around them. Elimination of all mission caveats
is the ultimate goal. In the absence of that, nations
should provide NATO air-planning staffs with a list
of their most likely national caveats well in advance of
any operation.
In a June 2011 visit to Brussels, then–U.S. Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates expressed his frustrations
with operations in Afghanistan, noting that the war
effort had been hobbled by “national ‘caveats’ that
tied the hands of allied commanders in sometimes
infuriating ways.”23 Ironically, the United States effectively imposed national caveats during Operation
UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya by not allowing its
air and naval air forces to perform strike missions;
these forces only performed enabling missions such
as ISR, air refueling, suppression of enemy air defenses, and electronic attack. For the first time, and
despite Washington’s previous complaints about allied caveats, the United States became, in the words of
Brzezinski, a “caveat nation.”24
Strategic Lift.
Strategic airlift is the key to moving troops, equipment, or a fighter or ISR aircraft package to the optimum location within or outside of NATO. However,
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among allied states and as seen in the French operation in Mali in 2013, this necessary capability is limited
and currently relies too heavily on the U.S. C-17 and
C-5 strategic airlift force.25 Currently, the UK has eight
C-17s that would be used extensively in any NATO
operation.26 Canada has four C-17s, and 10 NATO nations have access to a separate group of three C-17s,
known as the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC).
Established in September 2008 in Hungary, the
Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW) conducts SAC operations.
The HAW is not a NATO organization, but a number
of NATO and PfP nations—including Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Romania, Slovenia, the United States, Finland, and Sweden—contribute personnel and money for access to a proportionate share of the HAW’s
annual flying hours.
Many nations also collaborate to meet their strategic airlift needs with commercial aircraft they contract
from other non-NATO nations. However, these aircraft may not be available in a conflict, for a variety of
reasons. The future looks better with the purchase of
the Airbus A-400M strategic airlifter by Germany (53),
France (50), Spain (27), Turkey (10), Belgium (7), and
Luxembourg (1).27 Deliveries began in 2013 and will
extend through 2024.28 The UK is purchasing 14 of the
A-330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft,
and France is hoping to purchase 12 MRTTs.29
Air Refueling.
The United States provided the majority of the
air-refueling capability for NATO’s 1999 Operation
ALLIED FORCE in the Balkans. It also provided approximately 80 percent of all the air refueling missions
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in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in 2011 and sent
tankers in support of French fighters and bombers
during France’s 2013 Mali operation.
A March 2014 analysis by the Joint Air Power
Competence Centre summarized NATO’s current airrefueling capability with and without U.S. contributions. With U.S. capability, NATO has 709 air-tankercapable aircraft spread across multiple aircraft types,
some with boom-type capability, some with droguetype capability, and some with both. Without U.S.
capability, NATO nations collectively have only 71
air-refueling aircraft, many of which are aging and are
spread across multiple types of airframes.30 For example, the French operate three KC-135s and 11 C-135Rs,
Turkey operates seven KC-135Rs, the UK operates
four Lockheed TriStars, and the Netherlands operates
two KDC-10s.31
The outlook is improving somewhat. In 2011, Italy
received four new Boeing KC-767s with drogue and
boom capability. Germany and Canada operate small
fleets of modern military A-310 Airbus cargo and passenger aircraft with extra fuel capacity and a probeand-drogue system added to each wing.
As noted previously, in the near term, the UK is
procuring 14 Airbus A330 MRTT, with 9 of 14 in operation as of May 2014, while France announced that
it intends to buy 12. In addition, some of the NATO
nations buying the A-400M plan to equip them with
underwing drogue-refueling systems. The challenge
for NATO will be achieving the right mix of boom and
drogue capability to match the NATO fighter aircraft
fleets’ current and future requirements.
However, if defense budgets remain strained and
some planned procurements are put to the side, a remedial strategy could be for nations to create a shared-
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tanker capability similar to the C-17 HAW. Participating nations would contribute dollars and personnel to
a common air-refueling capability and then get access
based on their prorated contribution.
The Consensus Mechanism.
All NATO decisions are made by consensus after
discussion and consultation that give alliance members the opportunity to exchange views and information. Certainly, this process can produce well-thoughtout actions with thorough discussions of possible
unintended second- or third-order consequences. But
decisiveness is not its hallmark, and the challenge is
reaction time.
Articles 4 and 5 of the NATO charter provide key
principles for how the alliance consults and takes
action. Article 4 effectively says that any nation can
bring security issues and concerns to the North Atlantic Council for discussion and can seek NATO help
in bolstering defense. Nations have invoked Article 4
only four times in NATO history; most recently, Poland invoked it after Russia invaded Crimea. The three
previous times, Turkey invoked Article 4: in 2003 at
the start of the Iraq War, in June 2012 after Syria shot
down a Turkish military jet, and in October 2012 after
Syrian attacks in Turkey.32
Article 5 is the basis of a fundamental principle of
NATO: collective defense. The article provides that if
a NATO ally is the victim of an armed attack, every
other member of the alliance will consider this act of
violence an armed attack against all members and
will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the
ally that is attacked. NATO has only invoked Article
5 once, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks.33
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Airpower is the most rapid response capability
NATO has. The NATO Response Force, which includes
an air component, is designed for crisis response and
to do three things: deploy as a standalone force for
Article 5 operations or non–Article 5 crisis response,
deploy as an initial entry force until larger forces can
arrive, and deploy as a demonstrative force to deter
a crisis.34 Yet, the NATO staffing and consensus process can be lengthy, even for Article 5. When NATO
reaches consensus, nations must still offer force capability for the agreed-to operation. During this waiting
period, individual NATO nations may take unilateral
or multilateral action outside of NATO.
One example of the lengthiness of the consensus
process is Libya. While NATO eventually supported
UN Security Council Resolutions and led Operation
UNIFIED PROTECTOR, the first missions did not
occur until March 27, 2011, almost 10 days after the
UN Security Council Resolutions were published
and long after France started the initial strikes. By the
time NATO took over, a coalition of NATO and nonNATO countries was already executing combat air
operations.
Following Russian aggression in Ukraine, Poland
sought Article 4 consultations on March 1, 2014. In response, NATO leaders met from March 2-4 to discuss
possible actions but did not declare any additional
defensive actions. Within a week, the United States
had bilaterally deployed an additional six F-15C Eagle
aircraft and a KC-135 tanker to bolster the ongoing
U.S. rotation in the NATO Baltic air-policing mission.
Likewise, by March 9, the United States had bilaterally increased the size of an already-planned F-16 exercise with Poland to 12 aircraft. Within 2 weeks, NATO
was flying surveillance missions over alliance terri-
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tory in the proximity of Ukraine, using its NAEW&C
program E-3As.
During an April 3 press engagement at NATO
headquarters with the new Estonian prime minister,
the NATO secretary general said:
We have more than doubled the number of fighter
aircraft allocated to our air policing mission in the
Baltic States, thanks to the United States. Many European Allies have also offered additional planes, air-toair refueling tankers and other capabilities. And we
will make sure that we have updated military plans,
enhanced exercises and appropriate deployments.35

However, it was not until after a North Atlantic
Council meeting on April 16, that the secretary general formally announced larger NATO air, land, and
sea responses to bolster the defense of the Baltics and
Poland.36 By early May 2014, NATO was deploying
these non-U.S. aircraft to Poland and to the Baltic airpolicing mission (replacing the bolstered U.S. F-15
rotation). As General Gorenc noted:
What you see here is Allied solidarity. Under our
long-standing plans for NATO’s Baltic Air Policing,
the Polish Air Force deployed MiG-29 fighters in May,
leading the mission from Siauliai Air Base, Lithuania.
The effort has been supported by Royal Air Force Typhoons also flying out of Siauliai and Royal Danish
Air Force F-16s flying out of Amari, Estonia. At the
same time France has supported the mission with its
Mirage 2000 fighters here at Malbork (Poland).37

Long-Range Bombers.
Non-U.S. NATO air forces do not have a longrange bomber capability, despite the efficacy of such
a platform: it can operate, without needing refueling,
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at long ranges and with heavy precision payloads and
long target loiter times. Because of declining budgets
and NATO nations’ closer proximity to their likely areas of operation, it is probably beyond the scope of
any single NATO nation to procure such a capability.
But could NATO nations agree to a commonly
funded long-range bomber capability using a model
such as the NAEW&C, NATO AGS, or even the nonNATO HAW? At a minimum, it is important that
NATO maintain bases capable of hosting forwarddeployed U.S. bombers. As the United States designs
and procures a new long-range bomber, it must consult closely with NATO allies to ensure that some existing and future NATO airfields can host the aircraft.
A Common Vision of Strategic Threats.
Is the resurgence of Russia in the East or the terrorist threats emanating from Africa and the Middle
East the main strategic threat to NATO? Arguably,
both are. Therefore, non-U.S. NATO air forces must
train for both high-end and counterinsurgency-type
conflict. Strategic and tactical ISR platforms are crucial
to both efforts, so non-U.S. NATO nations must maintain ISR investment strategies for the future. The Chicago NATO summit in May 2012 reinforced the need
to strengthen multinational cooperation—in particular, on some strategic programs, including the AGS
program. At a press briefing on March 5, 2012, NATO
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said:
We will target a number of strategic projects for 2020
and beyond. As our operation in Libya showed, we
still face some specific capability gaps, such as air-toair refueling and joint intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance. And we know that we will need stron372

ger cooperation, across the Atlantic and in Europe, to
fill them.38

Cyber Preparedness.
Integrating cyber readiness into air operations is
absolutely critical for NATO to keep positive C2 of
assets and missions. Admiral James Stavridis, former
supreme allied commander Europe, commented on
cyber preparedness when he was commander:
Top of my list. Here we see the greatest mismatch between the level of potential threat and our preparation
for it. While the 28 NATO nations collectively have
enormous skill and capability in this area, we have yet
to find ways to work together, largely due to national
caveats and concerns about sharing such sensitive
technology, intelligence, and knowledge.39

Last November, NATO kicked off its annual Cyber Coalition exercise in Estonia. Jamie Shea, NATO’s
deputy assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, explained:
Cyber-attacks are a daily reality, and they are growing in sophistication and complexity. NATO has to
keep pace with this evolving threat and Cyber Coalition 2013 will allow us to fully test our systems and
procedures to effectively defend our networks—today
and in the future. . . . NATO has to keep pace with this
evolving threat.40

Cyber was the focus topic at the November 2013 International Seminar of the Alfredo Kindelán Chair—a
renowned forum for the study and debate of military
air strategy and doctrine—in Madrid.41 The conference’s keynote speaker discussed cyber preparedness
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in air operations and challenged NATO air force leaders in the audience to consider:
1. If I suffer a cyber attack, do I know? Do active,
layered network defense sensors alert me?
2. Once I realize I am under attack, do I have a reporting procedure and repair plan that isolates the attack and gracefully degrades air C2 to a backup plan
(if required)?
3. Am I truly prepared? Have I practiced 1 and 2
above?42
Since then, NATO has updated its cyber defense
policy. The new policy considers a cyber attack no differently than an attack with conventional weapons,
stating that cyber attacks are covered by Article 5. The
new cyber policy was approved by defense ministers
and gained endorsement at the 2014 NATO summit.43
This is the warfare of the future, and NATO and its
airmen are preparing for it.
CONCLUSION
NATO C2, airmen, aircraft, munitions, basing, air
and missile defense, and readiness are all pertinent
factors when examining the status of NATO air power
without a U.S. capability. NATO is addressing each
of the 10 challenges outlined earlier, but it is doing so
with budgets that may or may not allow it the resources to fully fix these shortages.
Under NATO’s Smart Defence banner, coordination among nations to procure similar capabilities
will be key. Nations should consider where they have
expertise and capability to contribute and should not
procure unnecessary, duplicative capabilities that
other NATO nations could provide. The NAEW&C

374

and AGS programs should be considered the norm for
the future. Pooling resources to share airlift or tankers
with organizational construct like the HAW in Hungary could be essential to the future success of nonU.S. NATO air power.
During the U.S. Air Force Association’s September
2011 conference, French Air Force General Stéphane
Abrial, former NATO supreme allied commander for
transformation, said that non-U.S. NATO air forces
“could not have performed to the same level of effectiveness without heavy contribution from the U.S.”
and would be severely limited if the United States
chose not to join a foreign operation such as the one
conducted in Libya.44
Although it is doubtful that NATO would ever
participate in a major conflict without significant U.S.
contributions, the fact is that in the 1990s, the U.S. Air
Force presence in Europe was much larger than it is
today. Numbers do count in any conflict. Non-U.S.
NATO nations must maintain their current air force
capabilities while procuring more advanced capabilities, such as the A-330 MRTT, A-400M, and JSF. They
must also procure enough advanced standoff munitions for any projected conflict.
During fierce internal budget battles, vocal ministers of defense will be key to NATO’s goal of each
nation spending 2 percent of its GDP on defense. Certainly, recent Russian aggression in Ukraine and the
brutality of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria should
provide a wake-up call to NATO’s national capitals.
The climate could be the necessary impetus to spend
more on defense and, in turn, commit forces to future
NATO endeavors.
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